
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Turkey contains, the first vow of Christian statesmen was the expulsion of the Turks from the city of Constantine, and the deliverance of Europe from the scourge and terror of the infidel. In the present age, the absorbing desire of the same cabinets is to maintain the unbeliever in their settlements; and to postpone, by all known expedients of diplomacy and menace, the hour at which the Crescent must again give place to the Cross. The causes and progress of this curious revolution of sentiment we purpose to trace; and to ascertain, if possible, by what sequence of events, and changes of opinion, such conditions of public policy have at length been reconciled among us.

It will naturally be presumed, that the clouds now gathering on the Eastern horizon have suggested both our disquisitions and its morals: nor should we, indeed, be without reasonable warrant for such an introduction.

* This was written in the autumn of 1853, but the Turkish war has long been a reality.

tion of the subject. But we feel it would be perilous to prophesy the dissolution of a State which has now been, for five generations, in its nominal agony. We believe we might venture to assert, that no Christian writer has treated of Ottoman history, who did not seek, in the sinking fortunes or impending fall of the Empire, the point and commendation of his tale. Knolles thankfully recounted the signs of its decline two hundred and fifty years ago. Cantemir discoursed of "the Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire," while Poland was still a powerful kingdom. As the eighteenth century wore on, such allusions became more and more audible and more frequent; and in the very existence of Turkey was hardly yet anticipated the decay of its *natural* term seemed within the limits of easy calculation. Even the end of the last war, which left so many crumbling monarchies repaired and strengthened, brought no similar relief to the House of Othman. Excluded, on the contrary, from the arrangements of the great European settlement at the Congress of Vienna, Turkey remained exposed to worse perils than any which had yet beset her. In the great peace of Europe there was no peace for Constantinople. Thirty years since, the historian of the Middle Ages expected, "with an assurance that none can deem extravagant, the approaching subversion of the Ottoman power;" and the progress

sive current of events has certainly in no degree changed since this conviction was avowed. Yet, though the only symptom of imminent dissolution that then seemed wanting has now appeared, and though territorial dismemberment has partially supervened upon internal disorganisation, the imperial fabric still stands—the Turkish Crescent still glitters on the Bosphorus—and still "the tottering arch of conquest spans the ample regions from Bagdad to Belgrade."

Without repeating, therefore, the ominous note of prophecy, we shall direct our remarks to the historical elucidation of the questions involved in it. Our purpose is to illustrate the origin and establishment of the Ottoman Empire, as one of the substantive Powers of Europe; to exhibit the causes which conduced to its political recognition; to trace the subsequent action of so anomalous a State upon the affairs of Christendom; to mark the fluctuations of fortune by which its external relations were determined; and to distinguish the stages of estimation and influence through which it successively passed, until the dreaded Empire of the Ottomans dwindled virtually, though with dominions not materially diminished, into the position of a *Protected State*, —subsisting, apparently, by the interested patronage of those very Powers which had been so scared and scandalised at its growth.

It may reasonably be thought remarkable, that the establishment of an infidel Power at the gates of Europe should not, in those ages of faith, have provoked, at the very onset, a prompt and effective combination of the whole Christian world for the expulsion of the intruder. In explanation, however, of this apathy or impotence, there are several considerations to be mentioned. In the first place, the phenomenon coincided singularly, in point of time, with the definite abandonment of the system of Eastern crusades. The seventh and last of these enterprises had resulted in scandal and defeat; and had disclosed the growing reluctance of States and people to contribute towards expeditions which neither promoted the objects nor conduced to the credit of those engaged in them. The final and total loss of the Holy Land in 1291, preceded but by eight years the enthronement of the first Othman; so that the origin of the Turkish State was almost exactly contemporaneous with the withdrawal of Christian arms from the scene of its growth. That the extinction, too, of the crusading principle was then complete, may be inferred from the violent suppression, only ten years later, of that military order which had been mainly instrumental in checking the march of the misbelievers. The commencement of the Ottoman dynasty is placed in the year 1299; and, in the year 1309, the Knights Templars, except as ca-

tives or pensioners, had ceased to exist. Nor was the rise of the Turkish power an event calculated, at its first announcement, to create any extraordinary consternation. As regards Asia Minor, the entire peninsula, with the exception of its western seaboard, had long been in the possession of kindred tribes; and the mere substitution of Ottomans for Seljukians could hardly be thought to menace the interests of Europe. Even the actual passage of the Straits, which was the first critical point of Turkish progress, presented no unparalleled phenomenon; for a Moorish kingdom still flourished on the Guadalquivir; and a Tartar horde had just established its sovereignty over the dismembered duchies of Russia. It is certainly true that the exigencies of Mogul invasions, and the remnants of crusading zeal, did originally suggest that concert of nations which became afterwards systematised by the standing requirements of a political equilibrium; and, perhaps, the dread of Ottoman aggression induced the first faint foreshadowings of those State-combinations which characterise the modern history of Europe. But it was not so at the beginning. Adrianople had been made a Mahometan capital, and the metropolis of the Eastern Cæsars had become a mere *enclave* in Turkish territory, before the aid of European princes was forthcoming against the new invaders; and when at length the Christian allies

and the infidel forces joined battle in the field of Nicopolis, the Ottoman power had been impregnably strengthened by the impunity and successes of a century.

In elucidation of the subject before us, it may be desirable to explain more particularly the events to which these allusions refer.

When the dominion of Imperial Rome was divided into two, the moiety constituting the Empire of the East, or, as it was more commonly termed, the Byzantine Empire, included the Thracian and Grecian provinces, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. The capital of this Empire was at Byzantium or Constantinople, and it claimed precedence of the Western Empire, as the elder and superior branch of the two. Its territories, however, were very soon dismembered. The Saracens issuing, under the impulse of Mahometanism, from the deserts of Arabia, stripped the Byzantine monarchy of its Egyptian and Syrian provinces; and though the power of the original Caliphs soon declined, they were succeeded by invaders as dangerous as themselves. In the middle of the eleventh century, about the time of the Norman conquest of England, a swarm of Turks or Turkmans, from the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, made an irruption into the territories of Byzantine Asia, and ultimately established themselves in Asia Minor, under the chieftainship of the house of Seljuk. From that

time forward, although the Eastern emperors frequently effected partial reconquests of their territories, Asia Minor was never entirely cleared of these invaders. The Seljukians formed a large and substantial kingdom, and even fixed their capital at Nice, within a short distance of Constantinople itself. It was against the Turks of this dynasty that the first crusades were directed, and the result was, that the infidels were dislodged from their position at Nice, and driven back as far as Iconium, which city they made the metropolis of their dominions for nearly two centuries more. It will thus be seen, that the Asiatic provinces of the Eastern Empire had long been more or less completely in the occupation of Turkish invaders. These invaders, however, rarely ventured to cross the straits, and never effected a lodgment in Europe; partly, in all probability, because Asia provided sufficient scope for their conquests, and partly, no doubt, because the superiority of the Greeks in naval science insured them the command of the sea.

Towards the close, however, of the thirteenth century —that is to say, at the very moment when the election of a Swiss knight to the Germanic throne was laying the foundations of the imperial House of Austria—events of equal singularity were preparing the seat of the rival Cæsars for the progeny of a Turkish freebooter. The Asiatic continent, from its central highlands to the

shores of the Mediterranean, had been utterly convulsed by the tremendous irruptions of the Mogul conqueror, Zingis Khan, and the Seljukian monarchy was destroyed by the shock. In the course of the commotions which ensued, a certain Turcoman chief, named Ortogrul, from the banks of the Oxus, found himself wandering in the hills of Anatolia, at the head of four hundred families. A service which he accidentally rendered to a prince of the country, was acknowledged by a grant of land; and the estate was soon expanded into a respectable territory, by the talents which had originally acquired it. The inheritance of Ortogrul devolved, in 1289, upon his son Osman or Othman, who at the death, ten years later, of the impoverished Sultan of Iconium, no longer hesitated to proclaim his independent sovereignty. Such was the origin of the House of Othman. The name itself, which is a vernacular epithet of the royal vulture, and signifies a "bone-breaker," has been recognised by the Turks as not disagreeably symbolical of the national character and mission; and so completely do they identify their State with the race of its founder, that they have foregone all other denominations for the dignity, style, and title of the Ottoman Porte.*

* The word "Porte" is derived from a version given by Italian interpreters to an Oriental phrase. It was an ancient custom of Eas-

At first, of course, the independence assumed by these Ottoman chiefs was not accompanied by any extensive authority. They were still only the leaders of an inconsiderable clan; but the circumstances of the period were peculiarly favourable to dynastic ambition. A large population, of Turkish extraction, and Mahometan religion, had been left without a head; for the Moguls withdrew from the scene of their conquests, and the Seljukian government had been disorganised. In fact, many provincial emirs or princes asserted their independence exactly as Othman had done; and it was evident that a contest for supremacy would arrive between them. Into the circumstances by which this contest was eventually decided, we need not particularly enter. It is said that the clan of which we are speaking, was conspicuous for its observance of the laws and ritual of Mahomet; and it is known with greater certainty, that its chiefs were eminently distinguished for military and political abilities. The event was, that the Turks of

tern sovereigns, in administering justice, or exercising other functions of their office, to sit, as the Scriptural expression runs, "*at the Gate*" of their palaces. "Gate" became thus synonymous with "Court," or "Office," and the Sultan's Court was called by excellence, the "*Exalted*," or "*Lofty Gate*." This phrase, in the literal translations of the Dragomans, who were mostly Italians, became "*La Porta Sublime*," whence the title of *The Sublime Porte*. To the same source we owe the term "Grand Seignior," as applied to the Emperor of the Ottomans.

Asia Minor acknowledged the sovereignty of the House of Othman instead of that of the House of Seljuk, and the city of Prusa or Brusa became the seat of the new dynasty.

It was now to be seen whether Ottomans would be more aggressive or formidable than Seljukians: nor was the question left long undecided. The opportunities, in fact, of aggrandisement now presenting themselves, were so peculiar, that far weaker hands than those of Othman's successors might have turned them to account. On one side of them lay the Byzantine empire, shrunk to the dimensions of Constantinople and its environs—on the other, the fragmentary or effete principalities of their Turkish predecessors. The House of Othman struck right and left, and, before the sixty years of its two first reigns had terminated, Asia Minor had become generally obedient to the lords of Prusa.

It happened that at this period the Byzantine monarchy was distracted by civil war, and the competitors for the Imperial throne, who had experienced the power of the Ottoman arms in the vain attempt to defend their Asiatic possessions, were solicitous to secure the aid of such useful allies in their own contests. This took the Turks into Europe. In the service sometimes of one pretender, and sometimes of another, they repeatedly crossed the straits; and at length the opportunity was found of

establishing a permanent lodgment on European ground. So rapid was the course of events, that by the middle of the fourteenth century, the northern shore of the straits was studded with Turkish garrisons; and Amurath, the third Ottoman sovereign, found little difficulty in conquering the Thracian territories as far as the Balkan, and erecting a second metropolis at Adrianople. A few years more, and we find these Ottomans of the third generation at the very limits of their present empire, and on the very scene of their present fortunes. By 1390 they had occupied Widdin; and before five years more had elapsed, the Moslem and Christian hosts were delivering, as we have said, the first of their countless battles on the banks of the Danube. Thus Byzantine Europe, as well as Byzantine Asia, was passing into the hands of the Turks, and nothing remained of the old empire of the East, except its capital. It will naturally be concluded that considerations, either of political foresight or religious zeal, had combined the forces of Europe against these fierce and unbelieving enemies. The state of opinion, however, at that time, was very remarkable, and it can only be explained by reference to events of much earlier date.

There had existed always national distinctions, and even antipathies, between the Greeks and the Romans; and these were confirmed and developed by the transfer of

the seat of government from Rome to Constantinople, which appeared to put the capital of one nation in opposition to the capital of the other. The jealousies thus occasioned were quickened by the rivalry between the two Empires; but they derived a fresh and inexhaustible accession of strength from a religious schism. At a period when, by the abeyance of the Western Empire, the whole Roman world was again thrown nominally under the dominion of the Emperor of the East, Leo III. decreed the destruction of images. The mandate was opposed by the Italian clergy and the bishops of Rome, and the result of the conflict thus created was, that the Romans threw off their temporal allegiance to the Eastern throne, and ultimately revived an empire of the West in the person of Charlemagne. The schism was aggravated some time later by a difference concerning an article of the creed, and disputes on certain points of ritual, until at length matters proceeded to the length of open rupture, and the political jealousies of the Greek and Latin people were exasperated by the animosities of the Greek and Latin churches. The subjects, therefore, of the two Christian Empires regarded each other reciprocally as heretics or schismatics, and little connection or sympathy survived between them.

The consequences of this schism were soon made manifest in the events of the Crusades. The nations of

the West had been so scandalised at the excesses of the Turks in the Holy Land, that they marched in arms to the deliverance of Jerusalem, and incidentally of course to the relief of the Byzantine Empire; but such was the ill feeling prevailing between Greeks and Latins, that they soon treated each other with greater hostility than the common enemy, and in the end the Latins actually sacked the Greek capital, and seated a dynasty of their own on the throne of Constantinople. Ultimately they were expelled, and the Empire reverted anew to the Greeks; but they long retained possessions in the Holy Land, the Morea, and the Archipelago, and thus introduced a certain element of Latin Christianity into the territories of the Greeks. Especially was this the case in Palestine, where the Holy Places, having been conquered by Latin arms, were naturally held to pertain peculiarly to the Latin Church.

It resulted from all these events, that though the relative positions of Turks and Christians were now wholly and alarmingly changed, and though the attitude of the new invaders on the borders of Germany did really portend more serious results than the transient irruptions of Tartar savages, yet the deportment of the European States underwent no corresponding alteration. So small indeed was the sympathy felt for the Greeks themselves, and so confirmed the antagonism between them and the

Latins, that if none but Byzantine territories had been endangered by the new dynasty, it is possible the Turks might have been left to work their way at discretion. But the Ottoman princes had overstepped the old frontier of the Eastern Empire, had crossed the Danube, and by attacking the kingdom of Hungary, had alarmed the states within the pale of the Latin Church. The consequence was the battle of Nicopolis, in which the chivalry of Western Europe was completely overthrown by the Turkish levies.

Still, however, the progress of the Ottoman arms exercised no proportionate influence on the councils of Europe, nor did the impending fate of an imperial and Christian city provoke any serviceable aid. After the Thracian and Bulgarian conquests, to which we have alluded, Constantinople, for the first time in its existence, was completely environed by enemies; and it became clear to the Greek emperors, that the invaders with whom they had now to deal, were of a very different mould from the swarming hordes, which had so often swept past them and retired. Yet, though four emperors in succession visited Western Europe in search of aid, and though one of them brought his petition even to the king of this island, and Kentish yeomen saw a Greek Cæsar entertained in St. Austin's monastery, and received on Blackheath by a Lancastrian sovereign,

there was no substantial aid forthcoming. This failure was doubtless, in some degree, ascribable to the disrepute into which crusading expeditions had fallen, and to the occupation with which both the French and English monarchs were then provided in their own kingdoms. But the chief cause was to be found in the circumstances already recounted.

In fact, though the Greek emperors were not only Christian sovereigns, but even coheirs of the political supremacy of Christendom, yet this very rivalry had combined with their geographical isolation and foreign tongue to estrange them from the Powers of Europe. As early as the reign of Heraclius, the intercourse between the East and West began visibly to slacken, and after the disruption had been completed by the great religious schism, Constantinople was scarcely regarded, either spiritually or politically, as entering into the community of European States. The contact induced by the Crusades rather increased than diminished the alienation. On more than one occasion, Greek emperors were leagued with the infidels against the soldiers of the Cross; and the imperial city itself, after triumphantly sustaining so many sieges, was captured and sacked for the first time by Christians and Franks. It may be imagined, perhaps, that the differences between the Greek and Latin churches could not much affect the

dispositions of Norman barons; but it must be remembered, that on these occasions the moderator and exponent of European opinion was no other than the Roman Pontiff,—without whose co-operation it would have been scarcely possible to organise an effectual crusade. The application, therefore, of the Eastern emperors to the Powers of Europe, took the form of conciliatory overtures to the Romish See; and, excepting in the case of the Emperor Manuel, the negotiations of the imperial visiters were confined to the limits of the Papal Court. Neither could the Greek State be exactly represented to European sympathies as a Christian city brought finally to bay, and desperately battling against the overwhelming forces of the infidel. The terms on which Turks and Greeks had for some time been living, precluded any such description of their mutual relationship. The presumptive antagonism of the two States had been openly compromised by concessions, by tributes, and, what was worse, by the ordinary passages of amity and good-will. Ottoman princes were educated at the Christian court, and Christian princes honourably lodged in the camp of the Ottomans; a mosque was tolerated in Constantinople; and a daughter of the Emperor John Cantacuzene was given in marriage to the second of the Turkish sovereigns. That these arrangements were not wholly voluntary on the side of the weaker party we

may safely believe; but it will still be evident how materially such a combination of circumstances must have operated to the disadvantage of the emperors, in their appeal to the sympathy of Christian Europe.

Meantime the Turkish power had been growing with a certainty and steadiness unexampled in the history of an Oriental people. Two or three of the causes which principally conduced to this remarkable result, it may here be right to specify. The passage of the Ottomans into Europe might have been long retarded by the simple expedient of guarding the Straits. While the power of the Greek Empire consisted almost solely in the relics of its fleet, still respectably appointed, and furnished with the most formidable appliances of naval warfare known to the age, the Turks were comparatively destitute both of ships and of the science which concerned them. A few galleys might have effectually protected the channel against all the forces of Orchan and Amurath; and yet not only were the Ottomans permitted to pass undisturbed, with such means as they could extemporise, but even the intelligence of their having secured a lodgment, and fortified themselves on the European side, produced nothing but careless scoffs in the Imperial court. The next point inviting notice is, that the conquests of the Turks were mainly effected by the agency of European troops. The Ottomans will be found to

have conquered the Byzantine provinces as we conquered India,—by enlisting and disciplining the natives of the country. Only 400 families had originally obeyed the voice of Ortogrul; and it is clear, therefore, that the subjects of his successors must have been swelled in numbers by accessions from other tribes: in fact, the progress of the Ottomans was merely the onward flow of the population of Asia Minor. Even this, however, would have been deficient in impulsive force, but for the singular institution which we are now to mention.

The Janizaries were originally formed and recruited from the impressed children of Christian captives; afterwards from those of any Christian subjects of the Porte, and at length from the sons of the soldiers themselves; so that a pure military caste, with habits and interests totally distinct from the rest of the people, was gradually established in the very heart of the nation. The number of the Janizaries in the middle of the fourteenth century was only one thousand; but this muster-roll was repeatedly multiplied by successive emperors, till at length, under the Great Solyman, it reached to twenty thousand, and in the German wars, under Mahomed IV., to double that strength. It is not a little singular that a body so constituted should not only have been the main instrument of Turkish aggrandisement, but should have been so inveterately identified with Ottoman tra-

ditions, as at all times to have formed the chief obstacle to any social or constitutional reforms. Nor should it be overlooked, that the creation and maintenance of this standing army, isolated from all popular sympathies by descent and character, contributed most powerfully to consolidate the authority of the new dynasty, and to furnish the Turkish sovereigns with those permanent resources, in virtue of which they escaped the ordinary vicissitudes of Oriental dynasties; and encountered the tumultuous levies of Hungary and Germany with all the advantages of despotic power. The pretensions of the House of Othman kept pace with its achievements. Originally its chief had been content with the title of Emir; but Bajazet I., by means to which we shall immediately refer, procured for himself, towards the end of the century, the more dignified denomination of Sultan. Already, in justification of his new assumptions, had he invested Constantinople, when events occurred by which the very course of Fate itself appeared to be threatened with a change. We can do no more than specify in a few words the occurrences which abruptly subverted the whole superstructure of Turkish power; which scattered all its acquisitions to the winds, and which render its restoration one of the most extraordinary incidents of history.

In the height of his power and presumption, Bajazet

was conquered and carried into captivity by Timour. By this defeat the inheritance of his house became to all appearance entirely dissolved. Its Asiatic possessions, though contemptuously abandoned by the conqueror, were seized upon by the representatives of the old Seljukian house, who regained the positions from which they had been dislodged; while in Europe the opportunity was turned to similar account by the reviving spirit of the Greeks. To complete the ruin, civil war between the sons of Bajazet presently ensued; and the heirs of the Ottoman House, instead of repairing their fortunes by concord and patience, were fighting desperately among themselves, for a heritage which hardly existed save in name. The perfect restoration of a State, dismembered and dismantled, at such a stage of its existence, by so destructive and shattering a shock, may be described as without parallel in history—and yet within ten years it was completely effected. Mahomet, the most sagacious of the sons of Bajazet, waited his time; and at length, by the extinction of other claims, succeeded in recovering both the Asiatic and European conquests of his family, and in reuniting the thrones of Adrianople and Prusa. A peaceful and prudent reign of eight years enabled him to consolidate his dominion anew; and when in 1421, Amurath II. succeeded to the crown of his father, the Ottoman Power

was as vigorous, as sound, and as aggressive as if the battle of Angora had never been fought.

We are now arrived at a period when the destinies of the Ottoman House were to be finally determined. Up to this time the progress and renown of the Turkish arms had stimulated Europe to nothing but a few insincere leagues and a single precipitate crusade; nor can we be wrong in presuming that the recent temporary suspension and apparent annihilation of the Ottoman Power must have operated materially in still further indisposing European statesmen to exertion or alarm. But in the year 1453, Mahomet II. at length laid siege to Constantinople; captured it; subverted by this act the ancient Empire of the East, and substituted a Turkish Empire in its place. It has been usual to describe this memorable event as one of those which mark a new epoch; and as serving to introduce that period of history which we now emphatically term Modern. Undoubtedly, the definite and final extinction of the Roman Empire, and the diffusion of Greek literature, through the agency of the Byzantine refugees, were incidents of no ordinary note; but by far the most important consequences of Mahomet's success were those which affected the Ottomans themselves. As regards Europe, it cannot be said that the destruction of the Greek Empire left any perceptible void in the community of States,

As no system of mutual relationship had yet been established among Christian Powers, no special disturbance, such as would in the present day follow on the extinction of a particular member, could then be expected to ensue; and, even in the partial and transient examples of concert which had occasionally occurred, the Byzantine monarchy had long been without appreciable influence or consideration. Since, therefore, no European functions had been discharged by the Greek Empire, no positive loss could be felt from its destruction; nor was the capture of Constantinople of much greater significance, in this respect, than the capture of Delhi. But, as affecting the rising power of the Ottomans, the event was of most material importance. It created, as it were, a vacancy in the list of recognised monarchies, and delivered over to a State, which already wanted little but a seat of central power, one of the oldest and most famous capitals of Europe. It gave to the House of Othman, in a single day, exactly the *status* which it needed; and which years of successful invasions and forays would have failed to secure. It precluded all future antagonism between Adrianople and Prusa; and established a permanent cohesion between the European and Asiatic dominions of the Turkish crown. More than this—it conveyed to the Sultans and their successors certain traditional pretensions, of which they soon discovered

the value. The Empire of the East, according to their assertions, had neither been terminated nor dissolved, but had merely passed, like other kingdoms of the earth, to stronger and more deserving possessors. They claimed to represent the majesty of Constantine, and to inherit his dominion. From such presumptions it was easy to derive warrants, if warrants were needed, for war against the Venetians, whose possessions in the Archipelago and the Levant were but spoils ravished from the declining strength of Constantinople; or against the Germans, whose rival pretensions to imperial supremacy were easily impugned. Independently, therefore, of the standing dictates of their religion, the Turks were now furnished with pretexts of some plausibility for carrying their aggressive arms across the Adriatic. In fact, Mahomet did advance from the Eastern Empire to the Western, crossed the sea, landed on the Italian coast, and menaced Rome with the fate of Constantinople.

We should probably not be justified in attributing to any accurate perception of these risks, the anxiety and terror which are described as pervading the courts of Christendom at the intelligence of the final catastrophe. There was serious agitation in Rome, considerable alarm on the Danube, and great scandal every where. A Christian capital of ancient name and famous memory

had been sacked by an unbelieving race, whose deeds for generations past had been the horror of Europe. Yet abruptly as the blow was at last felt to descend, it had long been visibly suspended: and, although no human power could have permanently protected the Greek Cæsars in their capital, while the Turks were established in unquestioned sovereignty between the Danube and the Euphrates, the actual circumstances of the siege were such, nevertheless, as to cast heavy imputation and responsibility upon the Powers of Europe. The Imperial city had been allowed to sustain the full shock of the Ottoman forces, with a weak and inadequate garrison of eight thousand men, three-fourths of whom were supplied from the population within the walls; so that the chivalry of Christendom was represented, at this critical period, by two thousand auxiliaries. Yet, that there was both room and opportunity for effectual succour was evident, not only from the manner in which the defence, even under such circumstances, was protracted, but from the diversion which had been accomplished, during the previous investment of Constantinople by Bajazet, with a force of only six hundred men-at-arms, and twice as many archers, under Marshal Boucicault.

But the truth was, that, although the actual catastrophe created a momentary consternation, and even

occasioned the revival in certain quarters of crusading vows, there existed, as we have already said, no fellow-feeling with the Greeks sufficiently strong to suggest an effective expedition; nor any facilities in fact for such an enterprise in the social or political condition of Europe. The Turks were no new enemies; nor were they now seen for the first time on the northern shore of the straits. The resources of Christendom might admit of combination and exertion in the event of an actual irruption of barbarians or infidels, as when Frederick II. repulsed the Moguls, or Charles V. afterwards scared the Ottomans under the great Solyman; but for aggressive enterprise in distant regions they were no longer available. The writings of Æneas Sylvius—one of the earliest statesmen who surveyed the several Powers of Europe in connexion with each other—give an intelligible picture of the condition of affairs at this period. The fall of Constantinople had excited some sympathies, but more selfishness. A certain commiseration, quickened by the refugees dispersed over the countries of the West, was felt for the exiled Greeks; but a far more lively sentiment was excited by the demonstrations of the triumphant Ottoman against the Italian peninsula. So reasonable were the apprehensions on this head made to appear, that within twelve months of the capture of Constantinople, war was actually de-

clared against the new Empire of the East in the Frankfort Diet; and, five years later, it was formally resolved at the Congress of Mantua, that 50,000 confederate soldiers should be equipped for the expulsion of the infidel, and the conclusive deliverance of Christendom. Neither of these designs, however, proceeded beyond the original menace; and the Turks were left in undisputed possession of their noble spoil.

Between this turning-point of Turkish destinies and the new epoch to which we must now direct our attention, there intervened a period of great general interest, and of remarkable importance to the Ottoman Empire —but not inducing any material changes in the relations of this Power with Western Europe. The avowed designs of Mahomet II. upon the capital of Christendom, illustrated as they were by his attitude on the Danube and his actual lodgment at Otranto, were not indeed without their influence, as was shown by the multitude of volunteers who flocked to the standard of the intrepid Hunniades. But when the idea of Ottoman invincibility had been corrected by the victories of the Allies at Belgrade, by the successful defiance of Scanderbeg, and by the triumphant resistance of the Knights of Rhodes, this restlessness gradually subsided, and in a few years the course of events became such as to substitute new objects of concern in European coun-

cils for the power and progress of the Turks. Perhaps the wild and indefinite projects of Charles VIII., in that gigantic national foray upon Italy which disorganised the mediæval constitution of Europe, may be taken as a fair representation of the ideas prevailing respecting Constantinople, thirty years after the fall of the city. If the forces of France and Spain, instead of then contending in deadly struggles for the possession of Italy, had been combined against a common enemy upon the Hellespont, it is certainly possible that something might have been accomplished. The great Gonzalvo did, indeed, once appear upon the scene as an ally of the Venetians, and with an effect proportionate to his reputation. But in computing the chances of any such expedition against the new Empire, it must be remembered that the Turks had hitherto achieved their conquests, not by mere force of numbers, like the Tartar hordes, but by superiority of discipline, tactics, equipments, and science. In this respect, at least, they were no barbarians. Their army was incomparably the strongest in Europe—and especially in those departments which indicate the highest military excellence. For many years afterwards, their artillery and engineers surpassed those of the best appointed European troops. These advantages would have told with tenfold effect from such ramparts as those of Constantinople; while nothing, on the other hand,

short of a recapture of the city, and a complete dislodgement of the intruders, could have effected the objects of the Christian Powers. Above all, it should be recollected, what was so clearly proved in the sequel, that these Powers could not then be relied on for any steadiness of concert, or any integrity of purpose; and that the religious zeal of former days no longer survived in sufficient force to furnish an extraordinary bond of union. The Turks soon ceased indeed to be politically regarded as the common foes, either of the human race or the Christian name. Already had the ordinary transactions of bargains and contracts become familiar between them and the Venetians; dealings of a more degrading kind had compromised the Papal See, and the Ottoman arms had in various expeditions been repeatedly aided by small Christian succours. It is related, indeed, that high pay and liberal encouragement attracted recruits from all countries to the Turkish ranks; nor is there, we believe, much reason to doubt that many an European Dalgetty was serving under the standard of the Prophet. The number of renegade vizirs and pashas who have figured in the Turkish service is something extraordinary.

To these considerations must be added the fact, that during the seventy years thus interposed between the capture of Constantinople and the accession of the

Great Solyman, the designs of Ottoman ambition had been diverted from the North and West to the East and South—from the shores of the Adriatic and the Danube to the defiles of Armenia and the plains of Cairo. Though the supremacy of the Turks was, it is true, steadily supported on the scene of its recent triumphs, and even unusually signalised by a naval victory on the waters of the Archipelago, yet the chief efforts of the two immediate successors of Mahomet were concentrated upon the territories of Persia and Egypt. It does not enter into our present plan to discuss the results with which these expeditions were attended. We need only remark, that while the overthrow of the Mameluke dynasty and the conquest (in 1516) of the kingdom of Egypt, compensated for the less productive invasions of the Persian provinces, the two objects together combined to divert the attention of the Sultans from Europe, and to suspend, for an interval, the apprehensions of Christendom.

On a review, therefore, of these events, it will be observed, that the first rise of the Ottoman power occurred at such a period and under such circumstances as to deprive the phenomenon of any great singularity or terror; that even the passage of the Turks into Europe, their appearance on the Danube, and the permanent investment of Constantinople which virtually

ensued, exercised no corresponding influence on the opinions of Western Europe, wearied as it was with crusades, and detached as it had long practically been from any civil or religious intercourse with the Greeks of the Lower Empire; and that the Ottoman invaders thus finally stepped without material opposition into an imperial inheritance, supplying them with what they most needed for the consolidation of their conquests—a local habitation and a recognised name among the Powers of Europe. Lastly, we may remark, that the power of resistance to further aggression developed at Belgrade, and exemplified in the evacuation of Otranto, contributed, in connexion with the diversion of Turkish conquests to other quarters of the globe, to reassure the kingdoms of the West, and to prepare the way for the eventual admission of a Mahometan Power into the political community of Christian States. Some of the earlier causes conducive to this remarkable consummation we have already pointed out; but others, of no inferior interest, remain yet to be noticed.

In the month of February, 1536, the nations of Europe were scandalised—we may still employ the expression—with the intelligence that a treaty of amity and concord had been struck between the Grand Seignior of the Turks and the first king of the Christian world! At an earlier period, Francis I. of France had

not hesitated to enter into one of those nominal leagues against the Turk, which decency was still thought occasionally to dictate, and the spirit of which it was the immediate interest of Charles V. to perpetuate. But the ease and readiness with which these considerations were now subordinated to the very first suggestions of practical policy, furnish edifying matter of observation. The political system of European States,—that is to say, the system in pursuance of which a reciprocal relationship is established between the several members of the community for the preservation of a general equilibrium,—was then in process of formation; and a more curious example of its tendencies could hardly be given than this which we are now attempting to represent, in which the single idea contained in the term "balance of power" sufficed, first, to introduce an infidel State into the company of Christian sovereigns; next, to bring aid and countenance to that state in its very aggressions; and, lastly, when the course of events had precipitated the hour of its decline, to protect its weakness, to assert its cause against even Christian adversaries, and to guarantee it, long apparently beyond the proper term, in a national and political existence.

The system of which we have been speaking, took its rise, or at least assumed its first practical developments,

in the rivalry, at the commencement of the 16th century, between France and Spain. The aggrandisement and consolidation which each of these kingdoms, though in an unequal degree, had recently attained, constituted them "the two crowns" of Christendom. The antagonism naturally ensuing between Powers thus situated, soon drew the other States of Europe into its sphere of action. This rivalry had been first exemplified in the Italian wars which followed upon the expedition of Charles VIII., and it was continued entirely in the spirit which that extraordinary enterprise had generated. The contested supremacy was for many years conceived to be represented by the possession of Italy; and the innumerable permutations of alliances which had been witnessed in the wars referred to, suggested all the requisite ideas of State-combinations. Whether it can be said that, in these early transactions, regard was really had to that equitable adjustment of power which afterwards became the avowed object of similar struggles, may be reasonably doubted; but, at all events, European States now first began to group themselves about two centres; and both parties anxiously cast about for means of circumscribing the resources of their adversary, or enlarging their own. It was no more than a natural result of such a condition of things, that the causes which had hitherto operated in promoting hostilities or friendship

between States, should be superseded by more absorbing considerations of present policy; and it will be seen, accordingly, that though religious differences were still capable of originating wars, no material obstacle was found in diversity of creeds to the establishment of cordial and permanent alliances. In the Thirty Years' War, for instance, though the dispute lay ostensibly between the Roman Catholic and the Protestant constituencies of the Empire, yet the paramount object of the aggressive belligerents was the depression of the House of Austria; and in this good cause, the Popish troops of France, at the instigation of a cardinal minister, fought shoulder to shoulder with the parti-coloured Protestants of Germany and Sweden.

It was in such a state of affairs and opinion, that Francis I. turned his eyes towards the Porte. Solyman the Great, who in 1520 had ascended the Turkish throne, had again directed the Ottoman arms to European conquests—and with a success surpassing the boldest achievements of his victorious predecessors. This redoubtable Sultan not only expelled the Christian knights from their seat in the Isle of Rhodes, but repeatedly invaded the territory of Hungary, and at last annexed a considerable portion of the kingdom, including Buda, its capital, to the Turkish dominions. He succeeded also in subjugating the provinces of Wal-

lachia and Moldavia, now constituting what are termed "the Danubian principalities," and in making their princes tributary to his crown. But these events, which a century before might have struck all Christian capitals with indignation and alarm, were now only looked upon as so many inducements to a political alliance. Francis saw in Solyman, not the conqueror of Rhodes and the would-be subjugator of Christendom, but the monarch of a mighty State, availably situated for active diversion, and already at war with his deadly enemy. That the Ottoman Sultan should have invested Vienna, and openly advanced pretensions to the supremacy claimed by Charles, were circumstances only additionally suggestive of the projected treaty. His resolution was taken accordingly. There had long been certain relations of trade and amity between French merchants and the Mameluke Soldans of Egypt; and when this country fell, as we have stated, under the dominion of the Turks, the privileges enjoyed by the Christian traffickers had been judiciously confirmed and augmented. These antecedents were turned to account by Francis; who based upon them a proposal for a general commercial treaty between France and the Porte. The instrument, it is true, did not stipulate any alliance for offence or defence; but the assurances of amity now ostentatiously interchanged, were sufficiently indicative of the point to

which matters were tending; and within a few months, the corsair subjects of the Porte were actually let loose upon the Neapolitan possessions of the Catholic king!

Such was the first formal recognition of the Ottoman dynasty of Constantinople. Truces and treaties had, of course, been previously concluded between the Porte and its enemies; but this was the earliest instance of an amicable and gratuitous alliance; and it is worth observing, that so early did it occur, as to make the admission of a Mahometan Power into the community of Christian States contemporaneous with the very first and rudimentary combinations of these States among each other. That it was considered a step out of the common course of politics, and that it created, even in impartial quarters, some scandal, we can easily perceive; but not more, perhaps, than had been occasioned by the previous overtures of the same unscrupulous monarch to the Protestants of Smalcald. It is a significant indication, too, of the temper of the times, that the treaty was negotiated at Constantinople by a knight of St. John—and that it contained a special provision for the admission of the Pope to the league!

Still there was really, as we have said, some scandal; and it needed in fact a concurrence of conditions to bring about so strange an innovation as the political naturalisation of the Turk among the States of Chris-

tendom. Some of these conditions are in the highest degree curious and interesting. In the first place, since the period when we left the Ottomans on their way towards Egypt and Persia, the Reformation of religion in Europe had been successfully carried out. This mighty event exercised a twofold influence upon the relationship between the Christian Powers and the Papal See. On the one hand, by subtracting so many States from the supremacy of the Pope, and weakening, in direct proportion, his authoritative power, it dislocated and neutralised the influence of that particular Court, from which all combinations against the misbelievers had previously received their warrant and organisation. No crusade could be maintained without the auspices of a Pope; and upon the good-will and services of this potentate more urgent and impressive claims were now preferred. But a few years before, indeed, the Pontiff had been besieged and imprisoned in his own city,—not by the fierce Mahometans, who once threatened such an attack, and at the echo of whose arms on Italian territory a former Pope had actually prepared to retreat beyond the Alps, but by the sworn foes of these intruders—the troops, on whose protection against such contingencies the powerless Romans had been heretofore taught to rely. The time had past when the most deadly antagonist of the Pope was necessarily the Turk,

and with it had gone all opportunity for the moral or material organisation of an actual crusade. On the other hand, the support derivable for such purposes from popular opinion was diminished in a corresponding degree by the operation of the same events. A new object had been found for the combative propensities of fanaticism or zeal. In the religious wars of these times, "heretic" was substituted for "infidel," and the enthusiasm or animosity which in former days might have been directed against the encroachments of the Turk, were now furnished with sufficient occupation by the fatal divisions of Christendom itself. In the year 1581 a proposition was actually made by the Pope and Jesuits, to divert the arms of the Maltese knights, those sworn champions of Christianity, from the still formidable Ottomans against Queen Elizabeth of England; and a few years later—at the very moment, indeed, when the Spanish Armada was directed against our shores, Henry III. of France despatched a confidential envoy to the Porte, for the purpose of impressing Amurath III. with the expediency of declaring war against Philip II. of Spain. These causes, co-operating with a visible and settled repugnance to distant crusades, with the distractions arising from domestic vicissitudes, and with the indifference to alarming phenomena which familiarity ultimately brings on, may be taken as explanatory of that

course of events which at length not only established the house of Othman upon the throne of the Eastern Cæsars, but gave it a species of place in the courts and councils of Europe.

It was not, however, under any ordinary aspect that this diplomatic *début* was solemnised. The Ottoman Porte made its entry into the European system with all the appliances of glory, grandeur, and triumph. Not only was it a first-rate Power, but, excepting the yet scarcely manageable resources of Imperial Germany, it was the strongest Power which could take the field. This consciousness of strength, combined with that orthodox insolence and heritage of pretensions to which we have alluded, gave to its deportment the genuine impress of barbaric pride. The Emperor of the Ottomans carried himself as a sovereign immeasurably exalted above all the monarchs of the West—especially above those with whom he was brought into immediate contact. The view taken by Solyman of the overtures of Francis I. may be collected from his haughty boast, that in his shadow the kings of France, Poland, Venice, and Transylvania had been fain to seek refuge. The first Austrian ambassador despatched to the Sublime Porte was sternly rebuked for applying a majestic epithet to his own master, and was thrown contemptuously into prison. Indeed, for a long subsequent period, the

Oriental arrogance of Turkish sultans withheld from the representatives of foreign Powers those honourable immunities which in the intercourse of civilised nations is ever attached to their office; and the personal liberties of the diplomatic body in the vicinity of the Seven Towers were proverbially insecure. It is nevertheless however remarked, with great justice, by Azuni, that on general international questions, Turkey has at all times set an example of moderation to the more civilised governments of Europe.

Sketching, now, a broad outline of the position occupied by Turkey between this time and a period which we can fix at the commencement of the Thirty Years' War, we may say, that the idea of the "infidels" had, from various causes, virtually disappeared; and that, if the Porte was on other than acceptable terms with the courts of Christendom, the difference was not owing to its national faith. By the States engaged in hostilities with it, it was regarded as neither more nor less than an ordinary enemy; nor would we undertake to prove, that Hungary had much greater repugnance to a Turkish than to an Austrian master. The States removed from occasions of collision with the Porte were positively amicable—submitting to certain barbaric assumptions in consideration of commercial advantages. France had led the way from motives already explained; Venice,

which in mercantile compacts had been already in the field, promptly followed; and England's first ambassador departed from the court of Elizabeth. His reception, curiously enough, was not unopposed. Previously, our few negotiations with the Porte had been transacted through the representatives of the States already accredited there; and neither Venice nor France was disposed to forego the prerogative of mediation, or to welcome a new competitor on the scene. Their objections, however, were overruled, and the Ottoman Porte was declared open to all. In 1606 the United States of Holland despatched also their envoy to Constantinople; and thus, either the suggestions of policy, or the temptations of trade, had collected the representatives of Christendom about the Turkish Sultan, at as early a period as could be reasonably anticipated from the temper of the government, and the distance of the scene.

The influence directly exerted at this period by Turkey upon Western Europe was not very remarkable; but there are two points connected with it which deserve to be recorded. The incessant attacks of the Ottomans along the Danube and the Theiss, created in Germany such a sense of insecurity as had not been felt since the irruptions of the Moguls; and it became indeed evident that the protection of the Empire, under such new frontier relations, could not be intrusted to a distant or non-

resident sovereign. It was true that the front recently shown by Charles V. to Solyman proved that the armies of the East could be still over-matched, on emergencies, by the forces of the West; but these forces could be mustered only by such desperate appeals, and after such difficulties, that they supplied but an uncertain resource against the perils constantly impending from the ambition or ferocity of the Sultan. Even on the occasion alluded to, the Mahometans were in the very heart of Styria, before the strength of the Empire could be collected for the deliverance of Germany. These obvious considerations, though they had less weight than might have been anticipated with the Imperial States, who apprehended more danger to their liberties from the House of Hapsburgh than from the House of Othman, did induce Charles so far to modify his own schemes as to partition the reversion of his possessions, and to bespeak the Imperial crown for his brother Ferdinand, instead of his son Philip. His exertions promoted a settlement which he afterwards vainly tried to cancel. Ferdinand was elected king of the Romans; and thus the substitution of the formidable Ottoman for the degenerate Greek in the halls of Constantinople, proved the means of settling the crown of the Empire in a German instead of a Spanish House —and of laying the broad foundation of the great mon-

archy of Austria. The event, too, produced its reaction on the fortunes of Turkey; for Ferdinand, thus strengthened, succeeded in incorporating the elective crown of Hungary with the already aggrandised inheritance of his family. From this consolidation of dominion flowed two results of signal importance to the subject we are now considering. Not only was a State created of sufficient magnitude to resist the aggressions of the Turk, but this rival empire became actually *conterminous* with the Ottoman dominions. Prague, Buda, and Vienna were now capitals of the same kingdom; a blow struck at Zeuta was felt at Frankfort; and thus, instead of the uncertain resistance dictated by the fitful and erratic impulses of Hungarian cavaliers, a steady force was organised and arrayed against the Turk, and the majesty and strength of Imperial Christendom brought bodily on his borders.

It is with no wish to disparage the national character of Hungary that we here avow our doubts whether this kingdom of itself either served or could have served as that "bulwark of Christendom" which it has been often denominated. We think, indeed, that after an impartial review of the annals of this period, it will be difficult to escape the conclusion that, but for its practical identification with the Germanic Empire, it would probably have become, and perhaps have remained, a dependency

of the misbelievers. Even as it was, it must be remembered that Buda was Turkish for almost as long a period as Gibraltar has been English; while, as regards any active or inveterate antagonism on the score of religion, we find little ground for concluding that the inhabitants of Hungary would have shown more tenacity than the population of Wallachia or Moldavia. The personal prowess and brilliant successes of Hunniades and Matthias Corvinus, were mainly instrumental, no doubt, in stemming the first torrent of Ottoman conquest; but though the flower of the armies which encountered the Moslem on the Danube was usually supplied from the chivalry of Hungary, it is impossible not to trace the ultimate ascendancy of the Christian over the Turk to those events which established a mutual assurance among all the kingdoms between the Vistula and the Rhine.

The second of the points to which we alluded as notably exemplifying the influence of Turkey upon Christendom was the establishment, on the coast of Barbary, of those anomalous piratical States which have only within our own generation become extinct. From the earliest development of their national strength, the Turks have always experienced and confessed their inferiority on the seas; and though their unexpected victory over the Venetians at Sapienza might for a moment appear to announce a change, the improvement was not maintained; and

the famous battle of Lepanto decided the fortunes of the Turkish marine. Exasperated, however, at the insults to which he was exposed, and desirous of creating by any methods some counterpoise to the supremacy of the European Powers in the Mediterranean, Solyman the Great invested the celebrated Barbarossa with a title beyond that of conquest to the possessions he had already acquired on the African coast. Algiers and its kindred strongholds became feudatories of the Porte; and in this capacity supplied, as will be remembered, the materials for some of the most curious historical episodes of the times in question. To say that these predatory governments ever seriously influenced the affairs of Europe, would be attributing to them too great an importance. But before the rise and growth of the proper Powers Maritime, they often successfully contested the command of the adjacent waters; and though they should have been outlawed by the very fact of their profession, so many States were fain to treat with them, that the Porte had little difficulty in maintaining them by its favour for three centuries in their anomalous existence. Something, perhaps, they owed to the reciprocal jealousies of Christian States; and it deserves at least to be mentioned, that our own good understanding with these piratical communities preceded even our definite alli-

ance with Holland, and was disturbed by only a single serious rupture through a century and a half.

Our review has now reached a point at which the action of the Ottoman Empire upon the affairs of Christendom can no longer be described as peculiarly that of a Mahometan Power. The holy war against Christians no longer supplied any guiding principle of Turkish policy, nor was any combination likely to be suggested by analogous considerations on the other side. Since the union of the Germanic and Hungarian crowns in the House of Hapsburg, and the establishment of this power on the borders of Turkey, the Ottomans had become the natural antagonists of the Austrians, and all the enemies therefore of the Imperial House were the friends of the Porte. When Mahomet III. departed from Constantinople on his campaign against the Emperor Rodolf II., his martial pomp was swelled by the ambassadors of France and England. And in truth, at the opening of the seventeenth century, the principal Western States were either at peace with the Porte, or had contracted positive alliances with it. The idea of attaching to this Power any political disabilities on the score of religion, had in reality become extinct, though it still survived in popular conceptions, and received occasional illustrations in examples of individual chivalry. In fact, the existence

of the still powerful order of St. John, holding its possessions and privileges on the recorded condition of war with the infidel, was sufficient to perpetuate the traditions of an earlier period; and instances of volunteers in the same cause were of constant recurrence. The spirit of which we are speaking was conspicuously exemplified at the famous siege of Candia, when, in addition to other succours, the garrison was reinforced by a select band of Christian knights under the Duc de Beaufort, although the alliance between France and the Porte remained nominally undisturbed. "The French," said the vizier Kiuperli, on this occasion, "are our friends; but we usually find them with our enemies." No serious notice, however, was taken of these incidents; nor was there wanting at Constantinople an accurate appreciation of the policy subsisting in the principal cabinets of Europe. In the reign of our Charles I., a Venetian envoy ventured to threaten the Porte with a Christian league. "The Pope," returned the Turkish minister, "would sting if he could, but he has lost the power; Spain and Germany have their own work upon their hands; the interests of France are ours; while, as to England and Holland, they would only be too glad to supersede you in the commercial privileges you enjoy. Declare your war, then—and see how you will fare for allies." This

estimate of the condition and temper of contemporary governments was tolerably correct, and, indeed, a combination of motives frequently secured to the Porte diplomatic concessions, not yielded to any Christian Power. Nor was its character in its public relations wholly that of a barbarian State. It was unquestionably chargeable with ignorant vanity, with passionate caprice, with savage cruelty, and with a contemptuous disregard of international usages; but, on the other hand, it often displayed a magnanimous disdain of opportunities, and a noble sympathy for greatness in misfortune; while its ordinary respect for such treaty engagements as it had formally contracted, was at least on a level with that of other governments, from whose civilisation and religion more might have been expected.

The truth is, that in the seventeenth century the peculiar character of the Turkish State was manifested rather in its neutrality than its aggressiveness. Bacon's doctrine, that there was a perpetual justification of invasive war with the Turks, on the ground of prevention, was evidently an anachronism. Probably no Christian Power, in a similar position, could have avoided an active participation in the wars of religion and succession which one after another desolated the European Continent; whereas the arms of Turkey, at this crisis

of German destinies, were again turned with irresistible force upon Persia. It was not until that terrible struggle had been terminated, that the Ottomans were allured, by the seductive representations of Tekeli, to make their last gratuitous demonstration against the capital of the rival Empire. But the result of this famous invasion was very different from what they had anticipated. Not only were the ramparts of Vienna maintained against Black Mustapha's janizaries, and his spahis scattered by the first charge of Sobieski's cavaliers, but many circumstances of the campaign disclosed the fact, that the preeminence in arms had passed at length from the Ottomans to the Christians. The stories of this celebrated siege, and the apparent peril of a second Christian capital, tended to revive in no small degree the popular horror of the Turk; but, in point of fact, the growing ascendancy of Christendom had been indisputably shown. Already had the defence of Candia, protracted to more than twice the length of the defence of Troy, demonstrated the resources of even unorganised Europe against the whole forces of the Ottoman Empire, directed by the ablest minister it had ever known; the recollections of Lepanto were reanimated and heightened by a new series of naval victories; and now, for the first time, the superior excellence of European tactics was displayed on the banks of the Danube.

Even had Vienna yielded to the first assaults, there is scarcely any room for doubting that the tide of conquest must soon have been both stayed and turned.

Still, although the seventeenth century was to close upon the Porte with humiliation and discomfiture, neither its attitude nor its position among the States of Europe had yet experienced any material change. It no longer indeed maintained a mastery in the field; but it still preserved its traditional carriage in the cabinet. It was still beyond obvious reach of insult or attack, and still affected the haughty language of unapproachable supremacy. It had not yet come to need countenance or protection; nor had that Power been yet developed before whose deadly antagonism its fortunes were at length to fail. A step, however, had about this time been taken towards the impending change, which deserves to be recorded. The Turks were disqualified no less by individual character than by national pretensions for the subtle functions of diplomacy; and the rude violence of their deportment in their foreign relations may be ascribed in no inconsiderable degree to the fierce and obstinate bearing of a true believer. Towards the end of the century, accidental events suggested the employment, in this peculiar capacity, of the Greek subjects of the Porte; who turned to such account the opportunities thus afforded them, that they presently monopo-

lised the chief offices of external intercourse. In some sense, the Ottoman Empire was of course a gainer by the substitution of these supple intriguers for its own intractable sons; but the change contributed materially to affect its position in the eyes of other nations, and served incidentally to mark the period at which its characteristic arrogance began to recede.

With the eighteenth century a new scene opened upon Europe, in which the part hitherto played by Turkey was to be strangely reversed. Though we have brought our sketch of the Ottoman fortunes to a comparatively modern period, we have as yet had no occasion to name that remarkable nation by whose action they were to be finally regulated. The reader may, perhaps, be amused with the first dim foreshadowing of the mighty figures which were to come. In times long past, before the singular succession of bold and sagacious monarchs on the throne of Constantinople had been broken by the elevation of idiots or debauchees from the recesses of the seraglio, some of these powerful princes, with an enlightenment for which they have hardly received sufficient credit, cast about for the means of restoring those commercial advantages which their dominions had lost by the discoveries of Vasco di Gama, and by the consequent diversion of Eastern trade from the overland route to an entirely new channel. Among

other projects for this purpose, Selim II. conceived or revived the idea of connecting by an artificial canal, at the most convenient points, the two great streams of the Don and the Volga, thus opening a navigable passage from the Black Sea to the Caspian, and establishing an easy communication between Central Asia and Western Europe. It was seldom that the Ottoman Sultans did their work negligently. On this occasion the zeal of Selim was quickened by his desire to invade Persia through the new route, and he commenced his canal as it might have been commenced by a king of Egypt. He may be pardoned, in the fulness of his power, for not taking into account the destined opposition to his schemes. As the work, however, was proceeding, a body of men, with uncouth figures, strange features, and barbarous language, sallied out from a neighbouring town, surprised the expedition, and cut soldiers and workmen to pieces. These savages were the Muscovite subjects of Ivan the Terrible,—and such was the first encounter of *the Turks and the Russians.*

About the middle of the ninth century, a short time before the accession of our Alfred the Great, Rurik, one of the Varangian rovers of the Baltic, sailed into the Gulf of Finland, and with the audacity and fortune characteristic of his race, established a Norman dynasty at Novogorod. He presently despatched a step-

son to secure the city of Kiev, on the Dnieper, which had formed the southern settlement of the old Slavish population, as Novogorod had formed the northern; and the invaders thus became the recognised lords of a country which was even then called Russia. To the instincts of the new settlers, the wealthy and unwarlike empire of the East was a point of irresistible attraction, and five times within a century were the "Russians" conducted by their new rulers to the siege of Constantinople. The bulwarks, however, of the Imperial city were proof against the canoes and spears of the barbarians; and the last of these expeditions, in 955, terminated in an event which precluded any repetition of the trial. Through the instrumentality of a princess, the House of Rurik and its subjects received the doctrines of Christianity; and from this time the marauding ambition of the Russians was exchanged for a deep respect towards that State from which they had obtained their religion, their written characters, and many of the usages of civilisation. Unfortunately, one of the consequences resulting from the disorders of an irregular and disputed succession was the transfer, about the year 1170, of the seat of government from Kiev to Vladimir. The former city had been early preferred to Novogorod, on account of its vicinity to the scene of anticipated conquest; and, when the relations between its rulers and the Greek

emperors had experienced the change to which we have referred, the proximity was still desirable, for the sake of an intercourse which was exercising a highly beneficial though partial influence upon the rising kingdom. But this removal of the grand "princes" or "dukes" from so convenient a capital as Kiev, to what is nearly the centre of the present monarchy, completely cut off the Russians from Constantinople and Christendom; and was the first of those occurrences which so singularly retarded the political development of this mighty State. The second was the invasion of the Moguls.

When in the middle of the thirteenth century, the Tartars of the Asiatic Highlands burst, for the third time, upon the plains of Europe, they found an easy prey in the disorganised principalities of Russia. Vladimir, as we have remarked, was the capital of a grand duchy, to which a score of princes, all of the blood of Rurik, owed a nominal allegiance; but, so destructive had been the consequences of unsettled successions and repeated partitions, that there was nothing to oppose the inroad or settlement of the Mogul; and the result was the establishment, upon the banks of the Don, of a Tartar khannat, or monarchy, with undisputed supremacy over the ancient princes of the land. The sovereignty of the Horde, however, although complete, was not very actively exerted; and, in the two centuries of dependence

which followed, the grand dukes were left at liberty to work out, in the interior of the country, the problem of Russian liberation. Kiev having now been definitely abandoned, the seats of the three leading princes were at Vladimir, Twer, and Moscow; the first of which lines enjoyed the supremacy, until it devolved, in the beginning of the fourteenth century, upon Twer, and, in the course of about fifty years more, upon Moscow. At this point the succession was finally settled in the person of Ivan of Moscow, surnamed Kalita; whose resources were strengthened by the gradual conflux of the population upon his territory, as they retired from the encroachments of the Lithuanians and Poles. His descendants were soon enabled to hold their own not only against these nations, but even against their Tartar lords: and the frame of a kingdom of "Muscovy" was already formed, when, in 1462, IVAN THE GREAT succeeded to the heritage of his ancestors. So completely by this time had the collateral lines of the royal stock been subordinated to its head, that little more was required for the consolidation of a powerful monarchy than the reduction of some municipal republics, and the subjugation of the now enfeebled horde on the Don. These conditions were soon realised. In 1481, Ivan, assuming the title of Czar, announced himself as an independent sovereign to the states of Christendom;—

and the outline of an Empire of Russia appeared to be formed.

It is very remarkable that even this remote and peculiar State, which then gave so little promise of its future destiny, should thus have been apparently consolidated at the same period which witnessed the definite formation of so many of the European kingdoms. Ivan the Great was contemporary with Maximilian of Austria, with Ferdinand of Spain, and with Louis XI. of France. And circumstances, arising immediately from the events before us, seemed at one moment to favour, in no small degree, the ultimate development of the new dominion. Constantinople, the early patroness of Russian progress and civilisation, from which the recollections of the people had never, even by the intruding Tartars, been wholly estranged, had just at this period become politically extinct, and was occupied by aliens in religion and race. We may perhaps say that this catastrophe was more sincerely felt in Russia than in any other part of Christendom. To the high gratification, however, of his subjects, Ivan raised Sophia, the last of the Greek princesses, to a share of his throne and bed; adopted as the ensign of his State the two-headed eagle of the Eastern Empire, which, by a strange vicissitude, had now been replaced at Constantinople by the old crescent of Pagan Byzantium; and pretended, by his alliance and his sym-

pathies, to have acquired some of the rights of the emperors of the Greeks. By this destruction of the old Byzantine Empire, the Russian monarchy became detached from its original connection with the East—a circumstance which contributed to give it from this time forward a European rather than an Asiatic aspect. This exchange was undoubtedly conducive to political advancement, but the penance was not yet done. At this critical conjuncture, when every thing appeared to promise the speedy growth of the new Power, the old stock of Rurik, after seven centuries and a half of existence, failed in the third generation from the great Ivan; and a succession of usurpers, invaders, and pretenders through a series of fifteen years, during which interregnum the country narrowly escaped annexation to Poland, threw back the rising monarchy into a condition scarcely better than that from which it had before emerged. At length, in 1613, the election of Michael Romanoff to the vacant throne provided Russia anew with a royal stock; and the fated antagonist of the House of Othman was finally established in policy and power.

But for the retarding circumstances to which we have referred, it is probable that the relations between Turkey and Christendom would have been changed at a much earlier period by the menacing attitude of the Russian court. Alexis, the second of the Romanoffs, suggested,

even in the middle of the seventeenth century, the formation of a holy league against the infidels of Constantinople. His country, however, was as yet in no condition to play the part desired; nor was it, indeed, until the days of Peter the Great, that Russian vessels, after a lapse of nearly eight centuries, again swam the sea of Azov. Still, the future was preparing. The peace of Carlowitz, in 1699, terminated the last of those Turkish wars by which European freedom was conceived to be threatened. Its provisions included Russia, which, for the first time, had been brought into hostile contact with the Porte. It may be even added, that the terms of the treaty were honourable to Peter; but, although the ascendancy of the Imperialist over the Ottoman arms had now been conclusively decided, some time was to elapse before this superiority could be claimed by Russia also.

The Turkish Empire entered upon the eighteenth century, considerably damaged by the last campaigns. Its forces had been relatively, though not perhaps actually weakened; but its reputation was most seriously diminished. Nevertheless, this very circumstance probably contributed, by finally removing all dread of its aggressions, to promote that peculiar interest which the cabinets of Europe now began to take in its political fortunes. The consideration, however, which modified

the estimation of Turkey among the Western States, was the progress of Russia alone; and we shall best understand the gradual revolution of opinion now ensuing, by observing the respective positions of the Porte and its new rival, at the close of the several wars by which this century was distinguished.

It should be recollected, that the direct influence of Turkey, at this period, upon the European system, was chiefly confined to the Northern States. The secret inspiration of France was, indeed, perceptible in the decisions of the Divan; but it was only on the banks of the Vistula and the shores of the Baltic that the vibrations of Ottoman struggles were practically felt. Acting on Russia and Poland through the medium of Cossack and Tartar hordes, which carried their allegiance and their disorder to all these countries in turn,—on Prussia and Sweden through Poland, and on Denmark through Russia,—the Turkish Empire found itself connected with the less important moiety of Christendom—its relations with the Great Powers of the West being mainly suggested by its capacities for annoying Austria. In the wars, therefore, of the Spanish succession, as in the other great European contests, the Ottoman Empire was not involved. Though its councils, as we shall presently see, became more and more exposed to the intrigues of diplomatists; yet so lordly was the indifference

of the Porte to political opportunities, and so capricious and uncertain was its disposition, that no extensive combination could be safely based on its probable demeanour.

When the Northern division of Europe had been convulsed by the enterprises of Charles XII. of Sweden, the Porte took no original part in the quarrel; but when, after the defeat of Pultawa, the vanquished hero sought refuge at Bender, the peace of Carlowitz was summarily broken in behalf of a sovereign whose inferiority to his adversary had been exposed before all the world. Turkey declared war against Russia. It would be a work of some interest to ascertain how far the Divan was actually influenced by any considerations respecting Russian aggrandisement, and whether, upon this early occasion, its deliberations were swayed by the maxims of more modern policy. That it was not so influenced, to any very great extent, we may perhaps infer from its promptitude in engaging the Czar, and from the justification which such confidence received on the Pruth. Peter was there completely discomfited; and although the Swedish king gained nothing in the end, the advantages obtained by the Turks over the Russians appeared in 1711 to be quite decisive as to the comparative strength of the two parties. By the year 1724, however, the Divan had evidently begun to look

with jealousy, if not apprehension, upon the growth of Russia; and a fresh war was only averted by the good offices of the French court. Its ambassador, on this occasion, represented to the Porte, remarkably enough, that the aggrandisement of Russia could be in no wise injurious to the Ottoman interests; but that, on the contrary, it would supply a counterpoise against Austria, the natural enemy of Mahometan power. It is said that Peter the Great bequeathed certain cabinet traditions for effacing what he considered to be the humiliating features of the treaty of the Pruth; and it is at any rate clear, that when the accession of the Empress Anne introduced fresh spirit into the Russian councils, an opportunity was promptly found for renewing hostilities with the Ottomans. Indeed, the cabinet of St. Petersburgh appears to have now almost succeeded to the imperious carriage of the Porte itself. Although such was the condition of the country, even twenty years later, that one of the most intelligent of French diplomatists described it as liable, at any moment, to relapse into barbarism, and on that ground disqualified for any permanent alliances; yet it already assumed the airs of imperial supremacy, even to the length of contesting the ancient precedence of France. The war from 1735 to 1739, which now ensued, proved the hinging point in the military fortunes of Turkey. It cannot certainly be

termed discreditable to the Turks. The Porte, notwithstanding that it was actively engaged in Persia with the formidable Nadir Shah, still succeeded in showing a resolute front to Munich in the Crimea, and to the Count de Wallis on the Danube, and at length drove the Austrians to a precipitate peace under the walls of Belgrade. But though the honour of the Ottoman arms was thus far unexpectedly maintained, and though no advantage was ever gained against them without a desperate struggle, it was nevertheless demonstrated, by the results of the campaign, that the rising power of Russia had at length reached an equality with the receding power of Turkey; nor could it be doubtful with which the superiority would rest for the future. The point had now been reached after which, even if Turkey did not retrograde, yet Russia must continue to advance,—and the distance between them must yearly increase. Even the terms of the particular treaty which followed immediately upon the peace of Belgrade, showed the change of relationship between them. The territorial arrangements were not greatly to the disadvantage of the Porte; but the haughty Ottoman condescended to acknowledge an "Empress" in the Czarina; and an explicit stipulation was introduced for the annulment of all previous conventions, agreements, and concessions, and the recognition of this treaty as exclusively

regulating the relations to subsist thereafter between the contracting Powers.

After this, all, excepting the actual conquest of the Ottoman Empire, might be said to be virtually over. In fact, even the last war had been commenced with the avowed expectation of despoiling the Porte of some, at least, of its European possessions,—so precipitate had been its decline. Turkey was now fairly on the descending limb of her orbit; and it seemed easy to calculate the speed with which she was hastening to her setting. True, however, to her ancient policy, if such a term can be applied to a strange combination of ignorance, high-mindedness, and disdain, the Porte took no part in the wars which embroiled its old Austrian antagonists at the demise, in 1740, of the imperial crown; or in the seven years' hostilities which afterwards ensued. On the contrary, it actually proffered its disinterested mediation to the belligerents, and voluntarily despatched to the Court of Vienna assurances of its unaltered amity. The question on which peace was at last broken, was that of expiring Poland. To say that the Divan was mainly influenced in this movement by sentiments of sympathy or generosity, would be saying too much; but, so blind was it to the changes which time had wrought in the relative strength of the parties, that, in 1768, it deliberately and of its own accord de-

clared war upon Russia. The campaigns which followed, speedily demonstrated the fatal folly of such a proceeding. The position of Turkey had, for nearly half a century, been defensive, and its vulnerable points were now fully exposed. On the other hand, so steady and rapid had been the advance, in the last thirty years, of Russian power, that the germs of all its subsequent pretensions were already visible, with their consequences, in this, the first war after the peace of Belgrade. Russian squadrons immediately scoured the Archipelago; Russian missionaries excited the Greek subjects of the Porte to rebellion; Russian agents tampered with the refractory governors of Egypt. So settled was the confidence of Catharine II. in the superiority of her admirably disciplined troops, that the vast hosts of the Ottomans were deliberately encountered by one eighth of their numbers,—and with perfect success. The Turks were driven out of Wallachia and Moldavia; the Danube was crossed; the fortresses of its southern bank invested; and the Ottoman communications intercepted between the famous camp of Schumla and its magazines at Varna.

And now, for the first time, were the apprehensions of Christendom generally excited, *on behalf of the Turks!* Austria, though both previously and subsequently allured by a proposal for sharing the anticipated spoils, dis-

cerned a new danger and a new policy, while England and France acquired new motives of interest; and even Prussia acknowledged her concern. What adds to the significance of this agitation is, that it was of no avail. Catharine proudly rejected all intervention; and, at her own time, and upon her own terms, dictated the famous treaty of Kainardji, which carried the old frontier of Peter the Great to the banks of the Bug.

This was the first advancement of the boundaries of Russia to the south: and we may convey an intelligible idea of the system commenced on this occasion, by merely enumerating the stages of its progress from those days to the present. Between the channels of the Dnieper and the Danube, three smaller streams fall in parallel directions into the waters of the Euxine—the Bug, the Dniester, and the Pruth. In the time of Peter, the Russian frontier had been formed by the Dnieper; in 1774, it was carried, as we have said, to the Bug; in 1792, to the Dniester; in 1812, to the Pruth; and in 1829, the line was made to include the mouths of the Danube. These advances represent, of course, respectively grave contests and serious cost. In 1784, Catharine had so far ventured on the rights of the strongest, as to annex the Crimea to her dominion, by the simple authority of an imperial ukase. But by her menacing parades in these regions, and by her haughty inscription—"The

route to Byzantium"—over one of the gates of Kherson, she at length exasperated the still ferocious Ottomans beyond the bounds of patience,—and war was again declared by the Porte. The campaigns of Potemkin and Suwarrow—the capture of Oczakoff—and the storm of Ismail, followed. The results we have already named.

What we are now, however, desirous of noticing, is not so much the protracted struggle between Turkish desperation and Russian strength, as the political persuasions which the development of these facts contributed to generate in Europe. We drew attention, at an early stage of our remarks, to the influence originally sought, though with great submissiveness and timidity, by the emissaries of France at the court of the Sultan. There was, we may here observe, a singular convenience in the alliance to which the Porte had been thus incidentally led. The King of France was far enough removed to be beyond the risk of collision; the traditional connexion of his cabinet with the affairs of Poland, and its peculiar authority with the Order of St. John, gave him frequent opportunities of serviceable mediation, while his position, as the first hereditary monarch of the Christian world, was such as to gratify the inordinate pride of the Ottoman Sultans. In respect of arrogance, however, the French monarchs were soon a match for their Oriental allies. They demanded from the Porte the

title of "Padischah," or Emperor;* and, in the conduct of such of their ambassadors as Marcheville and Ferriol, it is difficult to trace much superiority over the uncivilised envoys of the Turk. But as the preponderance of the Ottoman power gradually decreased, this indefinite influence of France assumed a more positive form and scope, and at length, in the wars of Louis le Grand, it was visibly established. So ambitious a monarch could not overlook a power of which so much use was to be made in a variety of ways. The Most Christian King had been forced indeed, for very decency, to despatch certain succours to the Emperor at the moment when the infidel was actually menacing Vienna; but his agents were all the while busy at Constantinople; and in the delay of the pacification with which at length the war and the century were terminated, the interested action of a Western Power in the affairs of Turkey was, for the first time, notoriously traceable. After this period, the necessities or liabilities of the Ottoman State in this respect, became matter of common recognition; and so

* The Ottoman Sovereigns, relying partly on their actual position and partly on the inheritance referred to in p. 25, refused to acknowledge an *Imperial* dignity in any Crown but their own. Hence the significance of the concession extorted (see p. 63) by Anne of Russia. It is not a little curious that Napoleon himself, when at the height of his power he assumed the title of Emperor, should have experienced a serious opposition from the same quarter. The Porte actually objected to this assumption as infringing the peculiar rights of the Sultan.

regularly during the next hundred years did all the great Powers of Europe, according to their successive ascendancies or opportunities, claim a right of interference and mediation in the negotiations and treaties of the Porte, that the conduct of Catharine II., in disallowing such intervention between her and her enemy, was conceived to indicate an extraordinary degree of presumption. These intercessions, however, had not at that time been dictated or determined by any especial alarm at the aggrandisement of Russia; they originated in the prospect of advantage which each State discerned in communicating the impress of its own interests to the engagements of a nation dissociated by creed, position, and character from the ordinary politics of Christendom. Even after Turkey ceased to be an aggressive Power, it still retained the capacity of effecting, on emergencies, very formidable diversions, and of granting commercial privileges of no trifling value. It became in fact a State, which, though not secluded from the rights of political community, was yet so practically withdrawn from the sphere of ordinary combinations, as to appear like a ready-made instrument for all collateral purposes. Its disdainful chivalry and its passionate caprices were well known; nor was there any cabinet which did not appreciate the services they might possibly confer. At the Pruth, the mediating Powers

were England and Poland; at Belgrade, the mission devolved upon France. Prussia was characteristically introduced to the Divan by the admiration of the Ottoman for the personal qualities of the Great Frederic. The state of things disclosed by Romanzoff's campaigns, transformed even Austria into an intercessor on behalf of the Turks; and in 1792 the cabinets of London and Berlin found themselves zealously co-operating for the same end. We may thus say, that for the greater part of the 18th century the chief Powers of Europe had been exercising a systematic intervention in the affairs of Turkey; originally with no clearer motive than the general acquisition of political influence, but latterly with a distinct apprehension of the danger to be feared, if a Power so aggressive as Russia were permitted to expand its already menacing proportions by the spoils of the Ottoman Empire.

In point of fact, the last wars had conclusively established both the gigantic strength of Russia, and the uses to which it would probably be applied. Catharine did not condescend to disguise her ambition or her hopes. She openly discussed the project of restoring a Greek Empire at Constantinople for the benefit of her successors; and revived the auspicious name of Constantine in a prince of her royal house. Nor, although the fate of Poland had alarmed the statesmen of Europe, was it

by any means certain that any peremptory arbitration could at this time have been interposed between Russia and her prey. In 1791, Pitt had found himself totally unsupported in his proposition to equip a squadron of observation for the Dardanelles; the functions of France, the old and, nominally at least, the natural ally of the Porte, became entirely suspended; and the complicity and spoils of Polish dismemberment furnished the Northern Courts with irresistible temptations. Already, in fact, had the *partition* of Turkey been deliberately canvassed, as a preferable alternative to its absorption; and although subsequent events showed that the Ottomans were by no means so defenceless as they were presumed to be, it may be doubted whether they would not at this time have been thrown wholly for support on their own fanatical courage. Even ten years earlier, France, acting always as the confidential friend of Turkey, had intimated to the Divan, that in any future war it would probably be vain to look to Europe for diversion or aid; and the inclinations of Austria to participate rather in the plunder than in the prevention of the deed, were sufficiently known. Other scenes, however, were now at hand. In the midst of these ambitious conspiracies, the French Revolution burst upon the world, and by absorbing all things in its vortex, relieved the Porte from the imminency of peril.

Under the pressure of such prodigious events, the Governments of Europe were fain to pause in their careers; and the same circumstances which had exempted the Ottoman Empire from any share in the great wars of the century just expiring, secured it also in a corresponding immunity from the revolutionary tempests by which a new order of things was ushered in. At length, after six years' neutrality, the passions of the Porte were violently roused by the ambition of the Directory. The ancient interests of France in these regions of the world, were characteristically symbolised in her revolutionary counsels by a descent upon Egypt. The results of this famous expedition were, in many points of view, remarkable; and in none more than those immediately connected with the subject under review. Unable to comprehend either the Revolution or its consequences, the Porte could at least discern that its oldest ally was deliberately proposing to rob it of its fairest province. It accordingly declared war against France; and, as a natural sequel of such a determination, drew more and more closely to Great Britain, which, always favourably disposed towards Turkey, had now become naturally its counsellor and friend. Into the particulars of the engagements which followed, we need not enter. It will be enough to observe, that by this measure the French Government rudely snapped asunder an alliance of

two centuries and a half; that the protectorate thus lost, seemed to pass to England, and that the consequences of the enterprise threatened little less than the transfer to this country of the credit, influence, and privileges, which France, for so long a period, had enjoyed in the dominions of the Porte.

The new impulse, however, thus communicated to the policy of the Divan, was by no means undisturbed. The vicissitudes of the great war soon furnished so adroit a negotiator as Napoleon with opportunities of reviving or remodelling the alliances of the old monarchy; and so well were his intrigues seconded by the impolicy of our own proceedings that, in 1807, the Dardanelles were forced by an English fleet, while the defence of Constantinople was directed by a minister of France. The publication of the secret negotiations between Alexander and Napoleon, at Tilsit, for the partition of the Ottoman dominions, once more, and more conclusively, estranged the Porte from its French connexions; and at length, by a concerted pacification between Turkey and Russia in 1812, the forces of the latter Power were opportunely disengaged to assist towards the issue of the Moscow campaign. We touch but cursorily on these events, since, however momentous in themselves, they but indirectly affected the question before us. What is chiefly to be remarked is, that Turkey, during this period, was

received with more universal consent, and on a more legitimate footing than before, into the community of European States, and that the part assigned to her in their general federative policy partook more of a regular character. On the other hand, although certain obligations were in this way contracted towards the Porte by the European States, yet its fated antagonist was more than proportionately strengthened by the operation of the same causes. So conspicuous had been the services of Russia in the struggle of Europe against Napoleon, and so entirely was the Continental policy of the Court of St. Petersburgh now identified with that of the other great Powers, that the attitude of the Czar became far more formidable than before; and results which we need scarcely recapitulate, proved what substantial grounds existed for the growing apprehensions of the Divan.

What is called indeed the Eastern question, may be said to have become fully constituted at the end of the last war. The Great Treaty of Vienna, by which the territories and relations of Europe were defined anew, did not include Turkey in its provisions. Considering the interests and the passions which would have been excited on such a point, it is not probable that any agreement could have been arrived at by the contracting parties; and there were obvious reasons presenting them-

selves for the omission of a State, which even yet took but conditional rank among European powers, and which had not played any principal part in the struggle just concluded. The future destinies, therefore, of the Turkish Empire, were left to be regulated by the course of events. On the whole, it may certainly be said that the monarchies of Europe had been purified by the terrible ordeal through which they had passed; and that political morality has stood higher since the peace than before. There exists, if not a more sincere respect for international law, at least a better concert for maintaining it, and a more perfect conviction of the necessity for so doing. Order reigns in Europe; and we may hope that such deeds as were perpetrated towards the close of the last century, would now be rendered almost impossible by the mere operation of opinion.

In this respect, therefore, the dangers of Turkey may have been somewhat diminished, but the case retains its perils still. It cannot, in short, be disguised, that the "situation," to use a French expression, is unnatural. In a community of States, differing merely in the extent of their territorial resources or military power, and where the strength of each is nearly proportioned to its magnitude, there is no great difficulty in assuring the safety and independence of each by the common understanding of all. As long as respect for public law prevails, no State incurs

any peculiar danger from its mere relative inferiority; it is the express object, indeed, of international law to insure the small against the great. In this sense the Kingdom of Holland is as secure as the Kingdom of Prussia. But these conditions are materially affected when the pretensions of a government are hugely disproportioned to its actual power, and when its own capacity for political life is becoming visibly extinct. A State may be protected against violence, but not against decomposition; and though it is possible to support a Grand Duchy, it is hard to find props for an Empire. The Turkish dominions are so enormous, they comprise so vast an aggregate of pretensions, and are at the same time so completely disorganised, that it is almost impracticable to preserve them; and in guaranteeing the "integrity" of the Ottoman Empire, we seem to be opposing those laws of nature which regulate the existence of States as well as men. The monarchy of the Ottomans represents nothing less than the Eastern Empire of the Romans, occupied by aliens in race and religion, who have long lost their original title to possession, that of strength alone. In "protecting" it, we assume nothing less than the patronage of a government claiming to exercise a controlling authority in three quarters of the globe.

An element, too, of signal importance in the question has now appeared. Although the spirit of the age may be

opposed to any crusading assaults upon the Turks on the score of their misbelief, it is impossible to disregard the fact, that these unbelievers hold millions of Christian subjects in a state resembling servitude. In European Turkey there are about 12,000,000 Christians to 3,000,000 Mussulmans. The proportions are exactly reversed in Asiatic Turkey, where there are supposed to be 12,000,000 Mussulmans to 3,000,000 Christians; but these figures show, upon the whole, that half the population of the Ottoman Empire partakes the faith of Christendom. Such facts could not be overlooked, and an interest has been claimed, whether sincerely or otherwise, yet with great plausibility by the Christian Powers of Europe, in the Christian subjects of the Porte. As there happens also, unfortunately, to be more than one description of Christianity, there has arisen more than one species of protectorate. The original schism of the Church producing the Greek and Latin communions, has been already mentioned, as well as the hostilities which this antagonism engendered. The two rival Churches are now represented by two rival Powers. Russia claims to protect the Christians of the Greek Church, as being herself the chief member of that communion. The defence of the Latin or Roman Catholic Christians in Turkey, has long been supposed to devolve upon France, having been assumed by that State at the time when its

relations with the Porte were peculiarly amicable, and never relinquished since. The Greek Congregations are of course far more numerous than the Latin; but the latter retain some establishments of considerable importance, and have always energetically asserted their rights of precedence in those Places which all Christians combine to call Holy. The Church of the Nativity and the Holy Sepulchre are objects of something more than veneration to the rival communions. Each desires to possess a superior right of custody or access, and each therefore, as opportunity offers, addresses its claim, through its own protector, to the territorial lords. It is evident how easily such protectorates may be made the instruments of political ambition; and France and Russia have been thus furnished with standing pretexts for interfering in the affairs of the Porte.

The "Eastern question," therefore, simply stated, inquires what is to be done with the East? It is scarcely in the nature of things, that a political fabric like that of the unwieldy and ruinous Ottoman Empire, should be long sustained. The existence of Turkey, as a European State, seems to have reached its term, and to be protracted only by an artificial and temporary suspense, resulting from the misgivings, apprehensions, and jealousies of Europe at large. But if these arrangements cannot endure, what is to be the end?

One obvious hypothesis, is that of the absorption of the Turkish in the Russian Empire, by the law of conquest only, and in pursuance of what would be a natural order of things, excepting for the prescriptions of the public law of Europe, and the conditions of a balance of power. Russia stands in almost the same relations to the Ottoman Empire, as the Ottoman held towards the Greek Empire. She possesses the power, at any moment, of ejecting the Turks from Constantinople, and restoring the church of St. Sophia to the worship of Christ. She represents the vigour of political adolescence in opposition to the decrepitude of political senility. Her frontiers are conterminous in part with those of Turkey, and she makes no secret of what she considers her natural destiny. But to this scheme of annexation there are objections at least as serious as existed in the time of Catharine II. The power of Russia is even greater now than it was then; and if there is a single point on which the governments of Europe are of one accord, it is the impossibility of conniving at such prodigious aggrandizement. Russia could not absorb and incorporate, in her own dominions, the territories of a second empire, without acquiring a position manifestly alarming to the whole community of States. This alternative, therefore, cannot be admitted.

The next is that of a concerted partition. If the Otto-

man Empire can no longer be maintained, and if the accession of its dominions to those of any one State involves the formidable contingency of a disturbance in the European system, it is obvious to argue that they had better be divided, and that a re-distribution of these territories should take place in accordance with a prearranged plan. This alternative has probably never been taken into serious consideration by any competent congress of Powers; for it would be odious in character, except under a greater pressure of political exigencies than has yet occurred. It was mentioned, however, as we have said, at the close of the last century, when the experiment had been tried, with what was deemed success, on the kingdom of Poland; and it was naturally revived among the numberless schemes of Napoleon. Since those times, however, it has figured rather as an "eventuality" than a project in the views of diplomatists, being regarded with especial, if not with exclusive reference to a Russian alliance. In any propositions for political connexion with Russia, this contingency has generally been alluded to, and French statesmen, in particular, have repeatedly framed the bases of a compact between France and Russia, upon the terms of an Eastern partition. Against these views, if the emergency should ever become sufficiently desperate, and if the interests of all the chief Powers were duly consulted, it might

be found hard to contend; but the principle and the proceeding would alike be dangerous. Pretexts of great speciousness were not wanting for that high political crime—the partition of Poland,—and it is obviously perilous to invest strong States with the privilege of deciding how soon it may be advisable to dismember and appropriate the possessions of a weak one. Nor can this question be at all affected by the religion of the State condemned. The Turks are misbelievers; but if we have taken no exception to their misbelief for three hundred years, we cannot be justified in commencing now.

A third view of the case is founded on the possibility of reverting to arrangements of earlier date in these parts of the world, and restoring the independence of some of those minor States, which were compressed by conquest into the single Empire of the Ottomans. There were anciently several small Christian kingdoms on the Danube, such as Servia and Bosnia, while Bulgaria once formed a monarchy of some consideration. The same may be said of other districts of European Turkey; and a kingdom of Greece has been actually constituted within very recent days. If some of the outlying provinces of the Ottoman monarchy could be thus disposed of, it is conceived that Constantinople might return again to the possession of the Greek race—a race both nume-

rous and energetic, and which of late years has made considerable advances in political and commercial enterprise. The advantages of such a scheme as this are obvious. It would be both less invidious and less hazardous than any other. As regards the Turks, it might be made to wear almost a semblance of retributive justice, since it is impossible to maintain that these Moslems can possess any indefeasible right to rule over Christian subjects in Christian territories; and if any province should evince a capacity for independence, it might, without much violence to political principle, be assisted and confirmed in the recovery of its freedom. As regards the great Powers of Europe, this scheme would obviate the dangers and difficulties of a partition, and would terminate the Eastern question, by leaving no empire to be disposed of. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the materials for such a process really exist; and if the new States of Christian Turkey, like the young republics of South America, should prove incapable of self-government, the problem of the East, with all its complications, might recur afresh. What is needed is, that the dominions now subjected to a semi-civilised and declining Power, should pass under some rule so stable as to make the dismemberment of the Empire no longer a subject of ambitious speculation. This would be accomplished either by the revival of Ottoman energy, if such an event were

possible, or by the substitution of Greeks for Ottomans, if the Greek element of the population should evince any capacity for self-support. Failing the latter chance, however, there would still remain a cluster of impotent, and perhaps troublesome, States on the frontiers of the Russian Empire; nor must it be forgotten, in the consideration of this alternative, that it could never satisty the views entertained at St. Petersburgh, and that all the known subtleties of that Court would probably be exercised, both to prejudice the experiment, and profit by its failure.

These remarks will convey some idea of the complications of the Great Eastern question. The enormous territories of Turkey, in extent, variety, and richness truly imperial, are at present under a government of such a character that its duration can hardly be presumed. On the borders of this crumbling monarchy lies an Empire of prodigious strength and vast military resources, bent upon conquest, and possessed for generations with the conviction that its conquests will take this direction. Such a consummation it is the interest of Europe to avert; but all expedients for the purpose appear so difficult, that the crisis, by general consent, is staved off as long as possible, and the question, instead of being solved, is postponed by a resolution, to "maintain the Ottoman Empire;" or, in other words, to keep things as they are.

In the interval, one conclusion has generally approved itself, and that is, that the affairs of Turkey, whenever they require extrinsic intervention, should be regulated by concert of the Great Powers in common. Three of these Powers are largely and directly interested;—Russia by its expectations, Austria by its contiguity, and England by the route to India, which these territories include. The pretensions of France to an interest in the Eastern question are of very ancient standing, and would undoubtedly be strongly supported; while Prussia, though less directly involved, participates the joint concern of all in the preservation of a political equilibrium. Partly, therefore, by engagement, and partly by consent, the disturbances inevitably occurring in the relations of this ruinous Empire, are settled from time to time by the concurrence of the Great Powers; and to such a point indeed has particular action been interdicted, that conditions have been fixed on which alone armed vessels of Foreign States may enter the Dardanelles.

The course of events, since the conclusion of the last war, will conveniently illustrate the foregoing observations. The Ottoman Empire has been exposed to the natural incidents of political decay in the rebellion of the provinces composing its enormous dominions. In 1821, Greece rose in insurrection against its Turkish lords. This proceeding was at first regarded as an

pable by the sovereigns who met the next year in Congress at Verona; but as the resistance was stubbornly maintained, and as the barbarities of the war became horrible, the Great Powers at last resolved to terminate the struggle by pronouncing for the emancipation of the Greeks. This decision was in a great measure due to the influence of Mr. Canning's liberalism; but it was quickened by the conviction that Russia was preparing to take the work of liberation on herself. Accordingly, in 1827, a treaty was signed between Great Britain, Russia, and France, providing for the independence of Greece; the battle of Navarino gave effect to the arrangement, and this portion of the Turkish Empire became detatched from the Ottoman dominions.

In 1832, an insurrection of a different kind occurred. The Pacha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, rose in arms against his master; the armies of the Sultan were defeated by Mehemet's son, Ibrahim Pacha; and it appeared as if Egypt and Syria would be severed from the dominions of the Porte. Here, however, the Great Powers again interfered, but not in concert, and not in behalf of the insurgents. Russia despatched a powerful auxiliary force to the Bosphorus, at which France took such alarm that she eagerly interposed her mediation between the Porte and its rebellious vassal, and suc-

ceeded at last in prevailing upon Ibrahim to retire. But this success was not obtained excepting on such terms as foreboded a renewal of the war; for what Ibrahim had obtained in trust he desired to secure in perpetuity, and what the Sultan had thus conceded he was anxious to revoke. Accordingly, in 1839, the contest between the Porte and its Egyptian vassal was renewed, and again the intervention of the Great Powers secured "the integrity of the Ottoman Empire."

In all these transactions, however, the gradual advances of Russia were clearly visible. It has been said that she was proposing, even without the concurrence of Europe, to emancipate the Greeks from the Turkish yoke; and her proceedings in the affair of liberation were followed by a war with the Turks, which was terminated only in the autumn of 1829. This war evinced, even more conclusively than before, the impotence of the Porte against its colossal antagonist. Heretofore the Russian armies had been checked either at the Danube or at the Balkan; but on this occasion the Balkan was passed, and the treaty of peace took its name from the city of Adrianople, where the instrument was signed. By these arrangements Russia gained a considerable extent of coast, and the Delta formed by the mouths of the Danube. She confirmed also, and increased her influence in what are termed the Danubian Principalities. These two pro-

vinces of Wallachia and Moldavia composed all that remained of the Ottoman conquests beyond the Danube. They were originally, as was before remarked, brought into subjection by Solyman the Great, who, without actually deposing their native princes, compelled them to become tributary to the Porte. Their territories, as lying contiguous to the Russian frontier, as leading directly to the Danube, and as forming, in short, the next morsel to be devoured, have always been regarded with peculiar solicitude by the Court of St. Petersburgh. The treaty of Jassy, which concluded, in 1792, the sanguinary campaigns of Suwarrow, invested Russia with a species of practical protectorate in these parts, inasmuch as it was stipulated that the *Hospodars*, or governors of Wallachia and Moldavia, should neither be appointed nor displaced without the consent of the Russian government. This protectorate was so far extended by the treaty of Adrianople, that it would be difficult to define the connection still suffered to exist between these provinces and the Turkish Government: their position being that of quasi-independence under the guarantee of Russia. If they are not yet Russian provinces, they can hardly be called Turkish; for the Ottoman Government is debarred from occupying them by a military force, and Turks are forbidden to settle in them, in order that the population, being more exclusively Christian, may

be more entirely under the influence of Russia. They have been detached, in fact, from one empire without being formally annexed to the other. In 1833, again, though the manœuvres of Russia were partially frustrated by the energies of French diplomacy, the Russians succeeded in obtaining from the Porte, by the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, a favourable recognition of their presumptive claims.

Such then is the position of the Ottoman Empire. Prostrate, to all appearance, at the feet of its vigilant and redoubtable foe, it is maintained, in a precarious security, by the jealousies rather than the sympathies of surrounding nations: For, although on more than one occasion, it has exhibited an unlooked-for vitality in the hour of peril, yet the experience of recent years forbids all further reliance on such resources. The Danube and the Balkan are no longer barriers. Adrianople has been already once reached; and from that city to Constantinople there intervenes but a step.

Historians have frequently indulged in speculations upon the causes of this decline. But the question lies, we think, within very narrow limits. The Ottoman Empire was never based upon any principle but that of force, and its force has failed. It never introduced any cohesion into its provinces, and they now fly asunder. As respects its relations with Russia it is not merely

the decay of one of the antagonists, but the growth of the other, which has so disturbed the balance between them. The armies which were overthrown by the Bajazets and the Amuraths bore no comparison to those encountered by Mahmood; nor is it probable that the Great Solyman, in the height of his power, could have ever made head against such a force as that now wielded by the reigning Czar. Turkey, in short, has at most been stationary, while Russia has prodigiously advanced. This is one of the consequences due mainly to the character of the national religion; though it would be incorrect to attribute to this most important influence results exclusively prejudicial. It is true that fanaticism has produced social insecurity as well as political stagnation, and that the false prophets of Ottoman history have been more numerous and successful than the pretenders or usurpers of any other history whatever. But, on the other hand, the sanctity which the theocratic principle communicated to the reigning House has proved its inviolable safeguard in the crisis of revolution; and the reversion of the holy Kalifate which Selim I. secured from the last phantom representative of the Abbasides, conveyed no insignificant authority to the Commander of the Faithful. In virtue of this title, the supremacy of the Sublime Porte was recognised by all the orthodox Mussulman world; so that an appeal based upon the

obligations involved in it was actually, in 1799, transmitted to Constantinople from Seringapatam. Tippoo Sahib demanded the aid of the Sultan, as the head and guardian of the Mussulman community, against the forces of the British general.

It is a remarkable feature in the history of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, that the destinies of both should be matter of long-descended tradition and common acceptance in the minds of the people. Though the establishment of the Turks in Europe is now of such respectable antiquity that its fourth, and perhaps fated centenary draws nigh,* and though their rights of dominion have acquired a title beyond that of mere prescription, yet the nation itself, as has been observed by an historian not often distinguished by such felicitous brevity of expression, is still only "*encamped*" on its conquests. They have never comported themselves, either politically or socially, as if they anticipated in Europe any continuing home. Ottoman legends relate how a belief arose, even in the very hour of conquest, that the banner of the Cross would again be some day carried to the brink of the Straits; and it is said that this mis-

* This was written in 1849. The centenary in question was the 29th of May, 1853. An old prophecy foretold that the Turks should reign in Constantinople 400 years, but no more; and it is certainly curious that, on the very day above mentioned, a rumour was current in the European capitals, that the Russians had entered the city.

giving is traceable in the selection of the Asiatic shore for the final resting-place of true believers. It is certain, too, that from the first definite apparition of the Russian Empire, they instinctively recognised the antagonists of Fate. Europe had hardly learned the titles of the Czar, when the gaze of the Porte was uneasily directed to the new metropolis on the Neva; throughout the whole century, notwithstanding its chequered incidents, the impression was never weakened; and to this day the inhabitants of Constantinople point out the particular gate by which the Muscovite troops are to enter the City of Promise. Nor are the traditions less vivid on the other side. Although the visible ambition of the Imperial Court may have been generated by the creations of Peter and the conquests of Catharine, yet the impressions popularly current flow from an earlier and a less corrupted source. The ancient relations of Russia with the capital of the Cæsars, the early hostilities, the subsequent alliances, and the presumed inheritance of Ivan, are all matter of national legend; and combine, with the appeal to religion and the incitements of pride, to make the recovery of Constantinople from the Ottoman appear an obligatory as well as a predestined work. The spirit in which the Russian legions would march to the Bosphorus would probably differ little

from that in which Grenada was invested by the levies of Castile.

Yet, with all these palliatives of conquest, and all this semblance of warrant, it is almost certain, that the sentiments which the occupation of Constantinople by Russia might awaken in the cabinets of Europe, would be seconded by the opinion of every people between the Vistula and the Atlantic. Though the Turks, even in the fourth century of their European existence, still sit like barbarous conquerors on the lands they won, though they retain in servitude and degradation millions of Christian subjects, though they perpetuate the hopeless desolation of vast provinces, and though these provinces are the very fairest regions of the known world and the most famous scenes of ancient story;—yet for all this, in the event of an invasion, they would command the sympathy of thousands to whom the "balance of power" would be a strange and unintelligible proposition. For the conclusions of statesmen there would no doubt be sufficient warrant in the obvious danger to public peace and freedom from the aggrandisement, by such vast acquisitions, of a Power already so menacing as Russia; but the main source of these sentiments must probably be sought in that popular instinct which naturally inclines to the weaker side, and with a stronger and more decided bias as the violence at-

tempted is more gratuitous and cruel. The considerations which now tend to the disparagement of the Turks, are feeble and inoperative, compared with those which are acting in their favour. They are semi-barbarians, and they are misbelievers: they have not improved, by the policy or enlightenment of their rule, the title which they originally derived from conquest: but they are as they were made. They retain their native impress of character, and they have repeatedly shamed States of more lofty pretensions, by their magnanimity, their generosity, their unswerving adherence to their plighted faith and presumptive duties, and by that disdainful grandeur of soul which refuses to avail itself of another's error, and renders to misfortune a homage which had never been extorted by power. Very recent events have shown* that the communication of European forms to Ottoman institutions, however it may have affected the vigour and elasticity of the national strength, has, at least, not impaired the national virtues; nor has there, probably, been any period since the war, at which the encroachments of an overgrown Power upon its defenceless neighbour would excite more general indignation or induce more serious results. These are things within

* This was in allusion to the asylum given by the Turkish government to the Hungarian refugees, in defiance of the menaces of Austria and Russia.

the daily observation of all; what we have previously deduced from the less obvious facts of history, may elucidate the character of the long-pending crisis, and facilitate the comprehension of the great problem which must be one day solved.

THE END.

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FERDINAND I. AND MAXIMILIAN II.

OF

AUSTRIA:

AN ESSAY ON THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS STATE OF GERMANY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE REFORMATION.

BY

PROFESSOR LEOPOLD RANKE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

BY

LADY DUFF GORDON.

LONDON:
LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS.
1853.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

SOME of Professor Ranke's works are so well known to English readers in translations by a far abler hand than mine, that I need say nothing about the nature of his opinions, or even about his reputation in Germany. His view of a very interesting period is given in the shortest possible manner in the following Essay, or I might almost call it retrospective Pamphlet, published in the "Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift" (Historical and Political Periodical) for 1832.

From the influence of religious differences upon political questions at the time of which he treats, he draws a warning moral for the use of his own countrymen at the present day. I know not how much truth there often is in such historical parallels; but while translating the passages more immediately treating of religious animosities, it seemed to me as though the Author might say to England, rather than to Germany,—*de te fabula narratur.*

L. D. G.

ESHER, 13*th Jan.* 1853.

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ESSAY UPON THE TIMES

OF

FERDINAND I. AND MAXIMILIAN II.

INTRODUCTION.

It is not enough for a nation to speak the same language and have the same customs. It will naturally endeavour to set forth in comprehensive and uniform institutions the unanimity implanted in it by God, were it only in order to obtain a fuller conviction of that very unanimity.

We all know what was the nature of German unity at the time when the Empire in the fulness of its might and greatness was the foremost power in Europe. We are equally well aware, and on that point all Germans are agreed, that Germany greatly lacks a national unity, calculated to exclude foreign influences, and to preserve its own independence.

If we ask how it happened that the German nation was reduced from its former to its present condition, we almost invariably receive the same answer. We are told that its present disunion was caused chiefly by the Reformation.

And indeed the national pride with which Germans look back to the great work of ecclesiastical reform, a work in itself needful, glorious, and essentially German, is tempered

in most by the painful conviction that it was also the cause of intestine divisions, of the horrors of the Thirty Years' War, of the heterogeneous characters developed in the various German races by the differences of their religious confessions, and thus of the decay and ruin of the Empire.

But although the Reformation was inevitable,—a fact admitted by both parties—is it certain that these consequences were so too? Was that which elevated and freed the German people necessarily associated with that which brought discord and disunion among them; or was not that rather the result of accidental circumstances, of mistakes which might just as well have been avoided?

It appears to me that this is a question still open to discussion.

I do not mean here to inquire whether it would have been possible from the first to give another direction to the Reformation, and to arrive at a totally different result, such as a union between the two faiths. An inquiry of this nature would be universal and theological, rather than national and political.

Let us rather take it from the point it had reached under Charles V. Was German unity then completely destroyed; or would it still have been possible to maintain it even after the Reformation had been completed although without embracing the whole of Germany? If indeed this was impossible, let us examine what were the causes which rendered it so.

In many respects these questions are applicable to those which agitate the present period.*

* Canning's words are very apposite: "It is true that in no former period of history is there so close a resemblance to the present as in that of the Reformation."—*Speech on Mr. Macdonald's Motion.*

The reigns of Ferdinand I. and Maximilian II. were those during which the course of the events now under consideration was decided. Had it been at all possible to give a decided preponderance to the general interests of Germany, it might then have been done; and if that was not done, we must look for the obstructing causes at the same period.

I am about to offer a few remarks on this subject; they have no claim to be anything beyond the thoughts and suggestions of a German attached to his native land. Besides the German sources, I have also made use of the reports of a Florentine resident, of several Venetian envoys, and a few Papal Nuncios which I consulted in Vienna, Rome, Florence, and Venice.

CHAPTER I.

EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS PEACE.

BEFORE the French invaded Northern Germany the people of those regions talked of nothing so much as of the deeds and events of the Seven Years' War. The older and better informed among them, in reference to the Swedish camps, told how a thirty years' war had gone before that; and those who were fond of antiquarian and legendary lore talked about one which had lasted for a hundred years, and in the course of which the neighbouring fortresses, now in ruins, had been built and destroyed.

In all probability these vague traditions, current among

our peasantry, refer to ancient private feuds, and the time when might made right. At all events the duration of the war was not exaggerated in them; it took more than a century after the decay of the Imperial power to restore the tranquillity of Germany.

The public peace, so often proclaimed, was as often broken, and scarce had a more peaceful generation succeeded to so many turbulent ones, when the excitement of the Reformation again disturbed all minds. The disorder lasted throughout the reign of Charles V.; at one time the peasantry, from Thuringia to the Rhine, were all in insurrection together; and, after that, the Hanseatic league fought its last great battles against the Northern Powers. For a time the princes of the Empire threatened each other in leagues and counter leagues; then the Protestants raised an armed force, and reinstated the Duke of Wirtemberg in his dominions, from which they expelled the Duke of Brunswick; at length the whole of Germany, in the fulness of its strength, but divided against itself, met at Ingolstadt and Mühlberg. The Emperor Charles, powerful and able as he was, and decisive as was the victory he had achieved, failed in establishing peace. The same untiring arms were turned against himself, and he took his final departure from Germany, wearied and exasperated, after having with difficulty escaped imprisonment.

Ferdinand was not comparable to his brother either in talent or in power; it is the more remarkable that the religious peace* which he established, and that not by his

* It was at the same time a public peace; it was called, "The following religious, and common public peace."

own influence, but only when empowered by the Emperor, should have been the sudden commencement of a long peace.

The foreign ambassadors and envoys were more particularly struck by this change in their observations on Germany. "During the latter part of the Emperor Charles's reign," says a Papal Nuncio in his report to Cardinal Caraffa upon German affairs*, "there was not a sovereign, a state, or a town in Germany, that was not at strife with its neighbour for some ecclesiastical or temporal interests. Margrave Albrecht and the House of Brunswick, the Elector Palatine Ottheinrich, and Cardinal Otto of Augsburg, were in open feud; all the rest were full of distrust towards each other, and always remained under arms; the subjects of contention were religion, territorial usurpations, and questions of jurisdiction. The Nuncio looked upon the meeting of the Houses of Saxony, Brandenburg and Hessen, at Naumburg, for the purpose of renewing their ancient hereditary alliance, as a sort of counter Diet. On revisiting Germany a few years after the religious peace, he found everything changed. He disapproved the religious peace, which he called impious; but he admitted that it was extremely efficacious, as there

* Informatione del Rev^mo Vescovo Delfino a M. S^r Ill^mo R^mo Caraffa. MS. in the Bibliotheca Barberina, at Rome, n° 3007. "Ed in somma chi per la religione, chi per beni usurpati chi per causa della giurisdittione chi per altri gravami ogn' uno viveva con sospetto, e conveniva per consequente stare in armi, il che causava la ruina di Germania. Si aggiunge a questo che mentre il ser^mo re sta nella dicta, li principi della casa di Sassonia Brandeburg et Hassia che sono in se potentissimi e capi degli heretici si ridressero a Naumburg e di la quasi da una antidieta scrissero a S. M." Menzel has lately called attention to the importance of the meeting at Naumburg.

had been no appeal to arms, great or small, throughout Germany since its conclusion; it was long indeed since such union had prevailed among the German sovereigns.*

Thus much is certain, that there was peace for thirty years. The Grumbach affair which was soon ended, consisted rather of mischievous intentions on the one hand, and severe retribution on the other, — it could scarcely be called a war. The resistance which the Emperor had hitherto encountered now ceased; the princes of the Empire attended the Diets, and came to unanimous resolutions; the separate constitutions of the circles into which the Empire had been divided now for the first time came into effect: and unwonted order prevailed. Public liberty and security appeared for a time to be combined.

We will now examine the causes which had produced this result after so long a period of intestine war and confusion.

CHAP. II.

CONDITIONS OF THE PEACE.

ARE we then to conclude that this peace was so happy a solution — so satisfactory an adjustment of contending claims? Had it been so carefully weighed — so unanimously agreed to?

* Delfino. "Ed è stato per dire il vero di tanta efficacia questa quantumque empia pace, che dall' hora non è stato piccolo ne grande movimento d' armi in parte alcuna dell' imperio, e di qua credo che nasce la risposta gagliarda che fece a me il ser^mo re, quando la seconda volta andai a S. M. e mi dolsi con lei da parte di S. Beat^ne di questo recesso come a pieno scrissi da Vienna alli 27 di Marzo 1550." (I have not seen this letter.)

I will not here enumerate all the conditions laid down by it — the greater part of them were not new; and it certainly does not appear that the most important subjects were very judiciously treated.

Without doubt nothing was of greater consequence than the regulations with respect to the spiritual princes, who might be said to have the chief influence in the affairs of the Empire, seeing that the decision of the weightiest affairs now rested with the college of princes, where the spiritual princes were sure from their numbers to command a majority.

The question was, whether the spiritual as well as the temporal princes should have the right to adopt the Confession of Augsburg? It was not proposed that they should be empowered to secularise their dominions. The Protestants expressly declared that this would be contrary to their wishes and to their interests.* They wished the spiritual principalities of the Empire to retain their non-hereditary character, but they wanted to have the right of being appointed to them.

This naturally provoked the most vehement disputes, and several times nearly caused the dissolution of the assembly. It is remarkable that, in the beginning at least,

* "The last final declaration of the electors and princes of the Augsburg Confession," in Lehmann, de Pace Religionis, b. I. c. xxi. "Their electoral and princely Highnesses have already expressly declared, and do again persist therein, touching the property appertaining unto the Church, that it is not their will to allow their domains to be lost or neglected, to the injury of the religious foundations of the empire. But rather, together with the other estates of the empire, to be careful that they should remain in undisturbed possession of the said foundations, and that if any one should claim any right of inheritance therein he should be debarred from so doing."

the spiritual electors were secretly in favour of the Protestant claims, and that even among the spiritual princes of the Empire there were some who, if they did not declare the same opinions, were only deterred by intimidation from doing so.* Unfortunately, German history is but too often silent as to the influences and counter-influences of individuals, always so all-important in deliberative assemblies; and we are unable to ascertain how it happened that the contrary opinion at length entirely prevailed; but so it was — even Ferdinand was entirely on that side; and if the Protestants would neither yield (which they declared their conscience would not allow) nor abandon all idea of the peace, it was clear that they must pursue some middle course. They accordingly conceded to the King a right of decision, but with the express reservation that they had not agreed to any such article themselves.† Ferdinand decreed that a spiritual prince of the Empire should forfeit his office and his revenues if he forsook the ancient faith. This was the spiritual reservation.

Another question immediately arose — what was to be

* Among others, the Bishop of Passau. Extract from the Instruction drawn up for the Wirtemberg envoy at the Diet, 1556. In Sattler's "Würtembergische Geschichte" (History of Wirtemberg), vol. iv. p. 96.

† It is remarkable how they agree to, and yet at the same time oppose this. (See the "declaration" quoted before from Lehmann.) "But as your Majesty's Highness adheres to your above-named resolution, and hath at length determined to enforce this article as drawn up by your Majesty's Highness, in virtue of your own office and authority, instead of referring to the power and dignity of his Imperial Majesty, our most gracious lord, their electoral and princely Highnesses know not how to set any bound or measure to your Majesty's Highness beyond the dutiful petitions and memorials they have already presented; but notwithstanding their electoral Highnesses feel themselves in conscience bound to declare that they for their parts cannot agree to the article in question."

the condition of the territories of the spiritual princes? Were they to be allowed to use their sovereign power against their subjects who had adhered to the Confession of Augsburg? If the general constitution of the Empire depended upon the first of these questions, that of members of separate districts would be decided by the second. The Protestants had obstinately opposed the reservation — the spiritual princes no less obstinately resisted any restriction of their authority. On this point, however, Ferdinand took part with the Protestants. Out of the large commission, from which no agreement was to be hoped, he formed a smaller one; he represented to them in the strongest terms that it was not a half peace that was wanted, but a complete one. Three times he appeared in the assembly, and declared that he would not allow it to separate until an agreement had been come to. At length his personal influence prevailed: the Catholics, after holding out until an unusually late hour in the evening, at last yielded to Ferdinand's wishes, in order, as they said, "to clear themselves from the suspicion of not being inclined for peace, and to make the King easy:" they gave up the right to force the Catholic faith upon their subjects more in form than in truth, just as the Protestants had yielded the former point. They empowered the King to make a declaration to this effect for the satisfaction of the estates belonging to the Confession of Augsburg.*

Such were the most important points of this singular peace. The reservation and the declaration complete each other: the former secures the spiritual principalities to the Catholic Church, the latter guarantees the subjects of those

* The negotiation of his Majesty's Highness with the electors and the committee of estates, on the 20th and 21st September, in Lehmann, c. 23.

very states in which they have the most to fear the free exercise of the new religion. The whole future of Germany turned upon these points. The conditions were discussed at great length and very minutely; the contending parties at length submitted, but found means to avoid being bound by them. The reservation was indeed inserted in the decree of the Empire, but with the additional remark, that it had been found impossible to persuade the estates of the two different faiths to agree upon it; and that the King had enacted it in virtue of the full power he had received from the Emperor.*

Then came the question, as to whether an Imperial declaration was fully binding. In this instance too it had a peculiar character. A conclusion which had been so much argued and discussed could hardly be called an Act of Imperial Supremacy. It was admitted that such an act could, in form at least, supply the place of an unanimous agreement when that was unattainable; in fact, it was an agreement combined with a protest from either side.

This did not look like a very stable peace. It is true that by it were confirmed the tranquillizing conditions of the treaty of Passau; but it was still very far from affording a satisfactory compromise for the past, or settlement

* ". . . Adeo ut utriusque religionis ordines in hoc puncto concordari non potuerint. Quapropter nos, de S. C. majestatis, fratris ac domini nostri, data potestatis plenitudine et arbitrationis declaravimus, constituimus et decrevimus, &c." This declaration is quoted in German in the Protocol of the Electoral Diet of 1575, in Senkenberg's "Sammlung von ungedruckten und raren Schriften," (collection of unpublished and rare writings), Part III. He adds, however, that "it is to be found word for word in the Latin tongue, in the which it was written." It is, however, like most resolutions of this peace, very undecided. For what does it mean,—"qui a longo tempore Augustanæ confessionis religioni addicti . . . . et ad hunc usque diem (eam) observant,"—who shall say what is a long or what a short time?

for the future. The peace was concluded, not because such a compromise had been made, but spite of its having failed.

Though Germany remained free from intestine wars, it cannot have been these conditions that effected this. The peace was the result of other circumstances which caused it to be maintained. Our task now is to discover what these circumstances were.

CHAP. III.

STATE OF THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF GERMANY.

If the history of Charles V. were re-written from original sources, the prodigious revolution in affairs which he encountered at the end of his life would excite at once astonishment, admiration and pity.

At the end of the Smalcaldic war his task in Germany was most important, his position in the world magnificent, his might prodigious. Fortune had showered all her favours upon him. While England and France were at war, he had time to regulate the affairs of Germany, and to establish his power in Italy which he prized so highly.

We are struck by the contradictions in which he was involved when he endeavoured, if not absolutely to restore the papacy in Germany, at least to establish a form of religion less opposed to it,—while at the same time he had no more dangerous enemy in Italy than Pope Paul III., and after his death the Farnese party.

We find that in Italy his servants and adherents, Don Fernando Gonzaga, Diego Mendoza, and the Duke of Florence, were constantly endeavouring to induce him to

take decided steps, and to entangle him in war; but that they encountered an invincible obstacle in his character which was essentially averse to all violent proceedings.* The result was that nothing was achieved, while much hostility was excited. A doubtful and fluctuating line of policy is always more likely to call forth serious opposition than the most decisive measures.

Meanwhile, Germany sighed beneath an unwonted pressure. Many parts of the empire were occupied by Italian and Spanish troops. Several of the German princes were driven from their dominions, others were imprisoned, and everywhere there were violent religious changes in favour of a form of worship which seemed as if it must be the immediate precursor of a return to the ancient faith; the conduct of German affairs was in the hands of detested foreigners, Alba and Granvella, who did not understand their character, and who were wanting in respect to their faithful princes.†

It can hardly be considered as a fortunate circumstance

* Concerning this period, the Florentine Despatches in the Medici Archives at Florence, and the Correspondence of Mendoza in the Corsini Library at Rome, give valuable dates hitherto unknown.

† Relatione del cl^mo S^r Frederico Badoero; ritornato Amb^re da Carlo V. 1556. MSS. in the Library at Vienna, and also in several Italian libraries. "Tutti i Tedeschi si lamentano che S. M^tà non a avuto amore verso il governo loro, di non aver avuto conoscimento di quel loro vero modo di vivere." He was bound only to have German ministers, &c., but he had not kept to this. Schwendi, Von Regierung des Röm. Reichs (Concerning the government of the Holy Roman Empire), sect. 15. "Another mischief was brought by the Emperor Charles's government into the temporal rule, namely, the introduction of a foreign element into the government of the kingdom. Hence the Germans . . . cherish a secret anger and dislike to the government of the Emperor . . . .; and although the Emperor Charles was a faithful German hero, and bore a true heart and zeal towards the German nation, nevertheless these foreigners (solche Leute) blinded and deceived him in many important matters."

for Germany that at so momentous a period, her Emperor likewise possessed Spain and America, Italy and the Netherlands; that his measures were determined rather by general than by national interests; and that foreign counsellors exercised so preponderating an influence upon German affairs. The nation murmured, it is true, but it endured an evil of which the end could be foreseen. Already Ferdinand of Austria, who had shown himself to be a true German prince, was king of Rome. It may therefore easily be conceived how great was the dismay when Charles V. conceived the plan of securing the succession to the German throne to his son Philip, who had been educated in Spain, and who arrived in Germany surrounded by Spaniards. A union which seemed scarcely endurable even for a short time, would thus have been rendered permanent; and the Spaniards would as easily have established themselves in Germany as in Milan or in Brussels. What must have been the consequences, if at the conclusion of the Council of Trent a Philip had governed Germany?

It was this question even more than anxiety as to the fate of the imprisoned princes, which filled Germany with vague ferment and uneasiness. Maurice of Saxony assembled his troops at Magdeburg, with the secret connivance of other German princes, "awaiting," as he said, "which way the wind should blow."

Before long it was decidedly favourable. France concluded a peace with England, and allied itself with the opposition in Germany and Italy. The storm which had long been gathering now burst over the head of the aged conqueror, and forced him to bend before it.

It was a proof of weakness in him to desire the main-

tenance of so unnatural an union after his own death, and to endeavour to bestow upon his son, who was unfit for such a station, the sovereignty of Germany; it was also an act of injustice towards his brother's family. He was heavily punished for his fault; no mitigating circumstances interposed to arrest the inevitable course of events.

That which most concerns us here is the great change produced in the situation of Germany.

The chancellor of Electoral Brandenburg, Lambert Distelmeyer, once remarked to his sovereign, that the Emperor's schemes would ultimately be of advantage to Germany, for they would compel King Ferdinand to desert him.* Distelmeyer's prediction was fulfilled.

In the course of the long and doubtful negotiation which was carried on upon the matter in the Emperor's family, Ferdinand sometimes appeared to give way; but he never did so in reality; his privy councillor, Hoffmann, whose long-forgotten name deserves to be had in remembrance for this one good service alone, was never gained over to the Emperor's side. There was another whose voice was most important of all, and who remained firm; this was the son of Ferdinand, who had hopes of succeeding him in the Empire, King Maximilian. Since the year 1548 they had been secretly endeavouring to come to an understanding with the German princes, and all were united by common hatred of the Emperor's foreign advisers and what was called the Spanish scheme.

* Gundling, Auszug Churbrandenburgischer Geschichten (Extracts from the history of Electoral Brandenburg), in his Account of the Life of Martin Lampert Distelmeyer, p. 124. See also the Extracts from Marillac's Despatches in F. v. Raumer's Briefe aus Paris (Letters from Paris).

The great successes achieved by the Elector of Saxony when he marched against the Emperor on the Danube, will not seem so surprising when we consider that his cause was that of nearly all the German princes. Even Ferdinand himself was to a certain extent his ally.

This was a very unexpected turn of affairs.

It was not Maurice only who had deserted Charles; in fact, all those who had been on his side at Ingolstadt and Mühlberg, were now united against him.

Charles V. knew this well. He sought for help from those whom he had then subdued. The very Elector whom he had formerly plundered was now taken into his confidence. The towns of Lower Saxony had always been the Elector's most faithful allies; the court of Austria now strove to gain them over to its side as well as himself. No country had more often and more heavily felt the might of Austria, and her preponderance in the Empire, than Wirtemberg; nevertheless, Charles hoped to obtain the support of the young Duke Christopher for his son Philip, to persuade him that "none were more fitted to head the Empire than his Majesty's son."* Whatever disturbances took place in Germany between 1552 and 1555,—even the feuds of Margrave Albrecht, who was not always forsaken by the Emperor, may be traced to these schemes.†

* On this subject Pfister has some well-founded observations in his History of Duke Christopher of Wirtemburg, p. 213. It is much to be wished, that papers of so much importance as the documents which the author made use of in this book were published more fully.

† It appears to me that the following passage from Soriano throws much light upon this subject which has not been satis actorily cleared up by Lang in his Neuere Geschichte des Fürstenthums Baireuth (History

It was not till the year 1555 that the Emperor altogether abandoned them. Perhaps it was the decided attitude of hostility assumed towards him by Pope Paul IV., which, after causing a renewal of the war with France, finally destroyed this plan also. The sanction of such a Pope to so far-reaching a plan for the election of Roman emperors and kings was not to be hoped for, even if the German nation could have been brought to consent to it. In reply to Ferdinand's request, that he would make peace with France in order that the dissensions in Germany might then be allayed, Charles said that in consequence of his own illness and of those very French affairs, he was unable to devote himself to those of Germany, and that he left them altogether to his brother.* He empowered him to treat and to conclude without reference to himself. This was in itself almost an abdication.

of the Principality of Baireuth), vol. ii." "L'anno passato, quando il marchese era in arme e si temeva ch' assaltasse la Bohemia, non si potè indurre mai l' imperatore a sententiarlo al bando imperiale come autore delli tumulti di Germania finchè non fu rotto tre o quatro volte e benchè fosse bandito per la camera imperiale di Spira: perro si trovo no lettere dell' imperatore scritte a quel marchese con tutti i titoli che si solevano dargli prima che fusse dichiarato ribelle." Upon these matters, indeed, Schmidt did not touch, although he was acquainted with Soriano.

* Delfino, Informatione, has this word for word: — "Risponde S. M. che alle cose di Germania non puo attendere per la malattia e negozj della guerra della Francia, e rimettendo il tutto al ser^mo^ rè cominciò allora come mi fu dopo affermato a parlare di volersi ritirare in Ispagna et lasciare l' impero." In another place he says: "L'imperatore scrisse l' anno del 55 al ser^mo^ Ferdinando ch' egli non voleva saper piu cosa nè di diete nè di altri negoci di Germania, e che intendeva rinunziare quel carico." The king begged him not to do so, as he saw "che all' imperio era gran freno solo il nome di Carlo V." Nevertheless, "L' imperatore scrisse assolutamente di voler cosi, tanto piu, che pensava di lasciar ogni cura mondana." According to this Charles's abdication took place in 1555, in all save the mere formalities.

Hereupon the conduct of German affairs was entirely withdrawn from the hands of foreign counsellors, especially those of Granvella, who is accused of having, in revenge, kept a number of the papers relating to them. Th measure which had been so strongly urged at Passau, for appointing to the Imperial council natives of Germany under a German president, was now carried into effect.

The connection with France had been given up as soon as the selfish motives of those pretended deliverers became apparent. "Germany," as the Rheingrave expressed it, "once more became German."

By this turn of events, those princes and estates who had at first been against the Emperor, and then either openly or secretly more or less for him, were vanquished a second time. Those who, in the beginning, had been on his side, or, at any rate, not against him, and who afterwards took part in various degrees in the opposition, still retained the upper hand throughout the Empire. It was under their auspices that, when the Emperor's influence was at an end, and the agents of the Pope had departed, the diet was brought to a conclusion, and the peace was agreed upon and kept.*

It is not the wording of a treaty or a few of its articles which usually render it binding, but a real concurrence of interests — the fact that those who conclude it should be agreed at least upon the main points. This was the case with the leading German sovereigns who formed the moderate party in Germany at that time.

* "Vedendosi," as Delfino says, "il ser^mo re senza ministro alcuno della sede apostolica."

CHAP. IV.

PERSONAL RELATIONS OF THE GERMAN PRINCES.

THE most powerful and the richest prince of Germany at the period of which we are treating was Elector Augustus of Saxony. His brother Maurice had achieved the great position which he was destined to enjoy and to enlarge. Of late years the old differences between the Saxon houses had been revived. John Frederick's connection with Bohemia rendered him utterly hostile to Ferdinand. For this very reason there was a natural alliance between Maurice and Ferdinand, which Augustus, who had been brought up at the King's court, took up and continued. Augustus pursued a very determined course of politics, both in his own dominions, which he raised in importance*, but ruled in an arbitrary and relentless manner, and also

* It is not, however, to be taken for granted that he had a revenue of seven millions of thalers, although this is according to the most moderate Saxon accounts. In our Venetian reports we find that his revenue on his elevation to the throne may have amounted to 500,000 thalers; at his death it was reckoned to amount to 2,000,000. According to Jacopo Soranzo (Lettere delle Cose di Sassonia. Di Praga, 14 Oct. 1586. Roma, Bibl. Barberina) impartial people reckoned it at about 1,500,000. This is an enormous sum, and an extraordinary increase. It consisted chiefly, and we shall see in how large a proportion, of the produce of mines, as well as of taxes levied somewhat harshly. The tax on drinks brought in 400,000 thalers. I cannot discover that these imposts were necessary, nor that they were especially useful. The Elector saved an immense treasure. "Resta l' erario," says J. Soranzo, "tenuto in una gran sala, dove fui introdotto, e lo viddi in bote, casse e sacchi; affermano coloro per la somma di 30 milioni di taleri, ma mi riporto alla verità, che mi par molto a persuadermi, che possino ascendere a 20 milioni; ma arrivando anco (only) a questa somma mi par assai perchè non vi deve esser in Christianità principe, che vi si possa metter al paragone."

in the affairs of the Empire. He said himself, that "what he had once taken into his head must be done." It is very characteristic of him, that when he was forty years of age, he learnt Latin, in order that he might be a real Elector, such as is required by the Golden Bull. In the Diets he displayed the personal superiority which was of such consequence in those days, when the most important affairs were transacted verbally. He was eloquent and dignified. The envoys from foreign courts,—Tuscany and Venice, France and England, Poland and Denmark,—courted him more than any prince of the Empire.

Joachim II., of Brandenburg, was a man of a very different stamp: good-natured, magnificent, and generous; a prince who wished to live and let live. His policy was, to carry out the Reformation without violence, by gradual changes, and avoiding much dispute with the Emperor or the Empire. Amid the tempests which shook or overthrew the other German States, he managed to maintain, in the Mark of Brandenburg, the peace which it so greatly needed. Never before had it enjoyed such a period of commercial prosperity, such activity of manufactures, or produced so many distinguished men of learning and science. It is true that Joachim did not, like Augustus, amass a treasure; on the contrary, he left considerable debts, while his brother Margrave Hans, of Cüstrin, governed his small dominions with the economy which amasses for the future. This talent the Elector did not possess. It must, however, be confessed that parsimony would never have extended his dominions, or obtained Magdeburg and the succession of Prussia for his son: if he had thought only of saving money, he would

never have gained the powerful influence which he exercised in the Empire.* He had always been more allied with the Albertine than with the Ernestine house of Saxony. Having been educated at the court of Maximilian I., he was on friendly and confidential terms with his descendants, especially with Ferdinand. They called him their father; and, indeed, he was one to them.

Saxony and Brandenburg, united as they were under these princes and their successors, had a very powerful influence in the Empire, especially the northern part of it. They renewed the ancient hereditary alliance with Philip of Hessen, and his son. The Duke of Pomerania received the oaths of allegiance in the presence of envoys from Brandenburg. Julius of Brunswick had in his earlier years found an asylum in Berlin, and he now governed according to the advice of Joachim II.

The posture of affairs in Upper Germany seemed more threatening. The Emperor, as we have already seen, endeavoured to avail himself of the old disputes between Wirtemberg and King Ferdinand, to the prejudice of the latter. In this, however, he did not succeed. At Heilbronn, King Ferdinand joined the Heidelberg league, of which Duke Christopher of Wirtemberg was the chief. I have found documents to prove that this league secretly had a tendency rather adverse to the Emperor than favour-

* Nic. Leutingeri contains a rich collection of notices concerning Joachim II. and his times in his book "De Marchia ejusque Statu Joachimo I. et Joachimo II. principibus electoribus Commentarii." See among other passages, vol. xviii. p. 632. He speaks also of the neighbouring princes judiciously. Möbsen in his "Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg" (History of the March of Brandenburg) has collected materials with much appreciation for what is worth knowing among others. Sect. 50.

able to him.* It is true that the league at its termination was not renewed, but it was amply compensated by the strong personal attachment between Christopher and Maximilian which time had increased and elevated. Their friendship may not have been quite so romantic as it has been represented; but it was manly, rational, and hearty. It was by no means limited to sending each other the wine of their respective countries, or the requirements for the chase. They held close and friendly counsel on the most important affairs of Church and State. They mutually exhorted each other; Christopher admonished the King to adhere to the true undoubted religion, and to promote the still further extension of God's word. Maximilian requested the Duke carefully to maintain the unity of the Lutheran Church, and to disregard the unfavourable rumours which had been spread concerning the intentions of the Emperor. Their policy as well as their sentiments coincided on many points. They repeatedly exchanged assurances,—on Maximilian's part, that he desired from the

* As far as I know, Sattler has but one notice of this treaty of Heilbronn, and that is meagre enough, in his "Geschichte der Herzoge von Würtemberg" (History of the Dukes of Wirtemberg), vol. iv. p. 58. Soriano's report for 1554 is somewhat more full, but scarcely quite accurate:—"L' altra (lega) che fu conclusa in Hailpron terra di Franconia, nella quale il ser^mo re de Romani, li conti Palatini, duche di Baviera, de Vertimberg e di Cleves, l' arcivescovo di Salispurg et alcuni altri principi sono obligati con un certo numero di forze alla difesa e conservatione l' uno dell' altro contra quoscunque. La conclusione della quale dieta non ho potuto vedere, perchè il ser^mo re di Romani non ha voluto che sii publicata, e la causa come intesi, fu perchè S. M. non è nominata come principal contraente, ma come aggiunto; e mi disse il s^mo re di Bohemia che S. M tratasse alcuna cosa contra l' imperatore, ma ch' anco contra S. M. Cesarea sarebbe quella lega, quando ella tentasse di voler molestar i confederati in' qualche cosa, li quali hanno da stare con le sue forze deputate all ordine."

bottom of his heart to please his friend in all things, great and small; and on Christopher's, that the King should ever find him ready and willing to do him service: and accordingly, spite of the general dissensions which so nearly affected them, they remained faithfully attached until death.* Maximilian lamented his friend in noble terms as a wise, righteous, and peaceful prince, whom he and the whole nation did indeed yet stand in need of for the furtherance of the common weal. Certainly it was a great advantage to Maximilian to have Christopher on his side. He was straightforward, active, honest, and resolute, and possessed the happy talent of carrying out his views—in short, he was what was then called "effectual." He stood on cordial terms with the Landgrave of Hessen, to whose house he owed the recovery of his dominions, and also with the Palatine. Over the latter, he possessed great influence. It was mainly owing to Duke Christopher that the Elector Palatine at length gave his vote to Maximilian, whose election he had long opposed.†

Of no less advantage was it to the Emperor that two powerful princes of the Empire, whose ancestors had often led the opposition against Austria—the Dukes of Cleves

* Their correspondence dates from 1554 to 1568, commencing about the time of the treaty of Heilbronn and ending with the death of Christopher; we should ever be grateful to the memory of Gemmingen and Lebret for making it public. Lebret's "Magazin zum gebrauch der Kirchen-und Staaten-geschichte" (Magazine for the use of Church and State History), vol. ix.

† The negotiations which preceded this election collected by Veit Stoss, and published by Moser in his appendix to Franz I. Wahlcapitulation (Capitularies of the Election of Francis I.), are of great value towards a knowledge of the internal relations between the Electoral Princes. Häberlin, "neueste Deutsche Reichsgeschichte" (later History of the German Empire), vol. iv. p. 467—636. has made a long extract from this.

and Bavaria—were his sons-in-law, and on good terms with him.* At the court of Charles V., Albert of Bavaria had always shown an especial aversion to the Spaniards; he would not even return their salutes, and he now attached himself the more to the interests of the German line. At Maximilian's election he undertook the office of Imperial Commissioner, and promised to hazard life and land for his success. When the league of Heidelberg and Heilbronn expired, it was chiefly through his exertions that another was formed at Landsberg. The bishops of Salzburg, Würzburg, and Bamberg, the towns of Augsburg and Nürnberg joined him in it; the Emperor also belonged to it, and thus acquired a special influence over Bavaria and Franconia.

In this manner the power of the Emperor extended over the whole of Germany through the various circles, each of which had its own centre. It made little difference whether a prince was Catholic or Protestant. They felt that they could not do without each other. The Emperor's sanction legalized the proceedings of the Protestant princes; but he still liked to see the envoys of Brandenburg and Saxony appear at the Hungarian Diets, or at the swearing allegiance in Bohemia. It was a free and voluntary co-operation of the leading German princes, and more important to peace and security than any formal treaty.

* Soriano. "Il Duca di Baviera et il Duca di Cleves, tutti due sue generi, mostrano verso S. M. segni d'amore e di riverenza."

CHAP. V.

FERDINAND I.

It is very remakable how well Ferdinand learnt to conform to German manners and customs; it was more than could have been expected of him.

He was born in Spain, and with some prospect of succeeding to the throne, for which reason he had been carefully educated according to the customs of that country. He had grown up beside his melancholy mother and his solemn grandfather, Ferdinand the Catholic. When the latter one day saw him at Burgos walking up and down with the learned, resolute, and warlike Cardinal Ximenes, he pronounced him to be fortunate in his companion.* And what a companion for a prince who had no inheritance to expect but a small German territory, such as Austria then was!

Things turned out very differently from what might have been anticipated. The mother, sunk in her own melancholy, and secluded from the world, and the elder Ferdinand, entirely absorbed by worldly affairs, were fond of the pretty, fair-haired, lively boy, but unable to devote much attention to him; he was accordingly left to the free development of his natural character.

When, however, Charles really occupied the throne of Spain, and left Austria to Ferdinand, the latter found it very difficult to reconcile himself to living in Germany.

* Breve Relacion del Infante Fernando, hermano del Emperador; from Fray Alvaro Osorio de Moscoso in Sandoval, "vida y hechos del Emperador Carlos V.," lib. i. sect. 64.

He learnt the language slowly; and his appearance, pale, thin, and ill-favoured as he was, was very foreign, especially when riding seated firmly on his horse at tournaments and hunts. He passed for proud and ambitious, and had a Spaniard as his most confidential counsellor. The Austrian dominions had not passed without disturbance, after the death of Maximilian, into the hands of his grandsons, and the dissatisfaction was increased when Ferdinand raised the taxes, and endeavoured to redeem the mortgaged lands. As we have already said, he, too, did not like his residence there. He would have been better pleased if his brother had made over to him his new conquest of Milan, uncertain as the possession of it necessarily was. I have discovered that he once even offered to cede Austria in exchange for it.

He soon, however, found himself deeply involved in the interests of the country he was called upon to govern.

The battle of Mohacz gained him the succession to Bohemia and Hungary, but at the same time involved him in a war with the Turks; — foes who, in a few years, sought him beneath the very walls of Vienna.

As King of Rome he was his brother's lawful vicegerent in Germany during the absence of the latter; and the internal dissensions of that country soon afforded him occupation enough.

Affairs of such universal importance henceforth gave interest and significance to his life. They put an end to his uneasiness and discontent by opening a career for his activity.

All jealousy and discord between Ferdinand and his brother were at an end. They now exhibited the unity

of thought and feeling, the unpremeditated unconscious accord, which betokens inward brotherhood, not mere accidental relationship. It appeared as though, during the remainder of their lives, they would never again be of different minds. The Emperor, as the elder, more gifted and more powerful of the two, naturally exercised the chief influence. The King revered Charles as his Emperor and Lord, and looked upon his will as law.

With all this they were very unlike in temperament, and totally opposite in personal appearance. The Emperor, as we know, was phlegmatic, slow, grave, severe, and silent towards every one. At the Diet of 1548 it caused much surprise that he should keep in his pay so many singers and musicians, and yet never hear any music. Very different were the habits of King Ferdinand, in whose palace there was every day banqueting and music, and whatever other diversions were in use at the time. Ferdinand was hot and hasty, but full of the good humour and frankness which win all hearts. He talked freely with every one and on all subjects. He was generous and magnificent. By degrees he had adopted the German customs completely, and had learned to live with the German princes after their own fashion, and like one of themselves. Like them he left the management of a great part of his affairs to his servants and counsellors; like them he was, on the whole, fond of peace and quiet, and accommodated himself to circumstances. He gained popularity among the masses by being lenient in punishing, indulgent in conversation, gracious, plain, and unaffected in his behaviour.*

* Niccolo Theupolo (Tiepolo), Rel^e di Germania. MSS. contained in the Chronicle of Sanuto. "Di complexion e costumi quasi in tutte diversi;

It is true that during the active period of his mature life, when he displayed his real power, he was not entirely free from the harshness and obstinacy which he showed in the beginning. When he was offended his original character was apt to break out; it was said that he never forgave any offence against his honour or dignity. He took the field in person, which he had never done before, against John Frederick, who, as he asserted, had aspired to the crown of Bohemia: and on this occasion he was one of the first to cross the Elbe at Mühlberg. After obtaining the victory, he addressed his prisoner in a tone of violence which, under the circumstances, amounted almost to cruelty. It has also been supposed that he hesitated so long about entering into a treaty with Zapolya at the greatest risk to himself, because he was offended at the thought of a mere private man contending with him for the possession of a crown.* He afterwards visited his wrath upon the Bohemian nation.

It is remarkable that of these two brothers the one who grew up in the Netherlands gradually departed from the German manners and customs; while he who was educated

ambi savii, prudenti e molte intelligenti di tutte le cose; ma l' imperatore piu reservato, piu considerato e piu grave;—questo piu pronto, piu efficace, piu espedito;—in vero principe di molto spirito, ambitioso di honore, desideroso di esser risguardato."—

* Soriano. "Riputandosi ad ingiuria ch' una persona privata havesse avuto ardire di contendere seco per un regno che per molte ragioni, antiche e nuove, doveva pervenire a lui, e fu che senti allora S. M. che disse che voleva piu tosto spendere tutti gli altri suoi regni, che sopportare che colui regnasse."

in Spain entirely adopted them.* The political causes and results of this were manifold.

When Charles tried to get possession of the Empire for his son, the old disputes between the two brothers were revived. The claims upon Wirtemberg gave rise to angry and bitter words.

Hereupon Ferdinand allied himself still more closely with his German subjects, whose dissatisfaction against the Emperor decided the question of the succession in his favour. Against the Pope, who offered some opposition to it, he even sought support from Protestantism.

He succeeded in gaining the full confidence of the German people. They admired his steady resistance to the foreign counsellors of Charles V., and what Schwendi called the "diligent, faithful, and paternal endeavours wherewithal he had accomplished the treaty of Passau and the peace of Augsburg." On one occasion, he rejected the demands of the clergy; on another, he condemned the conduct of the Protestants, in both cases without caprice, and moved only by a love of justice; both parties submitted with a good grace, conscious of his sincerity and impartial goodwill.†

* It seemed, however, more so than the Italians liked. Relne delli ambri Estraordrii Veneti, Zuanne Capello e Bernardino Navagier, all' impr Ferdinando, 1558. MSS. in Professor Ranke's possession. "Non e S. M. molto cerimoniosa ma molto umile e libera, talche per la sua humilta è poco temuta ed obbedita: non veste pomposamente: va levandosi la mattina dal letto, s' introduce ogn'uno nella camera et ivi comparisce allacciandosi le calze, con un scuffiato di tela in testa, onde a ogn'uno risponde e parla con ogn'uno, e quando noi eravamo nella camera di S. M. parlando con lei e stando S. M. e noi in piedi, due o tre volte si parti di noi, lasciandoci e ritornando solo per parlare con questo e con quello con poca dignità e riputatione sua."

† Schwendi, On the Government of the Holy Roman Empire, sect. 53

He himself was a Catholic, but he tolerated in his own dominions, though with rather more repugnance, what he was forced to endure in Germany.* He had Lutherans about his court, and even in his own household, and appeared not to remark the difference of faith. He was satisfied if those about him were of good lives and irreproachable conduct: on that point he was inexorable; his court had to shape its manners accordingly, and even the foreign ambassadors were obliged to conform, as they could not hope by any other means to acquire the influence which is inseparable from personal sympathy and agreement.†

It is with great satisfaction that we contemplate men advanced in life who have shaken off the harder and fiercer passions of their earlier years, and thus display more and more the original groundwork of a good and pure nature. This was the case with Ferdinand; and thus do we find him described by the ambassadors from foreign powers. "Let him die when he may," says Micheli, who quitted him in the year 1564, during his last illness, "his death must grieve all men. In him will

* Rel^ne di Micheli 1564. "Ferdinando, Catholico come si sa, sopra tutti gli altri principi non ha comportato che sia dato fastidio alli Protestanti, ma ha lasciato vivere ciascuno nel senso suo, non dico tanto nella Germania, quanto nelli proprii suoi stati, anzi che pareva piu strano nella propria sua casa, nella quale ciascuno vivvea al modo suo, e facea vista di non vedere."

† Michael Soriano. "Quelli sono amati chi hanno i costumi conformi alla M. S., la quale stima sopr' ogni altra cosa la religione, la modestia, e la bontà della vita, e di queste parti ne fanno gran professione li suoi conseglieri e tutti chi li sono piu cari. Onde niuna cosa può fargli un ambasciatore più grata che questi costumi, costumi propri da buon Christiano e di vita civile e d' huom veramente di republica, et all' incontro questi, chi hanno costumi diversi o contrarii a questi, sono riputati leggieri e scandalosi, e sono poco amati del ser^mo re, e poco stimati della corte."

die one of the best princes of our time—a prince peaceable by nature and by choice: his unspotted life, his continual fear of God, and, above all, his kindness and graciousness make him worthy to be held a saint." His own subjects thought the same of him. Schwendi calls him "the right praiseworthy and holy emperor, and father of the fatherland."

Such was the character and such the sentiments of this German Emperor and of the other contemporary rulers of Germany. It was a remarkable generation of princes. On closer investigation it appears that most of the constitutions which have lasted down to quite recent times were given to their dominions by the princes of this period. The great movement of the Reformation, and the combination of temporal and spiritual affairs, which they had to reduce to form and order, gave an unusual impulse to their mental powers. The greatness of their task expanded their ideas, while experience and change of fortune taught them moderation in their opinions and projects. They were vigorous and resolute, reasonable and peaceable, and they were united by the great common interests of Germany.

CHAP VI.

STATE OF THE GERMAN NATION.

It may well be urged that a political union between the German princes would be of small avail so long as a rooted hostility existed between the Catholic and Protestant popu-

lations, and their mutual antipathies rendered them adverse to any projects of reconciliation.

No doubt this is true; and far from attempting to dispute it, I go a step further, and assert that no such union could have taken place unless the nation had been, to a certain degree unanimous, and unless the animosities among the lower classes had been, not indeed at an end, but somewhat suppressed by the preponderance of one set of opinions.

I have come to the conclusion, that between the years 1560-70 the reformed doctrines had decidedly gained the upper hand in Germany.

We know that they were dominant in Upper and Lower Saxony, that they encountered a very feeble resistance from the Franconian bishoprics, and took root within their very territories; that in Swabia the nobles and the towns welcomed and adopted them from the very first. But they had likewise made considerable progress in Bavaria and Austria, in Westphalia and on the Rhine. In Bavaria Albert V. was forced to make large concessions in their favour — a subject to which I shall revert — and it is remarkable that he himself who afterwards became so strict a Catholic in the year 1561 voluntarily went with his whole court to hear the sermons of the Calvinist preacher Pfauser at Neuburg.* Even so late as the year 1570, the Duke himself informed the Pope that a great number of his nobles were so strongly attached to the new doctrines that they would rather live without services or sacraments than return to the ancient rites.†

* Sitzinger in Strobel, Leben von J. Seb. Pfauser, Beitrage zur Literatur (Life of J. S. Pfauser, Contributions to Literature), vol. i. p. 313.

† Relatio de infelici Statu Bavariæ ad Pium V. MSS. archivio Val. No.

In the year 1563, four districts in Salzburg demanded the sacramental cup for the laity, and the Archbishop told the Council that no human power would induce them to desist from the demand. Lutheran congregations continued to exist there in secret for a very long time.*

In Austria the Lutheran doctrines had been received with especial ardour. The nobles visited the Protestant Universities. Within a short space of time three young Austrian nobles filled the office of Rector of the University of Wittenberg, according to the custom of the period. Some of the principal Jesuit schools were dissolved because no native Austrians would send their sons to them. Austria and Styria were filled with Lutheran preachers who were introduced there by the nobles and tolerated, if not favoured, by the government.†

Schwendi asserts about the year 1570, that nearly the whole body of nobles throughout the Empire, in Catholic as well as in Lutheran States, was attached to the new religion, and that those who did not profess these opinions openly held them in secret.‡

"The canons of the Cathedrals," he adds, "were mostly either inclined to the same faith, or cold and indifferent. The convents were no longer supported, and no masses

3221. p. 418. There is a copy in the Bibliotheca Vallicelliana at Rome, No. 20. p. 175. "Noverit Sanctitas V^ra^ magnam Bavariæ nobilitatis partem hæresi infectam esse et malle sine sacramentis et religione vivere, quam se ad fidei catholicæ unitatem recipere."

* Göcking, "Emigrations-geschichte der Salzburger" (History of the Salzburg Emigration, p. 86.).

† Raupach, "Evangelisches Oestereich" (Lutheran Austria), vol. i. p. 58, and other passages.

‡ Schwendi, "Von Regierung des Röm. Reichs" (On the Government of the Holy Roman Empire), sect. 38—43.

were founded." The Duke of Bavaria in his report knows not how to describe the condition of the clergy in sufficiently dark colours. The monks, he said, had left their convents, and no sooner had they become parish priests than they made haste to take unto themselves wives.* Staphylus maintains that throughout Germany there was barely one priest out of every hundred unmarried.† At Münster, among other places, all the priests were married; it even afforded the curious spectacle of female canons of the cathedral.

With such a state of things as this, it was manifestly impossible to force the people to adhere to the ancient faith. The lower classes had lost all reverence for the ceremonies of the Church, and went away as soon as the sermon was at an end, and if that was not to their mind they read Protestant sermons at home or listened to the preaching of men of their own class. No one would enter the convents, hearken to the doctrine of purgatory, or perform pilgrimages or observances of that kind.

Even the potentates who had remained Catholic had lost all reverence for the See of Rome. Ferdinand himself constantly ridiculed the curia and its pretended reforms. "Formerly," says the Imperial Vice-chancellor, Seld, "the Roman See was almost worshipped; now it is despised;

* Relatio de infelici Statu Bavariæ. "Monachi quam plurimum in parochiis extra monasteria degunt, concubinas sicut et reliqui clerici fovent et liberos procreant potationibus addicti et ignorantes. In diversis Bavariæ locis multa sunt beneficia, quæ nemini conferuntur nec a multis annis collata fuere."

† Letter of Staphylus in Strobel's Beiträgen zur Literatur (Contributions towards Literature), vol. i. p. 265.

formerly the Papal interdict was more feared than death, now it is laughed at. The life and doings at Rome are now so well known to the whole world that nearly all men, be they who they may, whether of the old or of the new religion, do hold them in abhorrence."

This general falling away of the whole nation from the papacy is also described in the reports of foreigners.*

"The princes and people of Germany," says Soriano, in 1554, "are one and all infected with heresy. The Church of Rome has but little authority over them, and that little it is losing every day."

In 1557 Tiepolo finds the Protestants full of courage, and the Catholics lukewarm and irresolute. "Were I called upon to give an opinion," says he, "I should say that this country would soon be entirely alienated from the Church of Rome."

At this very time Badoer was with the Emperor. The description which he gives of Germany shows at least that he took the trouble to make himself well acquainted with it. He asserts that seven-tenths of Germany had become Lutheran, and that only one-tenth was Catholic: the rest, he says, had joined the other sects.†

This decisive majority of the non-Catholic population determined the condition of Germany, its internal peace and its political attitude.

Germany was not then, as it has been since, completely divided into a Catholic and a Protestant portion. The

* Consilium, or Memorial to the Emperor Ferdinand, &c. Seld, p. 90.

† Badoero, Rel^ne. "Delle dieci parti le sette sono Luterani, due delle altre opinione et una di Catolici." He also finds that the Catholics must go to the wall.

two parties were every where dwelling side by side; neither was there as yet any of the fierce sectarian hatred which afterwards raged. Even the spiritual princes had not begun to persecute their subjects for religion's sake; the most determined Protestants extol their conciliatory and well-meaning declarations of 1562; and for a long time their conduct was in accordance with their declarations. Nor was this to be wondered at, for among all their councillors and chancellors it would have been hard to find above one Catholic; the rest were Protestants, and some of them very violent Protestants.*

In the year 1564 Micheli does not apprehend danger for Germany from the religious differences. "One party," says he, "has got so used to tolerating the other that in places where both religions prevail, it is scarcely observed whether a man be Catholic or Protestant. Nor is it only in the same community, but even in the same family, that this mixture of religious faiths exists. There are houses in which the parents follow one creed and the children another. Brothers profess different faiths, and Catholics and Protestants intermarry. No one takes any notice of

* Relatione del Commendone dello Stato della Religione in Germania, —composed after Commendone's mission to the Diet of Naumberg; not so full of details as might have been wished, but still very remarkable. MSS. in the Bib. Vallicelliana at Rome. St. 19. n° 14.: "Li Catolici principi non ardiscono di mostrarsi e si avvezzano tuttavia a tolerar molti inconvenienti."—He remarks that they were not in earnest. "Essi Catolici sono disuniti et hanno i vasalli e le corti loro corrotte, che molti prelati hanno appresso di loro un solo consigliere o un solo servitore Catolico nè sanno di chi fidarsi, anzi vi sono di quelli, i quali ritengono studiosam anche a canto de' piu arrabiati heretici per potersene secondo l' occasione valere con i principi Protestanti."

it, or is at all offended thereat." Throughout the Empire, even where Protestantism had not received the sanction of the government, in the country, in the towns, and in families, a spontaneous practical toleration was established.

There are a few other points on which I wish to touch in connection with this subject.

There is a very prevalent opinion that the progress of poetry and literature in Germany received a severe check from the effects of the Reformation.

But was it not the religious movement which first gave interest to the writings of the Meister Sänger, whose tedious compositions had for some time superseded the ancient form of poetry? Did it not likewise produce the enthusiastic expression of the religious thought and feeling of Germany contained in the Protestant hymns? Master Hans Sachs sets forth in an honest, pleasant, ingenious, and instructive manner, the views and sentiments of the German burgher class. No one has ever equalled him in his own peculiar style, and his works will ever retain their interest. The poetry of Rollenhagen and Fischart is imbued with the vigour, simplicity, warmth, and sincerity, of the German character.

Nor should we overlook the merits of the Chronicles of the sixteenth century: they are written with research, patriotic feeling, and that straightforward manly honesty which is so useful both in action and in writing.

The spirit of the German nation was still active, unperverted, and productive. The legends of Faustus and the Wandering Jew, so full of deep meaning, and numbers

of beautiful and tender popular songs*, without doubt owe their existence to the sixteenth century.

The genius of the nation, which by a great spontaneous effort had reawakened a deeper and purer form of religion, would hardly, in so doing, have destroyed its own works.

The productions of this time lack, it is true, that elegance of style which is only produced by an intentional and conscious restraint put by the writer upon the abundance of his own thoughts ; they possess the merits of ingenuity, thoughtfulness, and variety, rather than any excellence of style. But it would be difficult to say which other period of German literature could be compared with this entirely to its own advantage. Certainly not our own. The merit of thoughtful simplicity, at least, is entirely wanting to us.

The national spirit of Germany, at that time still vigorous and healthy, seemed to be only awaiting the moment when the religious dissensions should cease, in order to try its strength in every field of action useful and honourable to mankind.

It has likewise been asserted that, towards the middle of the sixteenth century, the trade and prosperity of the German towns were almost entirely destroyed by the discovery of new channels of commerce. This does not seem to me to have been the case.

* Among others, George Forster has collected them with much taste. I would refer especially to the elegant preface to his Frischen Liedlein (Lively Ballads), Nürnberg, 1552.

The Venetian ambassadors at all events, after, as well as before the Smalcaldic war, mention the German towns as one of the chief props of the nation. Badoer describes them as built in well-chosen sites, adorned with fine town-halls and palaces, and with numerous and vast churches, which he even prefers to those of Italy.* He says they were kept very clean, and inhabited by wealthy private people, and by the most skilful workmen in the world, all well armed and jealous of their liberties.

According to him, the seaports were by no means falling to decay. He reckons that Hamburg, Lübeck, Rostock, Dantzig, and Riga, had each of them from a hundred to a hundred and fifty ships of their own. Dantzig was, perhaps, the second or third commercial town of the world. The two great routes to the East, the old caravan road across Russia and the sea passage discovered by the Portuguese, both met here; it was the central market between Eastern and Western Europe, from four to five hundred ships were often lying there in the roads.†

The northern trade, too, was not yet destroyed. In 1560, by the treaty of Odensee, Denmark confirmed the

* "Le chiese molte e grandi e di maniera ornate, che vengono stimate superiori a quelle d' Italia." A remarkable judgment for an Italian. It may be that he refers especially to the Gothic churches, or that he means to say, that in fact whatever strikes the eye as large and massive in Italy must be attributed to a later time.

† "Rel^ne del cl^mo S^re Giralomo Lippomani, ritornato amb^re del re di Polonia. L'anno 1575." MSS. in Professor Ranke's possession. "Dansica dove entrano le navi nel tempo dell' estate, che alle volte il numero è di 400 in 500: è commodo e frequent^mo mercato della Suetia, Dania, Norwegia; Fiandria, Francia, Inghilterra, e Portegallo somministrando pani, vini, olii, zuccari e drogherie che vengono di quei paesi in Polonia, in Littuania, et altre provincie soggette ricevendo da quelle formenti, line, canove, lana, corame, mele e cere." There exist still more flaming accounts of this harbour.

Hanseatic towns in the enjoyment of their ancient privileges as the most favoured foreigners; they remained masters of the trade at Schonen, and possessed the herring fisheries on the Norwegian coast, which were extremely profitable.

In Sweden they had indeed lost their exclusive privileges, but they still had access and custom there. In defiance of the King, they opened the passage to Narva, in order to keep up a direct communication with Russia.

But by far their most important station was London — the privileges which they there enjoyed were so great, that in 1551 they exported 44,000 pieces of cloth from England, while the English carried only 1100 in their own bottoms. The connection of Charles V. with England, and the ability of his ambassador, Hans von Werdern, maintained them in their ancient privileges spite of all opposition. In 1554 they again exported 30,000 pieces of cloth, upon which, as may easily be supposed, they made an immense profit. Of course, however, the enjoyment of so overpowering an advantage, especially as those who enjoyed it did not keep very strictly within their lawful privileges, could not fail to call forth much opposition on the part of England; and the question was, how to meet this effectually and with discretion.

The trade between England and the Netherlands was still chiefly in the hands of the Hanseatic towns. In the year 1561 Philip II. confirmed the privileges enjoyed by the Dukes of Brabant, who built a splendid new palace at Antwerp, then the seat of the commerce of the world.*

* Sartorius, Geschichte des Hanseatischen Bundes (History of the Hanseatic League), vol. ii. book 14—17.

Their trade with France increased to such an extent that they now resolved, for the first time, to have a resident agent in that country. They performed their journeys to Lisbon in large companies.

There, as well as in Flanders, France, and the whole of Western Europe, they encountered on the same field with themselves the representatives of the great commercial towns of Upper Germany, which at this period were equally flourishing.

The Rhine and the Maine were enlivened by the trade between Antwerp and Nürnberg. The latter city derived its chief importance from the fact that it in a measure supplied the want of water communication between the Rhine and the Danube, the necessity of which had so often been insisted upon. It was calculated that from the mouth of the Rhine to the mouth of the Danube there was only 160 miles of land-carriage, and all this traffic passed through Nürnberg. Neither was it merely a place of barter; Silesian linen, Italian silk, and English cloth were dyed and prepared for the different markets; every one knows the variety of manufactures, many of them nearly allied to art, which found their way thither from all parts of the world, and the products of which were again exported to all countries. In the year 1544 one of our Venetian authors visited Nürnberg, and the acute Republican cannot refuse his tribute of admiration. He praises the frugality of the domestic life, the scarcity of splendid silks and furs in the dresses of the Nürnbergers, the moderation of their banquets; and observes, that as they are thus continually making money abroad, and saving it at home, they must grow richer every day. The affairs of the town, he

says, were conducted in the same spirit. He calculates that they annually saved three fourths of their revenue, and must, consequently, possess a fund of fifteen millions of florins. "If," says he, "Nürnberg be the daughter of Venice, it must be owned that in this respect she greatly excels her mother." At the same time there was, he tells us, no saving in the needful expenditure. The town was fortified and armed without regard to the cost: he saw there above 300 pieces of artillery, and a store of corn sufficient to last two years. The people, too, paid greater obedience to the ruling families there than any where else.* It is true that the latter had not as yet formed a separate order of nobility: they carried on trade like their ancestors and fellow-townsmen. Their native poet, Hans Sachs, says that wisdom, justice, and might were on their side.

Augsburg was no less flourishing. The expenses of the Smalcaldic war have been estimated at three millions of florins; but it is an error to suppose that the town never recovered that blow. In the year 1557 Badoer mentions it among the most prosperous towns. The richest money-

* Relatione di Germania, 1544, in Professor Ranke's possession. It appears to be written by Martin Cavalli, and is not to be found either in the archives of Vienna or Venice. "È fatta rep^ca libera e la piu potente di Germania. Hanno una bell^ma munition d' artegliarie, armature, et polvere, e se ben mi ricordo li pezze di bronzo sono più di 300, et oltre di queste hanno molte sale piene di formenti e di segali: le quale ho giudicato che passino 600^m stara Venez^ni che è il viver per piu di due anni per questa terra." With reference to the contingent, they were to provide for the empire: "Sempre per gratificare al re fanno qualche cosa di piu e sono li primi et li extremi: hanno nel governarsi grand^ma dexterità e s' intertengono con Catholici et Lutherani, talmente, che sicuramente vivono a modo suo e sono ben voluti di ogniuno senza nemicizia e malvolir d' alcuno." This is not a bad pendant to the beautiful panegyric upon Nürnberg by Hans Sachs.

changers in the world,—the Fuggers, Welsers, and Baumgartners, who carried on business to the amount of hundreds of thousands at once,—lived there. In the year 1560 Guicciardini calls it the richest and most powerful city of Germany. In 1566 the Emperor Maximilian and his wife were received there with the utmost splendour, and presented with magnificent gifts. It was not till the year 1567 that the town-council purchased costly silver plate, magnificent salvers and goblets*,—then the great article of German luxury,—in order more worthily to entertain royal and noble guests. The cosmographer, Münster, dwells with peculiar complacency upon Augsburg. He cannot sufficiently extol the equity with which the magistrates rule the people, the virtue and felicity in which the burghers dwell together and carry on their trade in foreign lands, "even unto the furthest quarters of the earth, and towards the four winds of heaven." How honourably they brought up their children; how each did vie with the other in the adornment and beauty of his house; how splendid, costly, and well-ordered was all their way of living.† The garden of the Fuggers excelled the park of Blois; and in 1559 the first tulip of Europe bloomed in the garden of Herwart.

These Upper German towns enjoyed the same kind of privileges in foreign countries as the Hanse Towns. In France they were renewed by Francis I. and Henry II. Like the Swiss, who were so closely allied with France, they were subject only to the ancient established taxes,

* Stetten, Geschichte von Augsburg (History of Augsburg), p. 567. 577.

† Münster's Cosmographie, p. 880.

and exempted from all new ones. Special rights were granted to them for the fair of Lyons. The parliaments of Paris and Rouen, Burgundy and Dauphiny, registered their warrants. Charles IX. confirmed them again in 1566.*

Of all the western towns, Lindau was, to the best of my knowledge, the most important. The transport of goods between Danzig and Genoa, between Nürnberg and Lyons, lay through Lindau. Our cosmographer calls it the Venice of Germany.

Vienna was the market in which Italy, which exported wine and silk, and Hungary, which sent cattle and hides, carried on their trade with the Danubian provinces, and with Poland and Bohemia. The road from Vienna to Lyons lay through Lindau.

The Frankfort fair was established and attended by English and Frenchmen, Italians and Hungarians, Poles and Russians. "There," says Scaliger, "the East and the West may each recognise their own productions; and there, too, lasting stores of information may be gathered."

These large towns had a very important influence upon the whole interior of Germany.

The Altmark of Brandenburg, for instance, was now most prosperous. In Stendahl alone there were 700 or 800 cloth weavers, and in the year 1547, so small a place as Gardelegen could raise 700 soldiers. Thousands of pockets of hops were exported. The transit of herrings afforded a

* Privilèges pour les marchands des villes de Augsbourg, Ulme, Nuremberg, Constance, Strasbourg, Norlingen, Memmingen, et autres villes et cités impériales de la nation Germanique, in Roth, Geschichte des Nürnbergischen Handels (History of the Trade of Nurnberg), vol. ii. p. 288. 306.

considerable profit. Even Berlin, strange to say, was now rich.*

The exportation of salt from Lüneburg, and of corn from Magdeburg, maintained the prosperity of those towns. Magdeburg was rich enough to defend itself against the Emperor Charles by means of a garrison which cost 4,000,000 of florins.† The Sale and the Spree were made navigable.

In Swabia trade was already carried on systematically, and by companies‡; men and women were employed in spinning and weaving linen. In Ulm 100,000 pieces of stuff and dimity were sold every year. The Italians remarked that this dimity was partly made of cotton, which had to be bought from them, so that the advantage was not solely on the side of the Germans.

Even if this were so, and as they maintained, the balance of profit was against Germany, the loss could then easily be borne. Perhaps the German copper mines were never more productive than at that time.

There is an ancient legend common to many districts, of the old man who sits underground beneath the mountains, guarding rich treasures behind iron doors. The meaning of this legend, which is obvious enough, at that time received a far more brilliant solution than could ever have been expected.

* Möhsen, Gesch. der Wissenschaft in der Mark Brandenb. (History of the Sciences in the March of Brandenburg), p. 483.

† Rathmann, Geschichte von Magdeburg (History of Magdeburg), vol. iii. p. 600.

‡ Münster, Cosmography, p. 527. Word for word as in Boemi Mores, &c., from whence Fischer drew his materials in his History of the Trade of Germany.

This was chiefly the case in the Erzgebirg.

We will not repeat the monstrous and incredible statements of the Cronica Carionis concerning the quantity of ore raised in the Schneeberg, spite of all the endeavours of the worthy Albinus to make them appear probable. But that it was extraordinary is evident from common report. The registers, although very incomplete, show, during the first seventy-nine years, that is until 1550, a profit of 2,000,000 of gulden groschen, or about 3,000,000 of dollars *, which were divided among the adventurers. In Annaberg above 5,000,000 of dollars between the years 1500 and 1600. In Freiberg, for a long time, from 50,000 to 60,000 gulden groschen annually,—making altogether above 4,000,000 of dollars in seventy-one years,—and in Marienberg, between the years 1520 and 1564, 3,000,000 of dollars were divided. Concerning all these places we have the most exact records.† The largest find, at Trinity, 1540, was celebrated in a song which still exists.‡ What I have mentioned were only the most considerable mines, and many others flourished at the same time; all the expences of mining and smelting had been already deducted from the sums I have mentioned. Nor

* Albinus, Meissnische Berg chronica (Chronicles of the Meissen Mines), p. 33. The accounts fail from the period previous to 1511.

† Gmelin, Geschichte des Deutschen Bergbaues (History of German Mining), p. 322.

‡ Marienbergische Geschichts-beitrage (Contributions towards the History of Marienberg), in the collection of Saxon History, vol. viii. "From a sure archive." The accounts of the find at Annaberg corrected by Gmelin, in the same collection, vol. x. p. 338. The song which is to be found in Albinus reckons the product of the mine at 113,262 florins: the actual accounts give 114,810, so that it is evident that the poet did not exaggerate.

do they include the tithe and royalty of the sovereign which were very considerable Moreover a good many taverns had been built out of the profits. Unquestionably the profits of the Saxon mines must have amounted in that century to 30,000,000 or 40,000,000 of dollars. Our Venetian asserts that 3000 dollars were coined daily in Dresden, which would amount to a million in the course of the year.

Some districts of Austria were equally rich. The produce of Joachimsthal was accurately recorded by every succeeding superintendant of the mines. Between the years 1516 and 1560, 4,000,000 dollars nett profit were divided. The miner, Merten Heidler, with the assistance only of his wife, raised ore to the value of 100,000 florins.

In the Leberthal no mines were sunk until the year 1525, but there were already above thirty silver mines in work, yielding nearly 7000 marks of silver annually, when solid veins of silver ore were discovered at Bachofen and St. Wilhelm.

The mines of Schwatz appeared inexhaustible. "There," says Münster, "untold wealth is ever dug and smelted by day and by night." The revenue drawn by Ferdinand from this mine has been estimated at 250,000 florins. Between the years 1526 and 1564 it produced above two million marks of silver, or upwards of twenty millions of florins.*

Meanwhile the old mines were not idle. At Rammelsberg Duke Henry the Younger, who was himself a skilful miner, carried on the work very actively; and it was

* Gmelin, Geschichte des Deutschen Bergbaues (History of German Mining), §§ 319, 320.

afterwards continued with still greater vigour by Duke Julius, who took it up where his father left off, at the Goslar shaft, and raised his annual profit to 20,000 dollars a year more than had been made by his father.*

When we take all this into account, and likewise remember how many other silver mines are mentioned by Matthesius in Bohemia alone — at Budweiss, for instance, above 23,000 marks were raised in seven years; Rohrbüchel yielded above 22,000 marks in the year 1552, and Rauris and Gastein "did mightily pour forth their gold," not to mention innumerable other mines — if we consider all this, we shall find that Germany contributed very little less to the whole mass of the precious metals current in the world than America during the first fifty years after her discovery. We now know indeed that the amount of treasure brought from the western hemisphere was not nearly so great as was formerly supposed.

Neither was the mere production of the silver the only advantage. The occupation of mining, which in itself is very important, from the peculiar isolation and liberty which characterises it, likewise called into existence a vast number of kindred trades. Duke Julius, "the true father of all working men," took care to keep the iron-works at Gittelde and the brass-foundry at Buntheim in good and efficient order. The armourers of Suhl already supplied Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Poland. No period was ever richer in new inventions or improvements upon old ones — they range from the finest lace-weaving to the huge machinery for mining, and include watches and time-

* Rehtmeyer, Chronik von Braunschweig (Chronicle of Brunswick), p. 1008.

pieces, celestial globes and mariners' compasses, which the German, George Hartman, manufactured with such care and nicety that his work led him to the discovery of the declination of the needle. And here we are immediately brought back to the consideration of the great intellectual movement.

Germany was filled with a general spirit of active and ingenious search after novelty and fresh means of power over the elements, which was closely connected with the intellectual preponderance which she still had in Europe. At the same time, as we gather from Münster's account, wealth and comfort were pretty generally diffused throughout the land. He tells us how the produce of the country found its way to the towns; how Schweinfurt and Uebenlingen were centres of the corn trade; how 200 towns, villages, and hamlets went to market at Worms; how the Alsatian wheat was exported to all the adjacent countries, and even through Churwalen to the frontiers of Italy; how chestnuts were transported northward by the Thuringian carriers, or sent down the river to England; and how the wine of Weissenberg found a market in Brabant and the Netherlands. It is with pleasure that we follow his description, which leads us down from the mountains, beginning with a minute description of the healing plants which grow upon them, along rivers and through districts filled with countless villages and well-situated castles, surrounded by oak and beech trees, to the hills on which the wine ripens, and thence to the fertile plains where the corn stands so high as nearly to reach the head of a man on horseback, and finally to the wondrous medicinal hot springs. He paints Germany as a summer landscape, gaily decked with various

fruits, and cultivated from end to end by myriads of busy hands; and, above all, inhabited by a people faithful, honest, and steadily attached to their ancient customs and their ancient virtues.

CHAP. VII.

OF THE MEANS WHEREBY THE PEACE OF GERMANY MIGHT HAVE BEEN PRESERVED.

WE will now return to the chief subject under consideration.

We are indeed naturally led to it by observing that this very minute description of Germany contains scarcely any allusion to the differences of religion. From time to time a sovereign or a town council is mentioned with praise, as having caused the pure word of God to be preached, but only in such terms as might be used of any other measure of public utility; and no blame is cast upon those who did not do the same thing.

Hence it appears pretty certain that the unity of Germany might at this period have been preserved without supposing the movement of the Reformation to have taken a different course.

Spite of all the storms by which that movement was accompanied, we find the nation powerful and distinguished by commercial activity; we see internal peace preserved by the Princes of Germany, and foreign influences jealously excluded.

The important question was, how to maintain this state of affairs; nor was the task altogether neglected.

An endeavour was made to remedy the evils arising from the religious divisions. The College of Electors was split into two halves — one consisting of the Spiritual and Catholic, and the other of the Temporal and Protestant Princes; and between these two parties very serious disputes had arisen. In the year 1588 they concluded a new alliance. They resolved to assist one another with word and deed, and to comport themselves in a brotherly and confiding manner one to another, not to exclude any one at future elections for religion's sake, and to keep the Empire in the German nation. The oath taken at the meeting of electors, which had been held from time to time ever since 1338, was now altered, so as to suit Protestants as well as Catholics. Greater care was exercised in the election of successors to the Empire, so as to ensure a safer and more undisturbed succession.*

Another use made of the tendencies of the Reformation was the enfranchisement of the Empire itself from the dependence in which it had hitherto been upon the Pope. Ferdinand assumed the Imperial crown, upon the abdication of Charles V., spite of all the protests of Paul IV., and Pius IV. agreed to that which he was unable to prevent. At the election of Maximilian even Catholic princes expressly insisted upon the omission of any mention of the Pope, and expressed a hope that for the future the Pope would rather have to seek his confirmation from the

* Compare this meeting of electors with those previously held, in Häberlin's Neueste Reichsgeschichte (Modern History of the Empire), vol. iii. pp. 449. 458.

Emperor than the Emperor from the Pope.* When the Imperial Vice-Chancellor drew up an elaborate report to prove that the Pope had no more right to claim an influence over the election of an emperor than over the accession to the throne of any other crowned head, the Imperial dignity in fact lost its European and Christian significance, and became assentially German in its character.

But this was by no means all that was needed to secure the prosperity of Germany.

Even perfect health implies a possibility of sickness; the most stable greatness contains the germ of decay, and all union the chance of division.

The wise and prudent statesman is mainly distinguished from the chattering herd, and the furious crowd of partizans by the recognition of remote elements of danger and the endeavour to counteract them.

There is no denying that these elements were peculiarly strong in the condition of Germany at that time. A fortunate concurrence of circumstances, which diverted them into another channel, prevented the utter ruin of the nation, but the fermentation was barely allayed, by no means subdued.

The period of internal peace should have been devoted to the most earnest endeavours to prevent the threatened explosion.

The chief danger evidently lay in the relations of the German Church, at the point where spiritual and temporal

* The Duke of Juliers, according to the Report of the Imperial Envoy in 1560.

affairs came into contact. The German Church had been attacked in its very foundations by Protestantism, and during the period of disturbance when might made right, had suffered much injury and insult. And yet the constitution of the Empire rested mainly on the Church, of which so many members sat in its two principal councils, that of the princes and that of the electors.

I do not think it too much to assert that the German Church was quite as much, and perhaps more, a political than a religious institution.

At any rate, it acted as such. The spiritual functions of the German bishops and archbishops amounted to very little. With the cure of souls they had nothing to do, and they took but little part in the government of the universal Church. They were German princes, and displayed the same characteristics as their peers; and certainly during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they took a more active part than any in the administration of the general affairs of Germany. We find their names recorded in connection with their political occupations. It is true that their spiritual titles often contrasted strangely with their mundane employments. But nothing was to be gained by continually attacking them with very superficial ridicule. It would have been better to accept their position as it was.

To these considerations was added another of no less importance. It was continually stated by Protestant princes and nobles that religious foundations were instituted for the honour and glory of God, in the first place, no doubt, but also for the maintenance of princely and noble houses, and to that end richly endowed by emperors,

kings, princes, and lords, of gracious memory*; they urged that the continuance of their own families depended on these ecclesiastical possessions. It could scarcely be denied that considerations of this nature had some weight with the founders; and in process of time they had become paramount. The religious foundations were the inheritance of the younger sons of princely and noble houses; an inheritance which they enjoyed on the condition that they would found no families of their own. By the side of the hereditary principalities of the elder brothers the younger found these elective ones. The worldly distribution of spiritual property was of course followed by a worldly employment of it.

It could hardly be hoped that in those parts of Germany in which Protestantism had not secretly (for that was the case almost everywhere), but avowedly gained the upper hand, the great families would quietly give up their share of the ecclesiastical benefices and the participation in the affairs of the Empire which was connected with it, in obedience to the spiritual reservation.

Accordingly, spite of the conditions of the religious peace, we soon find Protestant spiritual princes who by no means resigned their standing in the Imperial college.

When Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg became Archbishop of Magdeburg, he promised to exercise his right of session in the Empire, and to hold the territory as other archbishops had done before. He even claimed the spiri-

* E. g. Copia Supplicationis, "from some of the estates addicted to the Confession of Augsburg," in Meissner's Beschreibung des Augsburger Reichstag (Description of the Diet of Augsburg), anno 1566. Seckenberg, vol. iii. p. 306.

tual primacy in the council of Princes of the Empire, after he had openly married and introduced a princess consort into the bishopric, though of course without laying claim to the hereditary possession of the territory.* His predecessor, Sigismund, had even professed his adherence to the reformed faith, in the face of the Emperor and the whole Empire, and had been left in undisturbed possession of his dominions and honours.†

Duke Henry of Saxe Lauenburg, Archbishop of Bremen, even when married, kept his place upon the bench of spiritual princes.‡

Bishop Eberhard of Lübeck and Verden, was confessedly a Protestant; nevertheless, he was confirmed by the Emperor and the Pope; he constantly attended the Diets in the person of his delegates, without opposition, and signed their resolutions.

Bishop Hermann, of Minden, an undoubted Protestant, likewise had a seat and voice in the empire.

In Osnabrück they had a Catholic and a Protestant bishop alternately, who were so tolerant that one of each faith was suspected of being secretly attached to the opposite party. In Paderborn, too, John of Hoya for a long time ruled with great moderation.§

* Rathmann, Geschichte von Magdeburg (History of Magdeburg), vol. iv. p. 69.

† Hamelius in the work which will be presently referred to.

‡ There is a cotemporary song concerning him in Hamelmann, Oldenburgisches Chronikon (Chronicle of Oldenburg), p. 435., where it is written:—

"Quin lolium papale sacra runcavit ab æde."

§ Schlegel, Kirchengeschichte von Nord Deutschland (History of the Church in the North of Germany), vol. ii. p. 422.

Duke Julius of Brunswick was recognised by the Emperor as Bishop of Halberstadt, but on condition of his receiving the Pope's confirmation, which the Duke by no means despaired of obtaining,

The Abbess Elizabeth of Quedlinburg, although a Protestant, found less difficulty in gaining the confirmation of the Pope's legate than that of her neighbour, the Elector of Saxony.*

But my readers will ask, how did this accord with that clause of the religious peace which had been confirmed; how was this consistent with German conscientiousness and respect for law.

The Protestants argued that the religious peace was not infringed, they maintained that by it only a prelate already installed was prohibited from going over from the Catholic to the Protestant Church; that the sole object of the clause had been to prevent the disputes which would otherwise arise between a chapter which adhered to the ancient faith, and a bishop who had gone over to the new; but that it was by no means intended to forbid a Protestant chapter to elect a Protestant bishop.†

* Haberlin, Neueste Reichsgeschichte (Modern History of the Empire), vol. vi. pp. 438. 456. Eichhorn's Stadt- und Rechts-geschichte (History of State and Law), part iv. s. 503.

† Bedenken über den pass des geistlichen Vorbehaltes, oder Freistellung (Thoughts on the case of the Spiritual Reservation, or Power of electing Protestants to Spiritual Principalities), drawn up by Dr. Henningius Hamelius, anno 1596. He maintains, "That the religious peace ought to be maintained. But as for example the Elector Truchsess in Cologne, *in fundamento*, had not had a good time of it, seeing that his chapter had not been reformed, while, on the other hand, Joachim Frederick had succeeded admirably, inasmuch as his chapter had been of his way of thinking." In Lünig, Staats Consilia, p. 482.

It appears that the Emperors were of this opinion. They recognised the sovereignty of Protestant bishops or coadjutors, and allowed them to keep their standing in the Empire. If the confirmation of bishops had rested with the Emperor alone the question would have been settled; but according to law, they also needed that of the Pope, and herein lay the difficulty.

The nation hesitated to deny the Pope's claim altogether. There is perhaps no stronger instance of the German respect for the letter of the law, than the fact, that long after the Reformation, even in Protestant ecclesiastical bodies, the right of presenting to benefices which fell vacant during the reserved months was still conceded to the Pope; only somehow it often turned out that the privilege was exercised too late, or in favour of persons who were ineligible from other causes.* This, however, being the case, it was not likely that the ancient forms would be disregarded in the appointments to bishoprics.

The Protestants, however, were lucky enough to find an ancient custom still in use which they could turn to their own advantage under the new order of things. I mean the Imperial Indulta. Under the pretext that the money required for the payment of the Roman fees was not forth-

* Minuccio Minucci, "Discorso sopra il Modo di restituire la Religione cattolica in Allemagna." MSS. Di qua è venuto che in Magdeburg, in Brema, in Halberstad, Verd, Lubecca, Minda et altri Vescovati che o in tutto sono distaccati da questo loro madre, overo si tengono legati con debol^mo filo, hanno sin qui sempre avuto luoco le provisioni apostoliche, quando di sua natura non sono state manchevoli; ma è accaduto più volte che le collationi sono state fatte in persone inhabili per difetto di nobilita o sono state tarde, e ben spesso ancora, che per fraude delli speditioneri di Roma con false relationi si sono impetrati beneficj agli heretici, e talora a qualche persona finta et imaginaria."

coming, the preliminary bestowal of the regalia for a few years was requested. Meanwhile the new bishop received the oaths of allegiance from his subjects, and established himself in his dominions. He then endeavoured to obtain the confirmation of Rome, and in case of failure he retained his office and procured a prorogation of the Indulta.

By this means the law was not broken, but it was evaded.

This was the point which affairs had reached in their natural and inevitable course in Northern Germany.

It will be admitted that such a state of things called for the most serious consideration.

Now as laws are of human and not of divine institution, it is possible to alter them in case of need, and when new forms of human life call for the change.

If things were suffered to remain as they were, the extension of unlawful practices was inevitable on the Protestant side, while the Catholic party must feel itself continually liable to insult and molestation. Under such circumstances the peace could never be secure.

It may perhaps seem presumptuous now, after the lapse of centuries, during which the great elements of which the German nation is composed have become irrevocably hostile, still to pretend to calculate possibilities.

But if different courses of action are now open to us, the same was true of our predecessors. While considering the approach of those disasters which afterwards occurred, we are impelled by that love of our country which embraces the past as well as the present, and not in any spirit of self-conceit, to inquire by what means they might have been averted.

Would it have been so difficult, considering the opposition in which the Empire already stood towards the Pope, to withdraw the German Churches more completely from under the influence of the Curia?

Was it incumbent upon Germany to accept those resolutions of the Council of Trent by which the oaths of allegiance taken by the bishops to the Pope were so greatly strengthened and extended?

Would it not have been possible to establish a German Church in which the temporal element, which already in fact predominated, should have been the most powerful in form also?

Might not the possession of these electoral principalities to which so few spiritual duties were attached, have been made independent of the profession of any particular form of faith?

This was the question which agitated Germany during the whole period intervening between the religious peace and the Thirty Years' War.

It was not in contemplation to make Protestantism the dominant religion. The only object in view was to render the possession of the electoral principalities independent of the profession of any particular faith, and to liberate the status in the Empire which was connected with them from the influence of the Curia. The question was by no means so exclusively a religious one as would at first appear. Its real import was whether a number of the German princes were to remain in allegiance to the Pope and to form part of the great political body of Christendom, or whether the German Empire was to unite in shutting out

the influence of the Pope, and to manage its own affairs according to purely national interests and ideas.

There would have been no need in this case either to have converted the property of the Church altogether into parochial benefices, or to alienate it entirely from its spiritual destination.

Those counts and nobles who so strenuously urged that these foundations had been endowed partly with a view to the maintenance of their families, never carried their claims so far as this. After the Council of Trent, they petitioned only for a relaxation of the statute and for exemptions from the new and more stringent oaths and duties. They even promised if they were relieved from these, to introduce a very much stricter discipline. The principal suggestion, however, was that the spiritual destination of the Church property should be retained, but in a modified form, and that it should be conferred as a reward for deeds of arms done against the Turks, just as the possessions of the ancient order of Teutonic knights had been granted to them for carrying on the war against the heathens, and as in Spain these orders had even received permission to marry.

Distinct propositions of this kind were made at more than one meeting of the estates of the Empire, and at more than one Diet; and introductory proceedings were even set on foot to this end.

The two great national interests were concerned in this question.

The conqueror of Hungary, who had already invaded Germany once, and most unexpectedly been arrested by the feeble bulwarks of Vienna, still lived. Again and

again was he to lead on his hundreds of thousands, in order to subdue Germany and Western Europe, and lay them prostrate beneath the feet of the Ottoman horses.

Was it befitting a great nation tamely to endure a hostility so inveterate as to aim at nothing short of its destruction,—always to await the attack, and never to be the first to unsheathe the sword?*

Had the Germans understood their true mission, they would have been contented with having simply brought to light the truths of Christianity, freed from all human additions, and shown the relation in which mankind stands to the Deity and His eternal purposes, after they had been obscured for so many ages. There was no need for them to lose themselves once more in dialectic subtleties, and to cover the newly-discovered gold with fresh heaps of rubbish.

But it was indispensable to allay the dissensions which had arisen in consequence of the religious changes, and to give to the constitution of the Empire a form which might endure for a time, and allow the life of the nation to develope itself. Then the great enterprise might have been begun, and the foe who was at the gates of the country have been attacked with the united strength of Germany.

And what a prospect would this have opened! We must recollect that the Ottoman Empire, which is quite as

* Augerii Busbequii de re militari contra Turcas instituenda Consilium: "Ad bellum omni spe pacis sublata cogimur: nullæ hic consilii, nullæ arbitrii nostri partes: vis necessitatis omnia occupavit; ad bellum violenter rapimur: bellum nobis vel invitissimis subeundum, gerendum, exantlandum. Quid frustra obnitimur? Quid circumspectamus? Quid vanis pacificationibus somniandis nos decipimus? In media nimirum flamma otium nobis falsa cogitatione fingimus, malumque, cujus si advigilaremus remedia aliqua esse poterunt, differendo nutrimus et parum providendo reddimus insanabile."

much a religious as a political institution, was at this time undoubtedly greater, more powerful, and more menacing than ever externally, but that its own subjects were far from being converted to Mohammedanism in the same numbers then as has happened since. A single happy stroke would have restored Bosnia as well as Hungary, Albania as well as Greece, to Christendom. In this case Germany, whose Emperor governed Hungary, and had a right or claim upon all its ancient appurtenances, — even then it was proposed to incorporate Hungary entirely with the Empire, — Germany, we say, would thus have obtained the predominant influence in Eastern Europe, and have been able to fill those regions with the overplus of her population.

If we consider how weak were the succeeding Sultans, how rapid was, for a time, the internal decay of the institutions of their State, and how powerful the armed force of Germany, we shall conclude that this might well have been carried into execution.

But then it was necessary that the nation should will it. The interests of the most powerful princes of the Empire should have been engaged in it; the nobility have been united for the purpose; and the strength of the whole nation have been called forth. So great a national work must have taxed all the national resources.

Under such circumstances the religious divisions would no doubt have become weaker and less mischievous.

Let no one think that a nation is to be tranquillised by preaching peace to it, or by denying the presence of the elements of movement; still less by violently restraining them: the only safety is in directing them into a proper

channel. A nation is not destined to mere repose — to inert dulness. It is in free and unfettered action alone that the human powers are called forth. To prevent the movement from following a destructive course, to ensure the nation against becoming divided against itself and tearing its own vitals, its real tendencies must be kept in view, its real requirements satisfied. A respect for its own laws and ordinances must be instilled, and a great future opened to it.

Such was the task which lay before Germany; — first, to establish a uniform ecclesiastical constitution, to which both parties might conform; and then to fight out the great struggle which the often-renewed and always-threatened attack of the power which the Germans of that day called the hereditary foe, rendered inevitable.

Such, too, were the ideas which ruled the nation. They are insisted upon, not only in writing, as in all Schwendi's books, but they were likewise repeated at every Diet.

There now seemed to be good hope that they would be put into execution; for a prince gifted with extraordinary abilities, moderate, gentle, and firm in matters of religion, and resolved to carry on the war against the Turks with the utmost vigour, now ascended the Imperial throne. This prince was Maximilian II.

CHAP. VIII.

EXPECTATIONS OF MAXIMILIAN II.

THE contemporaries of Maximilian II. know not how to praise him enough for the high degree of general cultivation he had attained. He had mastered the languages, and made himself familiar with the peculiar characteristics, he knew the virtues and the faults, the proverbs, the jests, and the literature of the different nations he had seen and visited. He treated the natives of each after their own peculiar fashion: with the Italians he was condescending, he was frank and cheerful with the Germans, easy with the Bohemians, vivacious with the Hungarians, measured in his manner towards the Spaniards. It seemed as if all that was new, noble, and peculiar to the time was displayed in his single person. We shall afterwards have to revert to the important part which Maximilian took in the new development of religious ideas. The study of nature was just entering upon the path of experiment; he pursued botany in his garden; he diligently made experiments in metallurgy; modern music was beginning to be cultivated in Europe, and that which he introduced into his private chapel was reckoned the best then existing;—but although he confessed that if he might follow his own inclinations he would never wish for any other pursuits than these, he did not allow such tastes to gain the mastery over him. There was perfect balance — I may say harmony — in the powers of his mind. It was impossible to find a more agreeable companion; he was full of wit and good humour,

perfectly easy and unaffected. He treated foreign ambassadors and princes in a manner which made them pronounce him to be the most perfect courtier in the world*; but in him these gracious manners were the result of a disposition naturally kind; and when he saw the village priest, to whom he had formerly confessed with satisfaction, standing humbly in a remote corner of his audience-chamber, he stepped right through the crowd of ambassadors and nobles who were present, accosted the priest with his well-known kind greeting, and took him with him into his closet. He gave to every one due honour, and addressed no man as "thou."

We feel it as a piece of good fortune when we chance to find ourselves in a circle such as gifted and finely organised natures are wont to gather round them. We seem, as it were, to breathe a purer atmosphere in the society of cultivated minds which extract from the world only what is good and beautiful; contact with a searching and discriminating intellect puts our minds into a state of agreeable tension; graceful manners and the unaffected expression of goodwill and kindliness—which is in itself a talent—exercise a real fascination upon us. Such are the natures that

* Micheli, 1564: "Di statura non grande, non piccolo, ma di bella taglia e dispositione, e sopra tutto di bel aspetto, con una carne viva rossa e bianca insieme, color naturale e proprio de' Tedeschi, fatto quanto alla sanità per quelli tremori di core et altro che pativa molto più gagliardo, che non si credeva, e di giorno in giorno fortificandosi meglio. Questo ha tanta gratia in tutte le attioni e cosi bel procedere, e belle maniere da affettionarsi ogn' uno che è cosa maravigliosa con una gravità e dolcezza contemperata insieme mediante una allegrezza che dimostra nell' esteriore, accompagnata da una tal vivezza d' occhi che non si può desiderare cosa nè piu viva nè piu amabile. Benche alcuni prendono questa prontezza a ridere con ciascheduno per duplicità."

win golden opinions from all men; nor is it strange that it should be so. The general satisfaction which they diffuse, is returned to them with interest.

It appears to me that we must feel as if we had entered such a circle as I have described, whenever we meet in history with the name of Maximilian II. It is true, that these are not the qualities required to govern a nation; although that affability which is so great a part of majesty, never fails to produce its due effect. But Maximilian devoted himself to public affairs with as much zeal as talent. When there was any thing to be done, he gave up his amusements, and listened patiently for hours; his replies and objections invariably hit the right point. In no court was business transacted with greater ease and expedition than at Vienna during his reign. No prince or statesman ever more thoroughly understood and grasped all the great political questions. Nor did any one ever express himself with greater freedom, or distribute praise or blame more impartially. Foreign ambassadors had to be on their guard, lest they should be drawn by him into a course of action contrary to their own views. Maximilian was discreet only on points that immediately concerned himself; in speaking of these he weighed his words most carefully.*

The language he knew best was the German. Had he been our chancellor, said Dr. Weber, his vice-chancellor, he would have shamed us all. And, indeed, the letters written with his own hand are remarkable for vigour

* The character we have traced of Maximilian II. is chiefly taken from Garlach's Turkish Journal (Türkisches Tagebuch), and from Raupach's Lutheran Austria (Evangelisches Oestreich), as well as from the Italian Reports. The Speech which Leuthinger puts into the mouth of Joachim II., although not authentic, contains much that is worthy of remark.

and propriety of expression. He possessed the rare gift of eloquence in German, to a very high degree; and he found frequent exercise for it at the numerous imperial and provincial assemblies which he was forced to attend, and where he always had stubborn spirits to deal with. His words were gentle, but his brilliant eyes flashed fire as he spoke.

It is manifest, that a spirit like his must be full of ambition. And so it was; — of an ambition not to be satisfied with empty praise, but thirsting for great undertakings and glorious achievements.

Obedient and devoted as Maximilian was to his father in all besides, he did not attempt to conceal that he thought his policy too peaceful, and always too easily swayed either by circumstances, by the accidental opinions of some of his counsellors, or by foreign influences.*

The anti-Spanish line of policy had in part been originated by him, and he intended to follow it out far more strictly. He complained bitterly that the Emperor Charles had treated the younger branch unfairly in the division of the inheritance, and had injured it repeatedly since. He himself, as his son-in-law, thought he had by his marriage acquired certain claims upon Milan or the Netherlands, and yet he was forced to content himself with a small pension, which was not even regularly paid. The most direct and severe attack upon him, however, was the Emperor's scheme of transferring the succession to the Empire to Philip II.† It could hardly be expected that so

* Soriano Rel^re, 1554: "Nelle cose del governo biasma l' imperitia de' consiglieri la facilita di S. M. et il troppo rispetto all' imperatore."

† Soriano, 1554: "La materia della cession dell' imperio ha acceso

high-spirited a man as Maximilian should tamely submit to be deprived of the first crown of Europe, a crown to which he was the natural successor, and find himself compelled to play a part subordinate to Philip, whose faculties he thought so mean, and whose vanity appeared to him so ludicrous,—to a man of whom he never spoke but with disgust and contempt. Indeed, it almost seemed as though it was partly dislike to his cousin, that had induced him to cultivate those talents and pursuits in which Philip was so utterly deficient.

He thenceforth banished all Spaniards from about his person and from his court. He behaved in such a manner that it appeared, as was said at the time, as though he wished to be honoured by all other nations, but to be feared by Spain. His sympathies and tastes became altogether German. To the descendants of Landgrave Philip of Hessen he promised "good round German words and deeds, not Spanish ones."† To Duke Christopher of Wirtemberg he declared how greatly he desired to be worthy, not in one thing only, but, as he expresses it, "in all the troubles which do oppress our beloved country, that I may be enabled to discover, to practise, and to perfect some ways and means for relieving the same; therein indeed would lie my greatest joy."†

l' animo di quel re di sorte che piu non si potria, e benchè paia al presente, che questa trattation sii sopita, pero m' a detto quel re in gran secreto che l' imperator è per tentarla certo un' altra volta." Even in 1562 it was believed that Philip had not given up the idea.

* From a Letter of Maximilian, dated 9th November, 1563, in Rommel's Landgraf Philip, vol. ii. p. 579.

† A Letter of Maximilian, dated 9th December, 1556, in Lebret's Magazine, vol. ix. p. 71.

In the year 1564 this sovereign ascended the imperial throne.

It is one thing to possess talents, to reflect, to deliberate to plan, and quite another to act and to execute. Maximilian was now called upon to realise the hopes he had raised.

It could not be long before the two great questions of internal and external policy, which I have already described, must come before him.

When we consider the ironical tone in which he repeatedly wrote to Duke Christopher, about the Pope and "his proper council at Trent," from whose Decretals scanty comfort could be gathered — how carefully he enumerated those works of Luther which he already possessed, and requested his friend the Duke to send him the rest, as well as the writings of Melancthon and Brenz — that he not only contributed funds for printing the Slavonic translation of the Bible, but caused the proof sheets to be examined by competent scholars — that he expressed a fear lest the Papists should mislead the young King of France — and, finally, that he actually called the Protestant party his own, and the Catholics his enemies; — when, I say, we consider all this, we must be convinced that he was at heart a Protestant.

The question was, whether he would continue in the same opinions when Emperor. In one of his letters of the year 1557, he laments that his father did not then do more towards opening the spiritual electorates to Protestants, and promises an ill reward to those who had prevented him.* At all events, it was to be expected that he would

* Prague, 13th April, "So far, however, as concerns the opening the

go into this great question of internal policy with a greater disposition to forward the change.

On the other great question he gave equal cause for hope. He intended to carry on the war against the Turks in a very different manner from his father, whom he altogether far surpassed in warlike spirit. His favourite talk was of fortifications, of sieges, and of battles.* The acute Venetian who was ambassador at his father's court, thought that the limited sway to which he was destined, would not satisfy him; that space must be given and a career opened to him, in which he could gratify his ambition and love of glory without disturbing the whole of Christendom.† A great campaign against the Turks would have opened to him this career.

spiritual electorates to Protestants (Freistellung), I should have been content, had his Majesty proceeded further in this matter, and can well guess who they were who prevented such a work. Sed recipient mercedem suam." Lebret, p. 85.

* Paolo Tripolo, 1558: "Continuamente pensa, poco contentandosi dello stato suo. Disegna a cose grandi." Tripolo describes his religious position in the following manner: "Non si alienando in tutto da cattolici si ha guadagnato una gran gratia con luterani."

† Micheli: "Saria per beneficio universale non solo da desiderare, ma per diu così da procurare da tutti gli altri principi qualche occasione senza maleficio di alcun principe Cristiano, nella quale avesse modo di sfogarsi; altrimente è grandissimo pericolo, che questa povertà con questa ambitione e desiderio di gloria non siano causa, che si precipiti tanto piu."

CHAP. IX.

THEOLOGICAL DISPUTES.

No one, I think, will dispute that a single man can do but little against the force of adverse circumstances.

Even from such an Emperor as Maximilian, who, as we have seen, was both gifted and well meaning, but whose power and influence were limited, and who had still to show whether his talents would be seconded by resolution and energy, little could be hoped, unless he were favoured by circumstances and furthered in his schemes by the sympathies and feelings of the German nation.

Unfortunately, he encountered only resistance; he was opposed by tendencies hostile to all exertion in behalf of general utility.

It was clearly impossible for the Emperor to give to the Empire a constitution fitted to the exigencies of the new faith, unless that faith bore in itself the elements of victory, of stability, and of increasing power over all convictions.

Unhappily, a violent internal breach took place in it, just at the decisive moment.

As the Princes of Germany had acquired so powerful an influence upon the churches, schools, and colleges, this rupture infallibly assumed somewhat of a political character.

The party which, when it opposed Charles V., had been beaten in the Smalcaldic war, and again after it, had become more favourable to him owing to the circumstances which accompanied his abdication — a party first conquered

by force of arms, and then discomfited by political combinations, now had recourse to theological polemics. The sons of the hereditary Elector of Saxony established a new university, in opposition to those which had fallen to the share of Electoral Saxony, and to it they summoned the declared opponents of the professors established in them. This was another form of feud.

The hostility among the Theologians had by this time risen to a great height, in consequence of the course of events.

Those of Wittenberg had, without giving up any point of doctrine, showed an inclination towards the Interim; while others had been exiled or had emigrated rather than accede to it.* The most rigid and zealous sect of Lutherans was to be found in Magdeburg, which had offered so determined a resistance to the Interim. The successful exploit which had given the upper hand to the moderate party in politics, had had the contrary effect as to Theology. The downfal of the Interim, which was caused by it, was hailed as a victory by the Protestant zealots. The expelled preachers returned, and held forth with increased violence, the more natural that the persecutions they had suffered seemed in a measure to justify it; they spread throughout the Lower Saxon towns, and were called thither by the Dukes of Saxony.

Were they to submit to the school of Wittenberg? Were they to acknowledge its head, Melancthon, as the

* Musculus, Osiander, Sarcerius, Schnepf, Flacius, Amsdorf, Gallus, and others were obliged to fly. See Arnold's Kirchen und Ketzer Historie (History of the Church and of Heretics), part II. vol. xvi. ch. xxvi. p. 934.

Ruler of the Chariot of Israel, the Preceptor of Germany, as he was proclaimed by his followers? It had long been a stumbling-block and an offence to them, that in his Theology Melancthon had given indications of his familiarity with the ancient philosophers, that he recommended Terence, and that he declared his admiration for Homer as well as for St. Paul; it was an abomination to them that John Major had called this Homer a divine work; and the study of Pindar they looked upon as part and parcel of the "defiling of holy things," wherewith they charged Strigel, one of Melancthon's pupils.

Unfortunately, the quarrel took a dogmatic turn, and the two great points of difference from the Catholics,—the Eucharist and the doctrine of Justification,—again became subjects of a dispute which, in time, embraced all the principal questions of Theology and the whole relation of God to mankind and the universe.

In the year 1548, a tolerable degree of moderation still prevailed; in the article of Justification, for instance, the doctrines of St. Augustine were not yet pushed to their ultimate consequences; it has been remarked that, if Luther's opinions inclined towards them, those of Melancthon were tacitly opposed to them.* In Bremen, where sectarian zeal afterwards raged, it sufficed that Hardenberg, though already suspected of a lack of Protestant orthodoxy, declared that he accepted only the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist; a precise definition of the manner in which they were combined with the elements, was not yet required.†

* Plank, Geschichte des Protestantischen Lehrbegriffs (History of the Protestant Doctrine), vol. iv. p. 562.

† Ibid., vol. ii. p. 146.

At this period the new faith as yet only professed to be the old one purified; Calvin still passed for a Lutheran, and people did not yet inquire to which of the three creeds every one belonged; by far the greater number simply held a form of Christianity freed from abuses, restored to its accordance with the Bible, and admitting of modifications of individual opinion.

But this happy state ended only too soon; whether it be that the restraint of fixed forms is absolutely indispensable to the human mind — which I can hardly persuade myself to be the case with an active and thinking mind; or whether the narrow views of the unintelligent mass can only be satisfied when enclosed within the strictest barriers; or, lastly, whether it was that the passions of men were strongly excited on these topics.

At all events, we find that the strongest assertions were frequently made in the heat of contest, and afterwards obstinately adhered to.

In Osiander, who was one of those that migrated from Nürnberg to Königsberg on account of the Interim, it was probably for the most part the conceit of a self-taught man (the same feeling which had led him to decline taking a degree at any University) and the desire to make himself notorious by a fortunate discovery, that induced him to develope and to proclaim a theory of justification, which he had at first accidentally introduced into a lecture. His views are acute, profound, and happily combined*, and

* Adam, Vita Osiandri, p. 226.; more especially Plank, vol. iv. ch. ii. I may add, that the exposition of Osiander's doctrine is one of the very best passages in Waltmann's History of the Reformation (Reformations Geschichte), part iii.

exhibit an ingenious attempt to make the inward conviction of one man appear so consonant with Scripture as to form an integral part of the Christian system. But was it necessary to proclaim them from the pulpit and the reading-desk? Was it right to shake the ideas of salvation which had prevailed until now, and which were so well fitted to the exigencies of mankind? We may indeed ask whether the whole dispute was not in fact, when considered from a higher point of view, merely a dispute about words; for Osiander lays down that by justification men had not merely righteousness imputed to them, but were actually made righteous, and it may be be asked whether in the sight of God this is not the same thing. Be this as it may, however, his doctrines disturbed the peace of the whole Lutheran community, and produced an irremediable breach.

This breach was widened by the circumstance, that soon after the same dispute was renewed under the auspices of the Dukes of Saxony. An old friend and colleague of Melancthon, George Major, endeavoured to meet a mischievous prejudice on the part of the unthinking vulgar, not by a departure from the established doctrine of justification, but by the mere assertion that good works were useful towards salvation, which his Thuringian opponents condemned as a rash, impious, and ungodly doctrine.* They eagerly sought to establish the contrary. Amsdorf, an old friend of Luther, went so far as to maintain that good works were positively detrimental to salvation, and what is more, his doctrine was received with ap-

* Adam, Vita Majoris, p. 40. Plank, Menzel.

plause; Melancthon rightly remarks, that future generations will think this incredible. The leader of this sect was an Illyrian of Albona, educated in Germany, and named Flacius (Wlacich) who, after many spiritual temptions, had imbued himself with the doctrinal theory of justification in its most rigid form, and had long been the most rancorous opponent of Melancthon.* In the heat of argument he first maintained that original sin was the actual substance of the human soul†; and far from being satisfied with this, he proceeded to set forth in great detail, how the soul of man, once the image of God and source of justice, virtue, and piety, had by the fall of Adam been changed into an image of Satan, and become like unto the flames of hell; just as though one should thoroughly impregnate a pure substance with poison, and convert it into the very essence of that poison. This extravagant doctrine was received by a sect at Jena, and found adherents and supporters throughout the whole domain of Protestant Theology.

But Flacius and his partisans were not to be satisfied with voluntary adhesion to their opinions. At Jena, they established a kind of inquisition; and it is characteristic

* Passages from the last report of the Leipsickers und Wittembergers, which retorts upon Flacius all his vehement complaints, in the Appendix to Arnold, vol. ii. p. 1599.

† Passages out of his work De Peccato Originali, in Plank, vol. i. p. 292. In a work by J. B. Ritter, published at Frankfurt, 1725, entitled "The Life and Death of M. Mathius Flacius Illyricus, a once famous and learned Theologian in Germany." (M. M. Flacii Illyrici, ehemals berühmt- und gelehrten Theolog in Teutschland, Leben und Tod.) I met the following excellent remark made by a certain physician, Leonhard Fuchs, a teacher in Tubingen and a friend of Flacius, viz. "Morbum esse substantiam." In this remark is contained, possibly, the original source of Flacius's religious temptations and the germ of his doctrines.

enough, that their persecution was chiefly directed against persons of irreproachable life, "such as otherwise are learned, upright, and pure; but who have not received the doctrine of truth unto salvation." Neither dignity, learning, birth, or even profession of the Lutheran faith afforded any protection from their persecutions to those who did not agree with their extravagant ideas. Poor Matthew Wesenbeck, who had left his native city of Antwerp and the service of his sovereign, in order to enjoy the freedom of the Gospel, did not find much of it at Jena.*

The much-vexed question of the sacrament was not long suffered to rest. The opposition to Calvin began in Lower Saxony. Was it really want of candour which led the zealous party to take no heed of the Calvinistic system of arguments and objections, and constantly to refute over again that which Calvin himself acknowledged was no part of his belief?† or was it merely owing to the natural obtuseness of a mind which is unable to seize upon delicate distinctions, which will endure no deviation from its own preconceived notions, and with blind fury takes up the cudgels in behalf of whatever opinions it has embraced? With what rude hands do these men touch these sacred mysteries! how coarsely does John Timann of Bremen handle the subject of the Lord's Supper! Whosoever was not convinced by his argument that, because God is omnipresent, therefore the body and blood of Christ must be omnipresent also, incurred his hatred, as was the case with

* Concerning the disputed excommunication of Matthæus Wesenbecius See J. J. Müller's State's Cabinet Displayed. (Entdeckten Staats Cabinet), Preface, p. 38.

† Plank, vol. ii. p. 98.

his colleague Hardenberg. The protection afforded to the latter, who was preacher at the Cathedral, by the Chapter roused the fury of his opponents. Hesshusen declared that "it was just as bad as though they made the Cathedral into a den of murderers, and foully slaughtered the townsfolk therein, or as though they had erected a battery there wherewith to bombard the city."

Manifestly the results must be terrible, should these champions of extreme opinions succeed in obtaining the direction of public affairs. It was a woful sight to see the poor fugitives from the Netherlands, who had just been expelled from England by Mary Tudor, how in the depth of winter they were driven without mercy from every town in Lower Saxony in which they dared to set foot; and this for no other reason than that they inclined to the views of Calvin respecting the Lord's Supper.

The whole of Lutheran Germany was agitated by these discussions. At Königsberg, not only was it rumoured that Osiander was always accompanied by two devils in the shape of black dogs; but it was even stated from the pulpit that "anti-Christ had appeared in his person." His adherents were forced to go about armed, and his opponents spat when they met those who had been in his church, often their nearest friends and neighbours. The University fell to decay*, the whole country was split up into factions. On one occasion ten squadrons of soldiers marched into Jena, in order to arrest a few of Flacius's opponents and to march them off as prisoners to Grimmenstein. When

* Simon Schardius, De Rebus Gestis sub Maximiliano II. Rerum Germanicarum, vol. iv. p. 14. "Cum academia falso Osiandri dogmate de hominis essentiali justitia collapsa fuisset."

these men regained their liberty, thirty preachers from among the number of those hostile to them were ejected at once in their turn. The Elector of Saxony at one time expelled all the followers of Flacius from Thuringia. Duke John William, on the other hand, received them all back again. The religous parties came into power, overcame their adversaries, were in their turn overcome by others, who again had to make way for those who had been first defeated. These spiritual administrations, with their leaders, their ruling ideas, and their discussions, are not unlike the temporal ministries which govern the great states at the present day; they were just as dependent upon the favour or the convictions of princes, the force of circumstances, or the endurance of the political tendencies with which they were associated.

Unfortunately, these animosities afforded no scope for those explosions by which violent passions naturally find vent and relief: this war was carried on with the poisoned weapons of literary calumny, collegiate hatred, and evil speaking at court and among the people; weapons which leave the body unscathed, but which pierce the soul with innumerable smarting wounds.

What must have been the feelings of Melancthon, whose life of contemplation was understood by none, and who was reproached, as if with a moral transgession, with every error into which he had been driven and hurried, and which he humbly admitted and tried to excuse.* At length the long-wished for hour of death drew near.

* Camerarius, De Vita Melancthonis, ch. lxxxvi.: "Multas amaras tunc, quasi potiones, hausit Philippus Melancthon et concoxit tacendo et tolerando."

According to the custom which still survived among our fathers' fathers, he recorded the feelings of his soul in short sentences: "Thou wilt enter into glory," said he to himself, "thou wilt see God and behold the Son of God;" but he found comfort not only in the hope of happiness, but likewise in the prospect of relief from present wretchedness. "Thou wilt," continues he, "be delivered from all thy tribulations, and from the implacable hate of Theologians."* And these very men from whose enmity nothing on this side the grave could shield him, were his own disciples; he, the teacher of Germany, the founder of Protestant Theology, had called them into existence as it were, and trained them up; but for him they would never have been. But there was one thing he could not teach them, he could not endow them with his own elevation of mind, with his own humane and generous spirit, the foundation of all that is truly good and wise in man. What a life was his! A man so richly gifted with splendid talents and aspirations, who had begun so nobly in the right course, persevered in it so steadily, and fought the good fight so manfully until his cause was all but victorious; always magnanimous, long-suffering, and free from all faults, save such as are inherent in a nature so delicately organised—then, by reason of this very generosity and refinement (unpardonable crimes in the eyes of base humanity) was he attacked, misconceived, slandered, pursued

* In the Vita Strigelii, Adam frequently recurs to this. Ut Melanchthon ante mortem dixit:—"Cupio et hac vita migrare propter duas causas: primum, ut fruar desiderato conspectu filii Dei et cœlestis ecclesiæ; deinde, ut liberer ab immanibus et implacabilibus odiis Theologorum." Ita Strigelius sæpe easdem causas inter precandum usurpare solitus fuit.—Vitæ Theologorum, p. 427.

by malignity into the inmost recesses of his soul, until he he succumbed beneath the wounds inflicted by his own disciples, and sighed to rest his weary head in the shelter of the grave! Such a spectacle is so mournful that we need to take comfort in that which comforted him; the thought of his final deliverance, and of his joy in beholding that perfection after which his pious and loving soul had always thirsted.

I can come to no other conclusion than that this fierce assertion of theological theories, which, after all, contribute nothing to virtue, piety, or religion, was extremely injurious to the great cause which was in progress, and one of the principal reasons of the unfortunate turn taken by German affairs.

The last religious conference, held at Worms in 1557, did not seem altogether hopeless. Germany was free from feuds and intestine war; the leading sovereigns of both creeds were united by common interest; the Pope had offended the Emperor and the Empire, by his veto upon the transfer of the imperial dignity, and thus given fresh strength to the opposition which always existed. Upon this opposition every thing now depended. If they had been able to agree upon a few important points, a great future would have been opened to the German nation. No one desired this more ardently than Maximilian. It is humiliating to be forced to record that the conference was not broken up by disputes between the two great parties; it never even got so far—the divisions among the Protestants themselves put an end to it altogether. The Theologians of Weimar came provided with an instruction taken almost verbatim from a memorial which had been pre-

sented to the duke by Flacius.* As might be expected, he insisted upon the unqualified condemnation of every opinion that he had ever opposed. It was manifest that this must create a division among the Lutherans, and arrest the progress of the colloquy. They were perfectly aware of this themselves, but nothing could induce them to abate a single iota of the opinions they had once professed, however extravagant. No persuasion, no concession, no mediation, were of any avail. It came to this, that the five dissenting theologians addressed their complaints of the conduct of their Protestant brethren to the Catholic president of the college, and then took their departure.† After this nothing more could be done. At Rome I saw a report of this colloquy drawn up for Philip II., in which much satisfaction at this result is expressed; "their strife," says the writer, "is our peace." ‡

No part of the blame can be laid upon the German princes.

The resolution upon which the sovereigns of Upper Germany agreed at Frankfurt in 1557, under the guidance of the Palatine and the Duke of Wirtemburg, related only to the Confession of Augsburg and its apology, without making any mention of more recent and stricter formulæ.

* Plank, vol. vi. p. 131.

† From Sarcerius's Report in Plank, vol vi. p. 162.

‡ Relatio Colloquii Wormatiensis ad Philippum II. MSS. in the Bibl Altieri at Rome, xxvii. G. 3. contains nothing very remarkable. The author asserts that the Catholics were "satis superque" informed of the divisions among the Protestants,—"aliis adhærentibus Sneppio et Sarcerio, aliis Philippo et Brentio,"—when these made their well-known demands. "Gavisi sumus non parum, existimantes bellum adversariorum pacem fore nostram." Then follows in the MSS. an Italian Report, which is not at all more important, but only a repetition of the Latin one.

In it the Theologians were admonished not to prefer the gratification of their own passions to Christian peace and unity.

The Frankfurt recess of 1558, to which most of the estates belonging to the Confession of Augsburg gave in their adhesion, under the auspices of the three temporal electors, did not anathematise the Calvinistic view of the Lord's Supper. Its tone was moderate and rational.

At this period, so far as I can discover, the majority of the German potentates were inclined towards a more comprehensive doctrine, well suited to the political attitude they had assumed. At the Assembly of Princes at Naumburg, in 1561, all were satisfied with the declarations of the Elector Palatine, although he could no more deny then than later a certain leaning towards Calvinist opinions.*

But the sons of the imprisoned Elector were absolutely intractable. Their support of the pure reformed faith had cost them their territorial possessions, and they were by no means disposed to give it up now that the danger was so much less. John Frederick the Middle, whose father had made him, when a boy, repeat the catechism in church with the other children before the whole congregation, was most rigid in his opinions. He opposed a formal recusation to the recess of Frankfurt, which he called a "Samaritan Interim." On one occasion, when he was at Hals-

* Report of Sebastian Glaser to Ernst von Henneberg, 4 Feb. 1561, in Gelbke's Account of the Assembly of Princes at Naumberg (der Naumburgische Furstentag), p. 96. "The Elector Palatine did there make his Confession in terms so stately and so clear, that the Electoral Princes and others were quite satisfied therewith."

pach alone with his brother-in-law, the Count Palatine, and Duke Christopher of Wirtemburg, he promised to rest satisfied with signing the Confession, to prevent his theologians from publishing polemical writings, and to bear himself towards his chief opponent, the Elector Augustus, as became a friend and cousin. This, indeed, was the first occasion of the Assembly of Princes at Naumburg. At the latter place, however, his theologians again got about him, and the consequence was that, instead of holding an amicable consultation, he published a violent protest, and went away without leave-taking.* Headstrong, stubborn, and over-bearing, and yet easily swayed by suggestions which flattered and excited his passions, he rushed headlong upon an inevitable doom.

Thus, then, the theological disputes pursued their mischievous course unchecked. This was, perhaps, the first signal instance of abuse of the power of the press,—a power which had already become irresistible. The people of Nürnberg were, as we have seen, an independent, rich, and powerful civic body. Even they, when attacked by Flacius, and that, so far as we can discover, without any just cause, dared not, after long consideration, to utter a word in their own defence, deeply as they were wounded by the affront.† Their adversary was too formidable. The

* H. Christoph to Maximilian. Stuttgard, 21st March, 1562: "Duke Hans Frederick of Saxony not only agreed to the Assembly of Princes, but did even declare himself willing to subscribe to the Augsburg Confession of Faith. He did likewise consent to the omission of the Condamnationes, and agree with the Elector of Saxony as to the draught of the document, but, notwithstanding his former agreement, he did make this rupture.

† Nürnberg resolution touching the unquiet Flacius, 1564, in Ströbel's Beiträge (Contributions), vol. ii. p. 403.

princes, who had succeeded in establishing peace in the Empire by the exercise of a power sufficiently great to restrain the conflicting passions of political parties, were unable to put any check upon these fierce disputes. Unhappily, too, they were by no means so unimportant as they were absurd; they were followed by the most disastrous results, especially to the Protestant party.

Each day the doctrinal points of difference diverged more and more, and became more and more precise, until at length the two Protestant systems were in complete opposition.

Even after Luther's death, and spite of the divergences of opinion in Switzerland, the various Protestant sects might still be considered as forming one party, until they split upon the two important points of Justification and the Lord's Supper, after which their differences still further increased. We might, I think, describe the course they took in the fewest words by saying, that one side adopted the most extreme views on the first point, and the other on the second. With regard to the doctrine of Justification, as soon as the Lutherans had to apply the theory of God's absolute predetermination to save some men and to damn others, to particular cases, they paused. They rather indicated than explained their method of reconciling their conflicting ideas, and were content, after all, to be somewhat inconsistent. Calvin, on the other hand, resolutely proceeded without any misgiving to establish the harsh and relentless doctrine of Predestination. "Predestination," says he in so many words, "is the eternal decree of God, whereby he hath resolved within himself what shall be the doom of every living soul. For all are not

born with the same gifts. Some are chosen beforehand to eternal life, and others doomed to eternal damnation."* It seems difficult to reconcile this doctrine with any sense of individual freedom; nevertheless, it became the distinctive belief of his party, and was again defended by old Beza against the founder of the Lutheran Concordia.†

The doctrine of the Eucharist was developed to the utmost by the opposite party. Calvin, who would neither give up the mystery nor adopt the somewhat material views of Luther, hit upon the idea of a spiritual substance and a spiritual communion. The Lutherans, on the contrary, adhered to the letter of the original ordinance. The bold and positive assertions which Timann had opposed to Hardenberg, they expanded into the doctrine of the symbolical communion, whereby the divine nature of Christ was transfused into the human, thus involving the omnipresence of his human nature also: a doctrine no less repugnant to the collective feelings of mankind than the former is to their individual sentiments.

Thus, then, in the second half of the sixteenth century the two Confessions were absolutely opposed to each other. Moreover, the two Churches were essentially unlike in constitution.

In Germany both Protestant creeds gained adherents and influence. We know how great a share the quarrels excited at Heidelberg by Hesshusen, chiefly from personal

* Calvini Institutiones, vol. iii. pp. 5, 21.

† Beza: "Summa totius Christianismi sive descriptio et dissertatio causarum salutis electorum et exitii improborum." This document represents the doctrine by an emblematical woodcut. Concerning the quarrels with Andrea consult Schlosser's Life of Beza (Leben Beza), p. 268.

motives, had in causing the Palatinate to separate itself more and more completely from the Lutheran party. The results which this separation produced in Germany are incalculable. They first became apparent at the first Diet held by Maximilian II. at Augsburg in 1566.

The Protestants pressed for religious equality. It would have been happy for them had they been unanimous. But while the Count Palatine Wolfgang took with him as his counsellor Hesshusen, the very man whom the Elector Palatine had exiled, while a legal participation in the rights conceded by the religious peace was denied to this same Elector by those of his own faith, it was manifest that the influence of the whole Protestant party upon the Emperor and the Empire must be both faint and injurious. It was by this very Elector Palatine that the demands for religious equality were most strongly made.

A complete breach would have taken place between the Protestants had not Augustus of Saxony exerted himself to the utmost to prevent an occurrence which he thought could only be advantageous to his cousins of Gotha, whom he so cordially hated.* Meanwhile the Catholics were more united than ever.

It was not only the presence of a few very able papal nuncios which kept them together. The whole body was inspired with a strong feeling of renewed cohesion.

* Remark of Thuanus, lib. xxxix. p. 783. Ed. Francof. Moreover, according to the Letter of Christopher Mundt to Cecil, dated Strasburg, 3rd June, 1567, we find, "Differentiæ et disjunctionis Germaniæ fomes et incendium pertinax illa logomachia de cœnâ Domini." He naturally enough makes out that the Palatine was right: "Palatino per speciem et culpam violatæ confessionis Augustanæ everso." So that this also was to be feared. —*Burleigh State Papers*, p. 450.

The Council of Trent was at an end: the disputed points of doctrine had been decided according to the spirit of the old system; a severer ecclesiastical discipline introduced, and the decrees of the Council gradually adopted in Germany. A German seminary of modern Catholicism was established in Rome, at which young Germans were educated, partly for the higher dignities of the Church, and partly for the duties of instruction. The different kinds of education which they received were well calculated for the several careers they had to fulfil.

Thus while the Protestants split into two distinct parties, and the advantages they gained were rather over each other than over the common enemy, Catholicism regained a firm footing within a separate territory of its own.

Germany became the battle-field of the three different creeds and systems.

CHAP. X.

MILITARY ENTERPRISES OF MAXIMILIAN.

WITH the best will in the world, Maximilian could not have opened the spiritual principalities to Protestant princes, seeing that the majority at the Diet was decidedly opposed to the measure, while the minority were divided amongst themselves.

The question now was whether he would have power to dissever from the rest of Europe a nation so divided, and perhaps even by some great undertaking impart to it an impulse strong enough to overcome the intestine divisions.

Maximilian did not long delay the attempt. It had always irked him to see that Germany had lost all courage to face the Turks, who were not only left in possession of a large portion of Hungary, but even exacted a tribute of 30,000 ducats for allowing the Slavonians and Croats, who were subjects of the Empire, to cultivate their lands which had fallen into the hands of the Turks.* Maximilian attributed this state of things less to the vigour of the attack than to the weakness of the resistance. He quite believed the representations of Count Nicolas Zriny, that the real force of the Turks was by no means equal to its reputation; and that if 70,000 men could be got together, with God's help the infidels might be defeated.† His ardent and chivalrous spirit glowed with ambition to perform this enterprise.

It cannot be said that Maximilian purposely provoked a renewal of the war; but it is certain that he did nothing to prevent it.

Sultan Soliman still lived; he was moved not only by political ambition, but also by the religious exhortations of his daughter Mirmah and Sheik Nurreddin. For the thirteenth time, he arose and girded himself for the holy war. Once more his poets followed him with the prayers

* Micheli, 1564, gives this reason:—"Il Turco, al quale si pagano 30,000 duc. acciochè quelli di Croatia, di Schiavonia, e degli altri confini possino sicura" godere le loro entrate e le loro decime che hanno dentro nel paese hora occupato del Turco." He adds, moreover, "Per li molti danni che l' imp^re ha ricevuto del Turco, S. M. si era totalmente avvilita, come è ancora avvilita tutta la nation Tedesca: ma tutti i pensieri del rè erano volti a far questa guerra più felicemente."

† At least Isthuanffy, Historiarum lib. xxii. p. 221., puts a similar speech in Zriny's mouth.

which had so often been granted to them, "That he might wave like the branches of the cypress in the wind of victory."* Surrounded by his court, his vassals with their retinues and all his slaves, he marched upon Germany.

This mass of Oriental slaves advanced without grumbling and with one accord; unfortunately, the Germans were not so ready voluntarily to unite against them.

The nobles who might have taken this opportunity to display their knightly valour, were entirely occupied in opposing a general and vigorous resistance to the growing power of the princes. The object of their especial hate was Augustus of Saxony, the most powerful of the German princes. William von Grumbach found support and encouragement in these views after all the acts of violence of which he had been guilty, and even when under the ban of the Empire. On the strength of this, he joined John Frederick, who was in opposition to the Emperor and the Empire, to the whole existing order of things, to the Protestants as well as to the Catholics, and, above all, to the Elector Augustus. Visionary hopes were held out to him of his restoration to the electoral dignity, nay even of his election to the Empire by the body of nobles and knights on the field of battle; but the excitement which prevailed among the nobility kept the whole of Germany in a state of agitation.† At the moment of undertaking a

* Ghasele of Baki in Hammer's Osman. Gesch. (History of the Osmanlis), vol. iii. p. 751.

† This is confirmed, among other writings, by the poem "The Nightingale," quoted by Lessing from the Wolfenbüttel Library, Beyträge zur Geschichte und Literatur (Contributions towards History and Literature),

war against the Turks, the Empire had likewise to prepare for an internal struggle.

Nevertheless, Maximilian was better supported than any Emperor before him had been. The Diet had granted him a noble subsidy*, and two large armies, the one commanded by Salm, and the other by Schwendi, awaited him at Comorn and Caschau. He himself took his departure from Vienna, well equipped, and accompanied by a number of German princes and nobles. The Hungarians awaited him on the plains of Raika. His army was more numerous than Zriny had formerly pronounced to be necessary.

Moreover the Turkish war was not exclusively German and Hungarian; the whole of Christendom once more made common cause with them. The Dukes of Tuscany and of Savoy, who were otherwise at enmity with each other, both sent troops. The Dukes of Mantua and

vol. i. Notwithstanding a diligent search, Lessing found no other trace of this, excepting in Heydenreich's Chronicle of Leipsick, which first put him upon the track. Probably none other was forthcoming at that time. Subsequently, however, other poems were found of the same sort, and by the same author,—a certain Klewitz as it appears,—also one upon the ordinance of the Emperor Maximilian "for the destruction of our party" (Deutsches Museum [German Museum] 1779, vol. i. Walch in Meusel's Hist. Lit. Magazin, vol. iv. p. 167). To all this we may add, that Maximilian likewise alludes to it in one of his Letters to Christopher (Prague, 12th April, 1567). He wished, above all, to know who the author was. Duke Christopher conceives "that it was forged by those who have since received their just reward at Gotha."

* It has been said that it was granted with an ill grace. The Palatinate Instruction of 1576 maintains, that when the sum was reckoned up it was found that 7,800,000 florins had been conceded and paid. Häberlin, vol. x. p. 22. This was an enormous sum if it was really paid. But this was denied at Court, according to Micheli's account. At any rate, it may have been paid slowly.

Ferrara appeared in person with stately retinues of cavalry; the young Duke of Guise came, followed by a company of warlike French nobles. John Smith, the nephew of John Seymour, Philip Butshide, and several others, came from England; there was no lack of adventurous Poles; all those who had just been engaged in the defence of Malta, and were not satisfied with one battle with the Turks, came in order to try their luck against them once more.

It is much to be regretted that Maximilian did not succeed in giving a permanent character to this movement by a successful conduct of the war.

He however advanced but slowly, and encamped at Raab. Instead of attacking the enemy, he gave his whole care to being well prepared to receive the attack.*

The Turks had recourse to their old arts of war, and attacked the neighbouring fortresses, resolved to conquer them at any cost. The first attacked was Szigeth.

Surely it was incumbent on Maximilian to hasten to the relief of the brave Zriny who was defending it, a man who did not serve for pay, and who possessed a large and rich domain on the shores of the Adriatic, and could any day have made his own terms with the Turks.

Unhappily, no such attempt was made. Solyman sunk under age, exertion, and the climate of Szigeth before the

* Apparently Schwendi's advice had some influence in this matter. Schwendi. Kriegsdiscurs; vom Turken krieg (Discourse on War; on the Turkish War), p. 289.: "Likewise the general hath to take heed, first, that he expose not his camp, that the enemy turn not his flank and thus cut off his provisions or harass his people with constant alarms and skirmishes, or wear them out, or keep them in terror, or throw them into disorder, for such is the practice of the Turkish warfare."

fortress was taken. The German forces could and should have attacked his camp at this juncture. They were informed of his death by a dervish friendly to the Christian cause, but did not believe his report, and remained before Raab without advancing a step.

The bold and simple stratagem practised by the Wezir, of concealing the Sultan's death, gained the victory over all the gifts and talents of the German Emperor.

The power of effective action is something quite distinct from the most brilliant gifts of perception and analysis; and nothing is so rare as the combination of the two. Moreover, practice and a knowledge of the enemy gained by personal experience are required in order to oppose an effectual resistance.

It availed nothing to Zriny to have defended Szigeth so long and so bravely, and to have beaten back so many assaults. It is true that no warrior ever died a more glorious death; but he perished, and the fortress he had defended fell into the hands of the enemy.* Victory, which had been so constant to Solyman when living, did not forsake him in death.

Meanwhile the wearisome, unavailing and hard service of the German camp discouraged the ardour of the troops. When the Turks, whose advance they had been awaiting, retreated after gaining their ends, Maximilian's vast army retraced its steps without having performed a single action of note, nay, without having so much as rightly seen the enemy.

* I. Barbaro, Rel^e di Constantinopoli, 1573: "Ritornò allora (da Zhiget) quel esercito (Turchesco) con tanta fattura e danno che sin al presente se ne risentono."

The Emperor found himself compelled to conclude a peace on far different terms from those which he had hoped. Spite of some advantage gained by Schwendi, in the following year he again had to purchase it: he was forced still to pay the tribute of 30,000 ducats, and to give up Szigeth and Gyula with the whole territory attached to them. And yet this peace was not looked upon as dishonourable, to such an extent had the soldiery lost courage to resist the Turks, and confidence in the fortunes of the Christian cause.* Maximilian could not be induced to recommence the Turkish war, even by so favourable an opportunity as the league, between Spain, Venice, and the Pope, or so brilliant an achievement as the victory of Lepanto.

Moreover, the warlike spirit by which Germany has always been inspired took an entirely new direction in the very next year.

The Duke of Alba's presence in the Netherlands apparently checked the agitation which prevailed there for a time; but for that very reason it only increased the excitement in the west of Europe. Disturbances broke out in Scotland, and France was desolated by the most alarming civil war which that country had ever known.

The only chance of safety for Germany would have been, as far as possible, to guard against the reaction which these struggles were likely to produce there, and by no

* Micheli, 1571: "I Tedeschi erano avviliti contra il nome di Turchi conciosiacosachè da quaranta anni in quà hanno sempre perduto; con Giula e Zighet era perduto un paese che abraccia più di 60 miglia Ungh., e più per la riputation. L' impre anco, con la vittoria (del 1571) è dubio, se non si viene seco ad offerte ed a partiti che le parino l'en assicurati."

means to act as champions and partisans in a quarrel which little concerned the German nation.

But when Wolfgang of Zweibrücken marched a strong army to the assistance of the Protestants in France, their opponents also had German troops. At Montcontour a Nassau fought against a Mansfeldt.

The disorders which accompanied these campaigns, the German blood spilt in foreign lands, could not fail to produce an effect at home, especially as the same cause of quarrel, the religious disputes, prevailed here as well as there.

Maximilian endeavoured to put a stop to this evil. At the Diet held at Speyer, in 1570, he proposed to prohibit the recruiting of soldiers by foreign powers, and to establish arsenals and provide speedy assistance in every circle of the Empire against any breach of the public peace which might occur from the insolence of the soldiery.* Thus far his proposal differed but little from several previous resolutions, and thus far he might reckon upon the general consent, if not upon the active co-operation, of the German princes. But Maximilian went one step further; he added a clause to the effect that they were not to join any foreign potentates, unless with the express sanction of the Emperor; and that a captain-general of the Imperial forces should be at the head of the troops appointed to guard the public peace. This was altogether opposed to

* Häberlin, N. D. R., vol. ix. I think it worthy of remark, that in the answer which Maximilian gave in 1568 to an offer made to this effect by the French, the very arguments were adduced which were subsequently turned against himself, *e. g.* "Ne arguatur facere contra libertatem Germanicam." Sichardius, Rerum Germ., vol. iv. p. 107.

the ideas of German freedom entertained by the princes; and John William of Saxony opposed the measure most vigorously. The projected appointment of a permanent captain-general excited considerable dissatisfaction, and even Schwendi, who was to fill the place, and Zasius, who was supposed to have a share in the plan, were made to feel the general displeasure. We are told that the Emperor would have given a great deal never to have broached any such scheme.*

We, too, may ask whether it would have been advantageous to the nation at large that such a power should be entrusted to him, and whether he was quite unfettered by foreign ties.

CHAP. XI.

MAXIMILIAN'S ALTERED POSITION.

A GRADUAL change was perceptible in the political conduct of the Emperor—a change mainly attributable to the development of his religious opinions.

* Michaeli alone gives the peculiar circumstances:—"Tutte le provisioni et ordini proposti da S. M. e di un publico armamento e d' un publico erario e di un capitano generale con altri capi inferiori non solo furono rigettate sotto colore che venisse impedita l' antiqua libertà di Germania, ma S. M. per questo incorso in una grave et universale indignatione degli Stati contra di lei, onde S. M. haveria pagato assai a non ne aver parlato, e ne furono grandemente imputati come autori di questo il Swendi et il Dr Zasio, questo vicecancre e consre di Stati di S. M. Cesarea, e quello di suprema autorità appresso in M. S. nelle cose di guerra, tenuto che occultamente per suo interesse e per propria ambitione aspirasse a quest' generalato.

It has been asserted that Cardinal Hosius reconverted him to Catholicism; but of this I am not altogether convinced. Hosius rather insinuates than asserts it; and in his reports of his interviews with the Emperor he only says that he believed he had made an impression, or that Maximilian appeared to be moved by his arguments.* Even of this there is no proof. In one of his letters Maximilian says that he had no inclination to enter more deeply upon the subject with Hosius, and that he preferred allowing him to maintain his opinions undisputed. It may have been this very silence which the controversialist interpreted so greatly in his own favour. At any rate, Maximilian's pungent observations on the Council are of a later date. Hosius is said to have converted him in 1560, but in 1561 the Emperor inquired of several Protestant German princes what assistance he might expect from them in case he were persecuted, or even dethroned, for religion's sake.† At this time, at least, he still bore himself as "the

* Two accounts have come down to us of the Conferences of Hosius with Maximilian, one in the Letters of Hosius to Cardinals Borromeo and Morone in Raynaldus, Annales Ecclesiastici, tom. xxi. p. 218., the other under the title "Relatio Stanislai Hosii de Actis in Legatione Germanica," composed, as the title implies, by himself, in Bzovius, Annales Ecclesiastici, tom. xx. p. 411. The two accounts are frequently identical word for word. Hosius's expression is, "Visus est huic sermoni meo rex assentari," (Letter of 29th Jan. 1560); or, "Cum hoc audisset a me, serenitas illius visa est non mediocriter commoveri;" or, "Audivit me patienter neque visus est illi sermo meus ingratus accidere" (Letter of 31st Oct. 1560): on the other hand, Maximilian says, on the 31st July, 1560, on some especial occasion, "We, however, would not enter into any argument with him (Hosius), but let him alone."

† From the Palatinate, Würtemburg, and Hessian Princes. The levy of Warnsdorf in Rommel's Philip d. G., vol. ii. p. 577.

Lion of Judah, the Second Daniel," which his court preacher had declared him to be.

I do not mean to deny that Hosius had made a certain impression upon him; the Cardinal took care to attack Maximilian on his most vulnerable point.

He had long been utterly disgusted by the incessant squabbles of the Protestants amongst themselves. In all his letters to Duke Christopher he urges the Protestant party to unite, and thus to acquire strength to deal a mortal blow to the Papacy. He says that he is quite tired of so many different opinions, which can only serve as weapons in the hands of the enemy, and as a subject of triumph to Rome. This formed the subject of his solitary meditations. My readers no doubt remember that he once propounded eleven questions to Melanchthon; it is remarkable that the three first relate to a settlement of the religious disputes. The most noble minds were those who found it most hard to relinquish the idea of the unity of the Church; and it was on this very point that Hosius attacked him. He represented to him evils like the split between the reformed Confession of Augsburg and the unreformed, the self-contradictions into which the most eminent Protestant divines had fallen*, the offence and scandal caused by the attacks of a Wigand and a Gallus upon Melanchthon, and he laid before him the most venomous polemical writings that had appeared at the last book fairs. This was the course taken with regard to the

* Hosius to Morone, 25th Sept.: "Mihi sum animadvertere visus, pluris a rege Philippum fieri; quem ego præ ceteris insector quoties cum rege mihi sermo est, et multis argumentis, quod sacramentarius fuerit, demonstrare conor."

Emperor by all the adherents of Catholicism. Chytræus again and again reiterates to the Protestants that nothing injures them so much in his eyes as their Cadmean strife amongst themselves, their daily increasing violence, and the utter anarchy of their Church.*

These representations did not have the effect of making Maximilian altogether go over to the other side, but the disgust with which he was filled by the constant divisions among the Protestants caused him to offer less and less resistance to the arguments which their opponents drew from them. He consented to appoint as his court preacher Zitthard, of Aix-la-Chapelle, who, although only belonging to the very moderate party, was supposed to be a Catholic; and moreover he attended mass on Sundays.

Maximilian gradually awoke to the necessity and also to the feeling of toleration, and he was one of the first who did so, though he only applied it to the two leading sects, not to all forms of religious belief. He refused to yield to the Pope's suggestions that the Protestants should be persecuted. But, on the other hand, he answered the Protestant Estates, when they demanded the expulsion of the Jesuits, that it was not his business to drive out Jesuits but Turks. It was, in fact, a slight extension of these ideas which led him to make the distinction between the Catholic and the Romish Church. He expressly commanded the Doctors of the University of Vienna no longer to take an

* Chytræus ad Marbachium, 8th July, 1568. He wrote this after a conversation with Schwendi. Raupach's Lutheran Austria (Ev. Oestreich), vol. ii. p. 189.

oath of conformity to the Roman Catholic, but to the Catholic Church.

With such views as these Maximilian had fallen upon evil times. The scenes of blood which were acted in France and the Netherlands distressed him deeply, and he laments them in moving terms in an eloquent letter to Lazarus Schwendi. "Religious questions," says he, "cannot be decided by the sword; no honourable man who has the fear of God and the love of man before his eyes will maintain such a thing. The sword wielded by the Apostles was the tongue, wherewith to preach Christian doctrine and a good life: but now, alas! the way of the world is such that there is but little peace or comfort to be found therein."†

Thus did Maximilian advance towards moderation, reason, and tolerance in religion, which seemed natural to his character. Accordingly, he now stood alone in the world, between Catholics and Protestants, without decidedly belonging to either.

To maintain such a position as this would be impossible to a weak nature; it would require the exercise of the most determined and vigorous will.

The world admires and approves none but exclusive tendencies and lines of action, because they alone lead to very obvious results; but there can be no doubt that far greater real strength is required to support and carry out

* See this remarkable decree in Raupach, vol. ii. p. 161. The promotion of a certain Sigmond Cyssler, according to Pantaleone and Schelhorn, was the immediate cause thereof.

† In Goldast, Reichsatzung (Decree of the Empire), part ii. p. 324.

any moderate view in the midst of contending parties and hostile claims.

The question was whether Maximilian really did possess this moral energy.

At first his political leanings were manifestly towards the Protestant party. Whoever was persecuted found protection and support from him. He kept up a secret understanding with those subjects of Philip II. who opposed the Catholic line of policy pursued by that sovereign; he was on the side of Orange and Egmont*, and this was useful to him in German affairs, inasmuch as the former was closely connected with Saxony, and the latter with the Palatinate.

But a change took place in him more sudden and more complete than could possibly have been expected; this change was brought about by an occurrence which would scarcely seem to belong at all to the series of events now under consideration. I mean the tragical end of the Infant Don Carlos.

The death of the heir to the Spanish throne placed the German branch of the House of Austria in a new position with respect to that power. Philip II. conceived the project of marrying a daughter of Maximilian himself, and of giving the Infanta to one of his sons; thus the crown

* Micheli, 1564: "Riceve et assicura tutti quelli, che ricercano la S. M. per causa della religione, di che natione si siano. So che occultamente fuori di Germania da ancora provisioni grosse a persone ritirate per questo rispetto della religione. S' intertiene studiosa" con molta unione e domestichezza con tutti li suddi:i del re di Spagna di altra natione che Spagnoli, spi cialmente con li Fiamenghi e con li piu grandi, come il principe d' Oranges, che è il primo e nepote per la moglie del duca di Sassonia, e con il conte d' Aghemont, cognato del elettor Palatino e tutti li altri."

of Spain must necessarily descend to the heirs of the Emperor through one or the other of his children.

The advantage was the more tempting to Maximilian, as he was of a feeble temperament, by no means sure of a long life, and burthened with a numerous family.

Philip represented this to him, and at the same time informed him of his conditions. He pointed out to him that the kingdoms of Spain — never too well disposed to accept the rule of foreign princes — would scarcely assent to the marriage of the Infanta with the son of an heretical Emperor*, adding that he himself should scruple to do that which might endanger the souls of a whole people. In this case he said that he too should seek in marriage a French princess instead of Maximilian's daughter.

I know not how this was received by Maximilian — his Protestant friends had always feared lest he should suffer himself to be too much swayed by hopes and fears†; at all events there is no denying that from this time his whole course of policy gradually changed.

"I can truly affirm," says Micheli in 1571, "that I have perceived a great change in his Majesty. Whereas, in former times, and even until the death of the Prince

* Dispaccio dell' Ambasciatore Venetiano alla Corte di Spagna, 9th Nvbre 1568 (Archivio di Vienna): "Il re scrisse all' imperatore passi d' estrema importantia; tragli altri questo della sua successione quando di lui non restasse altra posterità, che queste infante; perciochè questi regni, che mal volontieri admettono principi forastieri, haveriano grande occasione di tumultuare per non lasciar seguir il matrimonio di esse in li figlioli d' un imperatore heretico." He would not help him, he adds, "Per non dar ansa alla perditione e damnatione di tante anime."

† These were the "persuabilia hujus mundi," of which Duke Christopher had warned him some ten years before; 29th Oct. 1559. Lebret, vol. ix. p. 140.

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Charles, he showed himself to be the rival of the King of Spain, of whom he, on all occasions, did speak in no very honourable manner; he hath now assumed altogether a different manner, and never speaks of him save with the greatest respect."

Thus the bonds were gradually re-united, of which the dissolution had been so advantageous to Germany.

"At the present time," continues Micheli, "nothing is done on the Emperor's part — nay, nothing is so much as thought — no plan, be it great or small, is formed but what is forthwith communicated to the Spaniards, and discussed with them; according as they decide, yes or no, so it is carried into execution.*

This was in itself enough to draw the Emperor nearer to all Catholics and to the Pope. But there was another and more immediate motive at work. A prospect was opened to Maximilian of obtaining the crown of Poland for himself or for one of his sons; and this could only be effected with the concurrence and support of the Pope and his legates.

The politics of Germany were influenced by these new considerations, which caused the Emperor to lean more and

* Micheli's words in 1571:—"Non che si facia, non si pensa pur dal canto dell' imperatore cosa nè piccola nè grande, che non sia participata, consigliata e poi esequita o al si o al no secondo che viene di là. Colla potentia di Spagna si fortifica e se autoriza in tutte le azioni e con li suoi medesimi Tedeschi e con altri." The Spaniards sought to keep him to this: "E per mettere S. M. in maggior sospetto e gelosia della successione, se pure avvenisse il caso che il re non avesse maschi, consigliano e procurano di promovere ad ogni sorte di grado e di grandezza questo D. Giovanni d' Austria." What an entanglement of conflicting and powerful interests!

more towards the Catholic Estates. It has been remarked that it was to the advantage of a German Emperor to remain Catholic, for that had he gone over openly to Protestantism, the prelates would have been compelled to do the same, in order to escape from complete oppression. There would then have been only one party, or at least one would have had no more power than the other, and the Emperor would have had no more influence than what he might have owed to the limited resources of his own hereditary dominions. To him it was essential to be the head of a party. To keep this party in subjection, Maximilian now made use of the importance of King Philip, as on a former occasion he had made use of that monarch's opponents.

This was very obvious to the German nation; and the prince, who did not fulfil the expectations he had raised, was no longer trusted; the confidence of the nation was turned into suspicion; there was a general anxiety lest all the Catholics should secretly take counsel together, and enter into a dangerous combination to which the Emperor would be a party.

There is still extant a detailed report by Schwendi upon the government of the Empire under the existing circumstances, in which he especially dwells upon this point. "The whole German nation did receive the Emperor with joy and gladness, because that he had shown from his youth up traces of a right honest German heart. But now, since he hath not put a stop to the misdeeds in the Netherlands, and since it hath been believed that he acteth more in accordance with the desires of foreign potentates than for the good of the Empire, distrust hath

increased on the one side without diminishing on the other. Something might easily come to pass that 'would blow the smothering embers into a raging flame.'" *

CHAP. XII.

CONCERNING THE PROVINCIAL CHURCHES AND THE BEGINNING OF THE RESTORATION OF CATHOLICISM.

THIS expectation was not, however, destined to be fulfilled so soon; the affairs of Germany were still left to take their natural course.

No compromise had been effected between the two religions; no general measures had been taken to prevent inevitable dissensions; no new or engrossing direction had been given to the energies of the nation, nor had foreign influences been excluded from it; the storm which agitated Europe poured forth its chief fury over Germany.

* Schwendi. This did not escape the Venetian Micheli: "S. M. se bene in tutti li tempi per la impotentia sua fosse poco temuta come avveniva anche a Ferdinando suo padre, però pareva pure, che fusse amata e consequentem rispettata: hora è mancato assai e ogni dì va piu raffreddandosi quel amore e rispetto, che prima li era portato; perchè pare che restino ingannati dal procedere di S. M. in tutto quello che aspettavano e si promettevano da lei et in conto di guerra e per conto della religione: la tengono per persona che procede con duplicità, avendola intrinsecamente per papista con opinione che hanno, che la S. M. a destruttione della loro religione, e con fine di sommetterli abbia occulta intelligentia e con il Pontifice e con il re di Francia e di Spagna hora sui generi, e che per scoprir si aspetti tempo et occasione; e tanto piu lo credono quanto che anno veduto per rispetto del re di Spagna non solo ha favoriti ma abandonati quelli di Fiandra e delli paesi bassi."

The antagonistic tendencies first displayed themselves in the various German states separately, especially in those in which the necessity for unity was not apparent.

Everywhere, even in those states in which the change took place most quietly, the form of government was determined by a totally new union of Church and State, of political and religious interests. Let us pause for a moment to examine a few single instances.

We know how intimately the Reformation and the government were connected in Wirtemberg. The constitution was founded on the fact that the prelates who were now Lutherans had combined with the Estates to take upon themselves the public debt; and that the surplus of the Church property, of which so good a use was thus made, was placed under the control and disposal of the two Estates conjointly. At the meeting of the Estates of 1565 this was at length concluded, after much difficulty and discussion, and at the same time the Duke confirmed the religious confession and the ecclesiastical discipline for all future times, adding that "should he himself attempt to make any change therein, his subjects should not be bound to agree thereto." Hereupon the Committee of the Estates established itself in a house of its own, with a vault in which to keep the treasure of the public fund.* This was the origin of the constitution which has distinguished Wirtemberg for some two centuries and a half, a constitution which owed its existence to the union of interests between the sovereign and his Estates. Master Caspar

* Pfister, Geschichte des Herzog Christoph (History of Duke Christopher), pp. 545. 598.

Wild, to whose exertions so much was owing, was at once the counsellor both of the Duke and of the Estates.*

In other territories, for instance in Brunswick, when, after long expectation, a Protestant prince at length came to the throne, it was not difficult to imitate the administration of Wirtemberg.

It is still more remarkable that something of the same kind took place even in countries where the prince and the people were not united on the most important point — their religious creed; this was the case in Austria. It is true that this could only have happened under so moderate a prince as Maximilian II., who took up his position between the two parties.

By an agreement not unlike the compromises in Protestant countries, Maximilian, on the one hand, allowed his nobility to introduce a form of worship in accordance with the Confession of Augsburg, while they, on the other, bound themselves by a formal obligation on their part to tolerate no doctrine that was not contained in the Confession of Augsburg, and to suffer no ceremonies but what were directed by the new Agenda.† The Emperor entertained the strongest aversion to everything that he called sectarian: he not only gave instructions for the new Agenda — desiring its author, Chytræus, to retain as much as possible of the Catholic ceremonies — but he also revised

* See among others that passage from Lieblerus, De Vita M. Casparis Wildii, in Schnurrer, Elucidation of the History of the Church, of the Reformation, and Learning of Wirtemberg (Erlauterung der Würtemberg. Kirchen-Reformations- und gelehrten-Geschichte), p. 273.

† Formal Obligation of the Estates in Raupach, Luth. Austria (Ev. O.), vol. i. p. 128. Also in Waldau's History of the Protestants in Austria (Geschichte der Protestanten in Oestreich).

and corrected it himself. The new doctrines were introduced into Austria, not in opposition to the sovereign, but under his careful guidance and control. It is true that they were in some respects very favourable to his interests. That portion of the Austrian nobility which had imbibed the principles of the Reformation at foreign universities, had at the same time acquired a far higher degree of practical ability and experience than those who had remained at home; and as they were reserved in the expression of their religious opinions, and useful in public business, they soon gained possession of all the higher offices of State, and filled them with the adherents of the new faith. These now made themselves the champions of the rights of the State as against the Church; they easily persuaded the Emperor Maximilian, already inclined that way, that he had the right to alienate ecclesiastical property without the consent or knowledge of the Pope or the bishops. Convents were given away, sold and mortgaged almost as freely as in Protestant countries; and those that were spared were compelled, as in Wirtemberg, to pay over the surplus beyond a certain income into the Treasury. Here too the administrative and representative bodies — namely, the Estates — were closely united, as was the case in all German territories.*

This however only seems to have taken place where the old institutions had already fallen to decay, and left the field open to Protestantism.

The differences which broke out in the bosom of Pro-

* A very remarkable explanation of these matters by Cardinal Ceesel is to be found in Kevenhüller, Annales Ferdinandei, vol. vi. pp. 3. 152.

testantism itself, were not to be settled without a struggle, in which the stronger party of course came off victorious.

It was not at Osiander's death that his followers were overthrown in the Duchy of Prussia; another destiny awaited them. Some time afterwards they again succeeded in obtaining power both in the Church and in the Government. Johann Funk, a pupil of Osiander's, was at the same time court preacher, confessor, councillor, and treasurer to the Duke. He took advantage of his position to abolish the Exorcism in Baptism, and to introduce altogether a new ritual. Nor was he content with this. Duke Albrecht was very impatient of the restrictions which he had imposed upon himself by the privileges he had formerly given. He found himself nearly as much controlled by his nobles as the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order had formerly been by his Chapter. In these straits the Osiandrites came to his assistance. Funk contrived to oust the powerful privy councillors, and to place the government of the country in the hands of his own friends; he then levied taxes and raised troops. The Duke joined the commons, and the Duchess began to dress like a citizen's wife instead of a noble lady.

It was manifestly impossible that the nobility should not resist this loss of power. They were resolved to regain it, and they knew what means to take.

They contrived to have a Polish Commission sent into the country, and this commission referred the points in dispute to the judgment of the Kneiphof Court, that is, the nobility itself.

Funk and his friends paid for their ambition with their lives. His ecclesiastical and political innovations which

had been simultaneously made, were simultaneously abolished by the nobles.* It was with perfect consistency that on the one hand the privileges of the nobility were confirmed, the Duke deprived altogether of the right of levying taxes by his own authority, and subjected to a strict supervision and control†; while on the other, the ejected preachers were recalled, a strict Lutheran form of worship established, and in the year 1567 a law was passed to the effect that thenceforth no one who did not adopt that form should be suffered to hold any office whatever, whether spiritual or temporal: every Prussian subject, of whatever degree, was to embrace and adhere to this creed for ever.‡

In Saxony too, the very stronghold of Protestantism, internal divisions arose. The opposition offered to Calvinism by the Elector Augustus, was no doubt connected with his foreign policy, as I shall hereafter show. But I do not deny that it also bore reference to his domestic administration. The most eminent man concerned in these disturbances, Dr. George Cracau, endeavoured to effect a total change in the state of the law, and especially, by the constitution, of which he called himself the fabricator and

* Complaints against Funk in Leutinger, "De Marchia ejusque Statu," p. 324: "Quis ferret aulæ deliberationes et consilia ad unius arbitrium revocari: . . . hominem externum pedem unum in suggesto, alterum in aula habere . . ignotæ stirpis exteros incolis nobilissimarum familiarum præferri, suæ farinæ hominibus officia atque munera conspectiora demandari." Funk gave among other reasons, "Non principes, viri Borussi, sed nomina principum vultis."

† Chytræus, Chronicon Saxoniæ, p. 631.

‡ Plank, Gesch. d. p. L. (History of the Protestant Doctrine), vol. iv. p. 441.

which he caused to be proclaimed by his prince, to give to the Roman law a decided predominance over the national uses and customs. This attempt threw the nobility and the town councils into a violent ferment of opposition, which Cracau disregarded, and obstinately pursued his scheme. I think it not unfair to conclude that many of his subsequent disasters may be attributed to this cause. At Leipsic all the doctors of law had been expelled from the council chamber during these changes.

The Burgomaster Rauscher, who had established his power by these very changes, afterwards took a most active part in the prosecution of their author. After his downfall the towns were suffered quietly to revert to their old traditional forms.

Under such circumstances, so decided a struggle inevitably produced different results in different places. While in the Duchy of Prussia, and in Saxony, the aristocracy and the orthodox creed gained the upper hand, in Bremen the popular party and the Calvinist tendencies were victorious. Hardenberg had been persecuted by the council; the majority of the citizens who were his followers, under the guidance of their Burgomaster Büren, ended by turning out the old town council, and binding down the new one never to interfere at all in religious matters save by the advice and sanction of the community†;

* Sketch of the Life of Dr. George Cracau, in the Collection towards a History of Saxony, vol. viii. pp. 1—138, contains on this point all that is known, and the notices we have given. Concerning the legal matters consult Weisse, Geschichte der Chursächsischen Staaten (History of Electoral Saxony), vol. iv. p. 155.

† Narrative of the Notary in Löscher's Historia Motuum, vol. ii. p. 261.

truly a curious anomaly amid the strictly Lutheran and highly aristocratic cities of Lower Saxony.

One inevitable result of this reciprocal action of politics and religion, this strife of violently excited passions within so narrow a compass, was a reaction in favour of Catholicism.

In Bavaria, as in other countries, the sovereign had seen fit so early as 1556 to make most important concessions to his Estates. He allowed them to receive the Lord's Supper under both forms, to eat meat in their own houses on fast days, and held out to them hopes of the appointment of pastors "by whom the Word of God should be proclaimed according to the apostolical doctrines." It was under cover of such promises as these that the Reformation had begun and been carried out in other places. When Duke Eric II., although himself a Catholic, wanted to secure to the provincial estates of Calenberg the continuance of the Protestant faith, he made use of the words that "he should leave them in the right, pure, and true religion;" he gave no other assurance, and this had been sufficient.*

In Bavaria matters stood at this time much as in Austria under Ferdinand I.

But things soon took a totally different course in Bavaria, nor can it be asserted that this was solely owing to the inclinations of the Duke.

In the first place the Estates were not unanimous from the first. The prelates held aloof from the claims preferred by the other two, and by degrees the representatives

* Remark of Spittler, Geschichte von Hanover (History of Hanover), vol. i. p. 260.

of the towns became more and more lukewarm. We find that at the Provincial Diet of 1563, the leaders of the nobility, Count Joachim of Ortenburg, and Pancrace of Freiberg, vehemently complained that the towns had now let drop the demands which they had formerly made; they not only represented to the deputies how deeply they were interested in the introduction of the new doctrines, but went so far as to tell them they ought to be stoned if they went home without having obtained permission to introduce the Confession of Augsburg. But all was in vain; the prelates held aloof, and the towns were not earnest in the matter, which was left solely to the nobles.*

Now at this period the nobles throughout Germany were in a state of great fermentation. They everywhere had to dread the rise of the territorial power; and in Bavaria they anticipated the revocation of the concessions they had but just obtained. Their discontent increased, and it cannot be denied that it led to the formation of very alarming projects. Adlzreitter records a story, involved in intentional obscurity, of a conspiracy of the Bavarian nobility, destined to end in open rebellion. According to this author, the nobles had already raised troops when the Duke, who had received a warning from Saxony, and took a journey thither in consequence, discovered every thing but the names. He returned and summoned the conspirators before him. He reminded them of the duty they owed him, demanded their signet rings from them, caused

* Extracts from the Negotiations of the provincial Diet, authentically and sufficiently treated in Freyberg, Geschichte der Baierischen Landstände (History of the Bavarian Estates), vol. ii. pp. 313—359.

the stones engraved with their arms to be taken out, and broke them with a hammer; — with this punishment he dismissed them.*

Thus much is certain, that the nobility had entered into a general combination against the princes. When the Count of Ortenburg took upon himself to introduce the Reformation into his territory to the fullest extent, and the Duke thereupon confiscated Old and New Ortenburg, and all the other possessions of the Count, he discovered a correspondence amongst his vassals which disclosed to him a very alarming conspiracy.

Their object undoubtedly was, to carry the Reformation into effect against his will and pleasure, and very little respect was shown to his person in the project. I do not know whether there may have been any truth in the strangely-imagined symbolical punishment to be inflicted on him.

The affair came before a court of law, which advised the Duke to show clemency; he accordingly contented himself with depriving his most determined adversaries of the right to appear at the provincial diets.†

This punishment set the matter altogether at rest.

At the next provincial diet in 1565, Duke Albrecht boasts of the unanimity of the Estates, "now that certain malcontents were away." Hitherto, says he, there had always been some religious discussions, and now the subject was never mentioned at any provincial diet.

First the prelates and then the towns had separated

* Adlzreitter, Annales Boicæ Gentis, book II. vol. xi. p. 273.

† Freyberg, p. 358., from a Letter of Huschberg concerning Ortenburg, which I have not yet seen.

themselves from the Protestant interest, and now the nobility was deprived of its heads and reduced to silence. There was nothing to prevent the Duke from putting down a form of doctrine which he originally disliked, and which was moreover associated with a formidable movement against himself.

Nor was this the only motive. He gained the advantage of entering into an alliance with the Pope, which was useful to him with respect to the affairs of Europe, and even in his domestic policy.

In consequence of the Reformation, the German principalities had assumed a peculiar half-spiritual half-temporal character, and had seized upon as many spiritual as temporal privileges. No human power could arrest this current of affairs or prevent the Estates from drawing more closely together, in order to repel the interference of a foreign spiritual power. It must be borne in mind that this took place quite as much in Catholic as in Protestant countries; in Bavaria as well as in Saxony. One of the most judicious and effective measures taken by the Curia was the giving scope to this movement. In his correspondence with Gregory XIII. Albrecht V. figures completely as the representative and ruler of his clergy.*

It is not surprising that those princes whose own titles and dignities were spiritual should have been still more ambitious of filling the same position.

In 1570 and the ensuing years, accordingly, the counter-reformation gradually began in the ecclesiastical dominions.

* Copies of this remarkable intercourse exist in manuscript in the Münich Library.

The first to set it on foot was, so far as I can discover, the least of all the spiritual princes; namely, the Abbot of Fulda. The Protestant faith had flourished unmolested under six successive abbots in Fulda, when the young Abbot Balthazar, though the son of Protestant parents, baptized and educated in Hessen in the Protestant faith, was filled with enthusiasm for the principles of Catholicism as set forth by the Council of Trent; and persuaded himself that he had the right to enforce the practices of the Romish Church upon all his subjects, and to expel from his territory every one that rejected them. He banished the Protestant preachers, turned a deaf ear to all remonstrances, and took no heed of the rights of patronage belonging to the towns or to the nobility: he filled the vacant livings with young men brought up at the Jesuit school he had himself established. His next step was to dismiss the Protestants from all other offices: by the year 1576 all councillors, official men, clerks, procurators, and church ministrants, high and low, were Catholics. All who had refused to adopt the decisions of the Council of Trent had been dismissed.*

As the Abbot of Fulda had been able to effect all this in the teeth of the Imperial Declaration, there was strong encouragement for others to make a like attempt.

At Eichsfeld the Protestant faith was as thoroughly established as in the surrounding district, and the Mayence commissaries had themselves appointed Protestant preachers at Duderstadt: the example of Fulda now gave the new

* Extract from the Instructions for the Envoys of the Elector Palatine for the Diet of 1576, in Häberlin n. d. R. (Modern History of the German Empire), vol. x. p. 238.

warden Leopold of Stralendorf courage to deprive the town and the nobility, as they alleged, "by main force," of their Protestant preachers, and to introduce Jesuits in their place.

We may remark the affiliation. The first Jesuit, Halverius, accompanied by a lay brother, went from Heiligenstadt to Paderborn.† In 1576 the Jesuits had already reached Hildesheim.

The reaction manifested itself in all quarters. The Archbishop of Treves tried to drive the Protestants of Wetzlar out of their only parish church; the Bishop of Worms refused any longer to allow the Protestant congregation to have the use of the poor little church of Saint Magnus.

Nor was this kind of oppression by any means confined to the bishops. The small towns in which the Catholics had the upper hand began to attempt the same thing. In Swabian Gmünd the civic oath was altered, as we learn by the complaints of those aggrieved, "to a Romish style," so as to exclude the adherents of the new doctrine from the list of common councilmen.‡

Though it was never admitted by the Palatinate, the words of the religious peace would seem to imply that the temporal principalities had a still better right to attempt similar acts of oppression.§ The first temporal state that

* Memorial of the Knightly Order of Eichsfeld and Fulda, in Lehmann, De Pace Religionis, vol. ii. pp. 117—119.

† Bessen, Geschichte von Paderborn (History of Paderborn).

‡ Memorial of Gmünd and others, and the Intercessions; see Lehmann, De Pace Rel., vol. ii. p. 120.

§ After 1576, the Palatinate protested against this reading of the 14th Article, to the disadvantage of the subject. Häberlin, vol. x. p. 247.

really experienced the counter-reformation, as far as I can discover, was Baden. To this end the young Margrave had been removed from the care of his natural guardians, and educated under the guidance of the Jesuits in Bavaria.*

In the year 1574 Schwendi, as we have already seen, dwelt with no little complacency on the irresistible and, as it seemed, providential spread of Protestant opinions. This then appeared to be true, and the current of public opinion undoubtedly set in that direction. But at this very moment, as though in mockery of his triumph, modern Jesuitical Catholicism struck root in the very centre of Germany, and spread in all directions.

CHAP. XIII.

NEGOTIATIONS OF 1575 AND 1576.

BUT, we may ask, could the Protestants do nothing in their own defence? They had the Declaration of the Emperor Ferdinand, and surely such a prince as Maximilian would feel himself bound by it.

It was deeply to be regretted that during all the years of peace nothing had been done towards allaying religious animosities. At the assemblies of 1567 and 1570 no one had ventured to touch upon them; and now that Maximilian was already so infirm that he had to take into consideration the choice of a successor, and that fresh rumours

* Häberlin, vol. viii. p. 42.

of war had arisen in Hungary, the evils were become so manifold and so pressing that they could no longer be removed.

The question was first brought forward at the Electoral Diet of 1575, which had been summoned for the purpose of electing a new King of Rome. The temporal electors had a plan for binding the future Emperor to maintain not only the religious peace, but also the declaration thereof. The verbal change they proposed was a very slight one: they only wanted to include the words, "and the declaration thereof," in the capitulation of election. Never were four more weighty words: they would have been sufficient to neutralise the counter-reformation in the ecclesiastical states.

But the spiritual electors were themselves the chief authors of the counter reformation, and they were by no means ready to assent to the demands of their colleagues. They raised two different objections.

First, they alleged that no change could be made in the capitulation of election without the consent of all the Estates of the Empire. To this the Elector of Brandenburg replied that the electors alone had the right of making the capitulation; and that they were in duty bound to deliberate in close committee "upon the well-being of the Empire, without aid, counsel, or consent of the other Estates."

The second objection was of a more startling character. They denied all knowledge of the Declaration, and so did

* The Disputation between the Spiritual and the Temporal Electors, in Lehmann, vol. ii. c. 15.: "Summary of what occurred in regard to Religious Matters at the Day of Election, anno 1575," c. xviii.

their counsellors. A writer belonging to their party positively asserted that a lawyer of that time, whom he describes with great minuteness, and no one else, had brought it forward.* The truth was that, as we have already mentioned, the affair was quickly settled in the year 1555, and no protocol had been drawn up on the subject.

But its existence could not on this account be denied. I find it mentioned, even by writers belonging to the papal court, and that without any attempt to deny it.† A copy was found in the registry of the Imperial chancery, and the original, signed and sealed, was brought by the Elector of Saxony; this left no room for doubt.

The temporal electors were now by far the most powerful; they had the election in their own hands, and right on their side; they had confuted the objections raised by their opponents, and it seemed as though there could be nothing to hinder them from settling the matter their own way.

The insuperable difficulty was the want of unanimity among themselves.

Never were the evils of religious animosity more strongly exhibited; a violent enmity had gradually arisen in consequence of religious differences between the Elector of Saxony and the Palatine, and it was not long before this hatred showed itself in political combinations. Frederick III., Elector Palatine, a prince of great courage and determination, was closely allied with the Protestants

* Burgkardus. † Pallavicini.

in France and in the Netherlands.* Saxony, on the other hand, stood well with Spain. Unhappily these political alliances likewise included the reigning families, and called forth the most bitter animosities, for which the first cause was given by the Prince of Orange.

A few years before Augustus had married his niece, Anna, daughter of the Elector Moritz, to William of Orange, against the wishes of her other relations. Her grandfather, old Philip of Hessen, had warned her that she would find but little happiness in the marriage; but she would not suffer herself to be deterred by any representations. "He is a black-hearted traitor," said she of her betrothed, "but there is not a vein in my body that does not love him."† In this mood she went to the Netherlands, where her grandfather's predictions were but too quickly fulfilled; she quarrelled with the Prince, and he put her from him.

At this time Charlotte de Montpensier, a princess of the House of Bourbon, was living at Heidelberg. Some time before she had been made abbess in France, but with a reluctant heart, for she and one of her female friends had embraced the Protestant faith. During the disturbances which followed the massacre of St. Bartholomew she found means to escape and take refuge in the Palatinate, whence

* Struvens, Detailed Account of the Church History of the Palatinate (Ausführlicher Bericht von der Pfälzischen Kirchenhistorie), p. 267. § 70., relates, among other things, how the Elector comforted himself on the occasion of the death of his son Christopher, who perished in one of the campaigns in the Netherlands. "It was better that he should die in a foreign land, fighting for the good cause, than that he should be spoiled by idleness at home."

† Message to Landgrave Philip, in Rommel's Philip, vol. ii. p. 657.

her father, a strict Catholic, vainly demanded her back. Charlotte de Montpensier was young and handsome, and the Elector Palatine negotiated for her a marriage with the Prince of Orange.*

Hereupon Augustus appeared at the electoral meeting bursting with indignation and resentment, the more so as he believed the repudiation of his niece to have been caused by the influence of the Palatinate. He loudly complained that a dishonourable stain had been cast upon his house, and that the Elector Palatine had attempted more than he would be able to effect. Fortunately the latter was not present, but Augustus at first refused to sit in council even with his chancellor, Ehem; he at length consented, but amid expressions of the most violent anger, and he would never exchange a single word with him.†

Now the Palatinate had been the first to suggest many innovations, such as the institution of an Imperial commission to share the power with the Emperor, and the employment of the Annates towards paying the expenses of the Turkish war; and it was now again foremost in support of the Declaration, and in demanding that it should be confirmed in the capitulation of election.

But, as we have already seen, the Palatinate was in no position to make good its claims. The Elector's foreign connections had made him many foes. His envoys say, "we were almost entirely forsaken, and quite despised,

* Thuanus, Historiarum lib. lix. p. 109. Meteren, Niederländische Historien (History of the Low Countries), vol. xi. French Transl., p. 215.

† Protocol of the Electoral and Imperial Diet, in Senkenberg's Collection of Unpublished and Rare Documents, vol. iii. p. 8.

and were very near being shut out as Samaritans from the synagogue of the Pharisees." Even among themselves they could not agree; the electoral prince Ludwig of the Palatinate, their head, who had come to the electoral meeting in his father's place, disapproved his father's policy. One day when the Emperor sharply rebuked the councillors of the Palatinate for their foreign alliances and manifold intrigues, they believed that he had been led to do so by the prince who had just left him.*

Under such unfavourable circumstances it is no wonder that the demands made by the Palatinate failed one after the other. While such discord reigned among the temporal electors the spiritual ones, who were perfectly united, had nothing to fear from them.

Moreover, the Emperor made use of his personal influence with the Elector of Saxony. He represented to him that such complete religious liberty would be the ruin of Germany; he entreated him, as the spiritual electors were immovable, to do his part towards sparing him the shame and mortification of leaving the electoral assembly without having effected any thing.†

* Epilogue of the Protocol.

† Lettera del Nunzio, Vescovo di Torcello (Delfino), al C^le^ di Como, Ratisbona, 18th Ottobre, 1575, MSS. in the Corsini Library at Rome, no. 677.: "Sabbato mattina s' accommodono le differenze tra gli elettori circa questa elettione, havendomi l' imperatore l' istesso giorno particolarmente narrato, con quanta difficultà haveva persuasi gli elettori secolari a desistere dalla demanda della libertà della religione, con haver mostrato loro che ciò saria la ruina della Germania, e che non lo permetterà mai, e così, parte con mostrarsene alienissima, parte con pregarli e particolar^m^ il Duca di Sassonia, del quale si loda assai, non le fara questa vergogna, di doversi partire da qui senza alcuna conclusione, essendo risoluta lasciar più tosto l' elettione imperfetta che acconsentirvi, ha ottenuto che non si parli d' altro che dell' elettione."

Hereupon Augustus promised on this occasion to give up the Declaration. In the college of electors he represented that this was a dispute for which the Emperor was not to blame, but for which he alone would have to suffer.

The end of the matter was that nothing was insisted upon and nothing obtained. The election was made, the Declaration left unconfirmed, and the counter reformation went on as before.

Ostensibly the consideration of the grievances complained of had only been postponed until the next Diet; but there could be no hope of effecting any thing so long as such discord prevailed.

It was again the Elector Palatine who, at the Diet of 1576, at Ratisbon, opened the question. He advised that no other business should be taken into consideration until the various grievances, of which he enumerated a long list, should have been redressed; he dwelt strongly upon the question of opening the spiritual principalities to both religions, and demanded from the Emperor a plain declaration, in black and white, of what he meant to do in case one of the spiritual electors should turn Protestant. This time many of the Protestant princes were on his side.*

The jealousy of Saxony was aroused at seeing the petitions presented by the protesting Estates drawn up in the words of the instructions emanating from the Palatinate.

The theological disputes ran higher than ever. The Elector Augustus had just begun his opposition to Cal-

* Instruction for the Palatine Envoy, in Häberlin, vol. x. pp. 20. 283. Häberlin is well informed in all that concerns this Diet, from MSS. in the Wolfenbüttel Library.

vinism. The question was again raised, whether the Elector Palatine could still be reckoned among the adherents of the Confession of Augsburg, and be admitted to a participation in the advantages of the religious peace. The Theologians who had drawn up the terms of concord decided against him. At the very moment when the Palatinate was pressing for the preservation and extension of the rights of the Protestants, an effort was made by them to deprive that State of any share in those rights.

Moreover, Saxony was never very favourable to the plan of admitting both religions to the spiritual principalities. For some time past Augustus had feared the outbreak of some hidden remnants of Catholicism in his own dominions.*

At all events he declared his readiness to proceed with the grants without further delay. Even before the Diet he had advised the Landgrave William of Hessen to do the same; and while it was sitting he wrote to the Dukes of Weimar and Coburg, urging them no longer to refuse the supplies for the Turkish war; they, he said, must be granted even should the Emperor put an end to the religious peace.†

All that the Protestants had ever obtained had been by making the grants conditional upon the redress of their grievances, and they were now about to follow the same course. There was no time to be lost; the Emperor still hesitated, and was not yet altogether opposed to them; but

* As early as 1556 this was mentioned as the cause of the opposition made by Saxony. Sattler, Würtembergische Geschichte (History of Wirtemberg), vol. iv. p. 105.

† Declaration of Dr. Lukas Thangel, in Häberlin, vol. x. p. 331.

Saxony, occupied with its unlucky politico-theological dispute with the Palatinate, refused to join it, and to pursue the former course. No one doubted that but for this the spiritual principalities would this time have been made common to both religions.*

At this moment a fresh dispute arose in another quarter, which seemed likely to destroy all hope for the future.

We have seen how intimately the demand for throwing open the spiritual principalities to both religions was connected with the endeavour to make the Turkish war into a more national cause. The counts and lords hastened to bring forward schemes for this purpose. They suggested that "all Protestants who were in the enjoyment of ecclesiastical benefices should be bound by a formal decree of the Empire to render military service to the Emperor both in maintaining internal peace and against the Turks." "Was it not," they asked, "more honourable to earn the revenues of benefices wherewith no cure of souls was connected by honest exertions for the public good than to enjoy them without working for them at all?"

This suggestion was discussed on all sides, the Emperor and Estates entered into elaborate projects for the institution of an order of knighthood to be endowed with a territory of its own, perhaps at Canischa, and which was to have all it might conquer as its own property after the deduction of the Regalia.†

* Memorial of a Prince of Nassau to Frederick IV., Elector Palatine, 1594, in Lunig, Staats Consilia, p. 454.: "It is well known that in the year 76 the opening the spiritual principalities to both religions would have been obtained, had not Saxony separated herself from the other Lutheran electors and princes."

† Petition of the Counts and Nobles. Memorial of the Emperor and the Estates, in Häberlin, vol x. pp. 270. 398. 403.

Nothing was wanting to the completion of the scheme than that the whole of the nobility, or at any rate the majority, should unite in it. Unluckily, this class offered a very unexpected resistance to it.

The rapid progress of the Reformation in the beginning had been mainly owing to the German nobility. By degrees, however, they discovered that its results were not so advantageous to them as they had at first expected. The territorial power of the princes increased daily, and the nobles perceived that their liberties and their influence in the Empire would be lost unless they maintained the religious foundations; by degrees they became convinced — partly owing to the violent and arbitrary proceedings of some of the Protestant princes with regard to ecclesiastical property — that this could only be done in case they remained Catholic. This was a sufficient reason for opposing the measure of opening the spiritual principalities to both religions.* On this subject both Protestants and Catholics were agreed. I know not how it happened that this opinion prevailed so suddenly and so completely in the

* The Papal Nuncio, Minuccio Minucci, conceived it, and with justice, to be of the utmost importance for the maintenance of Catholicism that the chapters should be in the hands of the nobles. Discorso, 1588, MSS. in the Bibliot. Barberina at Rome: "Chi pensasse, di darle tutte (le chiese) in potere di genti ignobili e levare quel instituto di provanze (proofs of nobility) saria cosa perniciosissima la qual portaria in consequenza la ruina manifesta delle chiese, poichè ove in presente sono difese da nobili, come proprio patrimonio loro, sariano allora oppugnate e lacerate senza rimedio, nè gli huomini che conoscono bene lo stato delle cose d' Alemagna, potranno mai dir altro, se non che quel antico instituto, d' haver i canonici nobili, e di far i vescovi per elettione, sia stato il solo sostegno delle chiese, che restano ancora in piedi, e forse unica causa, umanam parlando, di non lasciar perire affatto il Catolicisimo in Alemagna."

year 1576; but it cannot be denied that such was the case. When, in the month of March of that year, the Elector Palatine requested the nobility of the Empire to support his petition for the opening of the spiritual principalities, the Rhenish nobles first replied that they scrupled to bear a hand in an innovation upon the established order of things. Hereupon the nobles of Franconia, Swabia, and the Wetterau, held their meetings, and came to still more decisive conclusions. With one accord, they petitioned the Emperor to do nothing contrary to ancient custom; only too many religious foundations, they said, had been thrown open and temporalised, to the irreparable injury of the nobility. They implored him not to ruin them altogether.*

Here was a strange turn of affairs! There existed a religious party the members of which were bound by a common interest, upon which the progress of their opinions and the welfare of their country depended.

Unluckily, they split upon certain points of belief, and either section embraced extreme views. The one got entangled in foreign quarrels, which inevitably envenomed the dispute at home. Whatever was proposed by the head of one party was defeated by the leader of the other.

They also quarrelled upon questions of interest. Hitherto both princes and nobles had had a share in the property of the Church; the majority was undoubtedly Protestant, and it was manifestly their interest to keep that share, together with the new faith. But some strong measures taken by the princes filled the nobles of Upper

* Häberlin, vol. x. p. 360.

Germany with apprehension. They preferred seeing the ecclesiastical dominions remain Catholic out of the power of the princes, to seeing them become Protestant, and fall into their hands. Hereupon they too forsook the cause, and the whole party broke up.

The Catholics, on the contrary, were more closely united than ever. The lukewarmness which they had formerly displayed was succeeded by the most vigorous course of action. In 1575, the Elector of Cologne declared that he would, if necessary, uphold the Catholicity of the religious foundations even with the sword. Pope Gregory sent his most able cardinal, Morone, to the Diet of 1575, amply supplied with money.* The Protestants complained of the influence which he managed to obtain, and the papal historians commend him for the same thing.† By degrees the Catholics gained the upper hand.

The supplies were voted, and the grievances left unredressed. Nothing was done towards adjusting the disputes, and the hostile parties were more than ever incensed against each other. In this condition did Maximilian leave the Empire to his son.

He had cherished far different hopes; he had wished and striven to put an end to the divisions, and to prevent bloodshed. He took a right view of the situation of affairs,

* Dispaccio P. Tiepolo, Roma, 26 Aprile, 1576, Archivio di Vienna.

† Maffei, Annali di Gregorio XIII., Roma, 1742, § i. p. 228.: "Seppe con si fatti legami annodare tra se gli animi di Cattolici, o laici o di chiesa, o principali o sostituti che fossero, etc. etc." Minuccio Minucci: "Tanto era il valore del C^{l} Morone, ch' era legato. Siccome tenne saldo l' imp^{re} Massimiliano nella negativa, con tutto che si vedeva piu volte vicino alla necessità e forse alla determinatione di consentirvi, dalla quale si crede, che fosse ritirato principalmente dall' autorità del Duca Alberto di Baviera."

and foresaw all that would happen, but he was not strong enough to change the course of events, parties were too violent, circumstances too powerful for him. He was scarce able to maintain his own private opinions in the midst of such dissensions;—if, indeed, he was able to do this, he certainly could do no more.*

Maximilian died at the very moment in which his last Imperial decree was being read.

The first remark made upon the conduct of his successor was, that he set the Protestant counsellors more and more aside.†

Fresh events were now in preparation.

CHAP. XIV.

CONCLUSION.

On reviewing the period of history we have just traversed, we first behold Germany restored to peace by favourable circumstances, freed from foreign influences and given back to herself.

We see the nation rich and industrious, and more formidable in arms than any other people; Protestantism prevailed in all parts of the Empire, and the German mind followed new paths in art and literature; a liberal, tolerant

* Account of his death, given by Schelhorn. Raupach, Evang. Oest. (Lutheran Austria), vol. ii. p. 50.

† Huberti Langueti Epistolæ Arcanæ, vol. i. ch. ii. p. 211.

spirit united the heads of the nation, both those having authority and those possessing high intellectual gifts; it seemed probable that all remaining differences would be settled, the defects in law and government amended, the most dangerous enemy repulsed and conquered, and that Germany would give the law to her neighbours instead of receiving it from them.

That intelligent portion of the community which forms the real strength of a nation displayed in all its actions and ideas a strong tendency in favour of general and simultaneous progress, of the execution of great undertakings, and the construction of vigorous and permanent institutions. By following the course already entered upon all this might have been attained. Prudence and absolute devotion to the public good would have led to no other results; but there existed some antagonistic elements which could not fail to destroy the whole if they gained the upper hand.

Unhappily these very influences prevailed.

Whether it was owing to the repression of extreme speculation, or to passion, or both, a violent dispute upon doctrinal points arose among the Protestants themselves. The hostile parties embraced extreme views in opposite directions, and declared open war upon each other. One or the other gained a footing in the several districts, according as some subordinate interest with which it had leagued itself prevailed or succumbed.

For a time the principal liberal sovereigns strove to resist this turn of affairs; but by degrees they themselves felt an influence, which was strengthened in every case by political considerations.

First, the Saxon houses again quarrelled among themselves. A feud broke out between them, in which the one side was in opposition to the Empire and the other undertook to execute the Imperial decree upon its adversary. In reality it was only a revival of the old dispute, under another form.

The Palatinate and Wirtemberg, which were close neighbours, and even the two lines of the Palatine house, next fell out.

Electoral Saxony and the Electoral Palatinate, both Protestant, but divided by the extension of the new theological systems, became most bitter enemies.

In the prosecution of these quarrels all larger interests were forgotten: the much desired object of a new constitution of the Empire was never attained; the intellectual movement of the nation took a direction unfavourable to any common enterprise; and the Emperor, a man of much greater intelligence than vigour, was wearied and disgusted by the conflict of opinions, and abandoned the execution of his projects.

The influence of foreign nations, in whose disputes Germany was mixed up, once more gained the ascendancy. The different parties in Germany espoused the French differences as if they were their own, and Spain once more found partisans; Germans fought in all their battles.

The principal effect of the violent quarrels between the Protestant sects was to disgust many of their adherents; Catholicism, which had at first been conquered on the field of opinion but which in the mean time had formed itself into a system like that of the opposing faith, now regained the footing it had lost.

While the two Protestant parties were fighting, each for the exclusive possession of the domain they had gained in common, Catholicism re-established its influence in those countries which it had in great measure, but not wholly, lost.

A very considerable ally joined the Catholic cause. At first the nobles of Southern Germany were entirely Protestant, but they were alarmed at the rapid growth of the power of the princes, caused by the Reformation; for a time they endeavoured to counteract it by joining the extreme Protestant faction: and it is worthy of remark, that it was this that induced Bavaria wholly to espouse the Catholic system. But the Protestant princes had shown themselves no less dangerous to the independence of the nobility, and that body found that its sole safety lay in upholding the spiritual principalities. During the years 1563 to 1567 the nobles kept up a Protestant agitation, although hostile to the power of the princes; to the latter part of their agitation they still adhered, but for that very reason they espoused the interests of Catholicism.

From that time forward the counter-reformation made steady progress, especially in the spiritual dominions. The history of this movement is very important, but almost unknown. We have seen that it began in Fulda, and was continued in the Eichsfeld; the innovations made by Julius Hechter, Bishop of Würtzburg, had a great effect, and were soon imitated in the neighbouring bishopric of Bamberg. After the fall of the Elector Truchsess at Cologne, that archbishopric was reformed, and Mayence underwent the same changes at the hands of the Elector Schweickard. It was not till the beginning of the seventeenth century

that Protestants were excluded from offices, and Catholicism completely restored at Treves.

Meanwhile the Pope had found means to ally himself more and more closely with some of the German princes. Bavaria was the first, and was soon followed by Baden-Baden, Archduke Charles of Styria, and the Palatine of Neuburg. Even such petty princes as the Duke of Teschen contrived to make themselves conspicuous at the beginning of the seventeenth century by counter-reformations.

This was not effected by force alone, but quite as much by teaching: the change was mainly owing to the influence of the Jesuits, who contrived to get public opinion in their side.*

Simultaneous with this revival of Catholicity was the spread of its extreme opposite, Calvinism, though only in countries already Protestant; this put an end to all hopes of reconciliation. During this strife of religious parties all general interests were lost sight of: Sweden destroyed the trade on the Belt by incessant hostilities; Denmark impeded the passage through the Sound by arbitrary and heavy increase of the tolls; the first use made by the Dutch of a freedom which they owed in part to the assistance of Upper Germany, was to shut up the Rhine, which has never been reopened until this very day; England not only annihilated the privileges of the Guilds, but

* Rel^e dello Stato infelice della Germania, mandata dal nunzio Ferrero, Vescovo di Vercelli, MSS. in the Bib. Barberina, shortly after 1600: "Da alcuni anni in quà si è convertito alla nostra santa religione una grand^a quantità d' anime, ristorate le chiese, rivocate molte religioni di regolari alli loro antichi monasteri," etc.

captured German ships as they sailed along the Channel on their voyage to Spain, and at the same time English monopolists went to Embden in order to put the trade between Germany and England on a footing favourable only to the latter. The power of England advanced step by step, and it was suffered to advance unchecked; no resistance was attempted, no effectual measures taken; Germany was too disunited to do any thing. It was at this very time that the German States began to be separated from each other by custom-house duties. For a short time there was a project for appointing an Imperial Admiral to protect the interests of the Empire in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, but it was abandoned as soon as conceived.

Meanwhile the intestine divisions became more and more formidable.

In 1608, the Imperial decree had to be proclaimed in the presence of Catholics only, all the rest had left the Diet in anger. In the year 1613, the constituent princes declared the power of the majority to be an intolerable yoke; they refused to take part in any deliberation until all their grievances should be redressed. "This cut the Emperor to the heart," says the protocol of this Diet; and, indeed, it is painful to a German, even at this day, to dwell upon such a state of things.

The League and the Union were quite ready for war; the events in Bohemia were sufficient to make it break out.

This was the thirty years' war: from it Germany emerged poor, devastated, entirely deprived of its trade,

and at the mercy of foreign powers. It was dependent on other nations for its culture, nay, for its very existence.

What sacrifices, what mighty and enduring efforts did it cost the German people to emerge from this subjection, even externally, until at length the spirit of the nation was aroused, and the internal deliverance of Germany was effected!

Shall we not hence read a lesson which may hinder us, under similar circumstances, from exposing ourselves to similar perils?

THE END.

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